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Preface

I have been interested in the issue of preserving agricultural land for
nearly forty years. My wife and I represent five generations in
American agriculture, and we view agriculture as both a productive
activity and a way of life that has much to recommend it. As
operators of a sheep ranch in Montana's Gallatin Valley, we are well
aware of the problems of preserving agricultural land.
This professional and personal concern was the reason for
sponsoring the Vanishing Farmland Crisis: Critical Views of the
Movement to Preserve Agricultural Land, the working conference
that produced this volume and was funded by a grant from the
Carthage Foundation. In December 1981, twenty-four authors and
critics met at the Lone Mountain Guest Ranch in Big Sky, Montana,
to present and evaluate papers on various aspects of this important
policy issue. Both authors and critics were selected on the strength
of their previous research and publications. Each author presented
his paper, which was then evaluated by assigned reviewers.
A lively general discussion followed each presentation. While
consensus may be a sign of cowardice and weak-mindedness, a
'' sense of the meeting,'' as that term is used by the Society of
Friends, did emerge. It was generally agreed that the "vanishing
farmland crisis'' has been widely misunderstood and exaggerated.
This hook analyzes the prevailing hysteria, explains why it is
unnecessary, and presents dispassionate and well-documented counterviews.
We should understand and sympathize with those who view the
vii
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conversion of farmland as a crisis in the making. Issues involving
policy on natural resources are, after all, consistently complex and
emotional. More often than not, this conjunction offers a recipe for
confusion, error, and acrimonious debate and a propensity for
moralizing. The farmland issue clearly exhibits all of these characteristics. We trust that the reader will have greater understanding and
less concern after reading this volume.
Several individuals deserve thanks for their contributions to this
book. First, I acknowledge my early and very direct experience with
agriculture, compliments of my parents and my grandparents, who
introduced me not only to farming but also to the rural culture
associated with 4-H, the Grange, and the Farm Bureau. My friends
and relatives who are farmers and ranchers in the Midwest and in
Montana and Idaho have continued to increase my understanding
both of agriculture and of the subtle consequences of agricultural
policy. I am especially grateful to my wife, Ramona Marotz-Baden,
for sharing her experiences with me.
Cartoons aside, few people are much smarter than the ''dumb
American farmer.'' The survivor in that business stands high in
terms of intelligence, dedication to work and progress, and the ability
to take risks without being paralyzed by their potential consequences. Clearly, they deserve respect, admiration, and the dedication of this book.
Special thanks also go to Pierre Crosson and Ted Schultz.
Professor Crosson participated in the conference, but his introductory chapter was written only after he had reviewed the other
contributions. Professor Schultz unfortunately was not a participant
in the conference, but after reviewing the project, he also agreed to
submit a chapter.
I am especially grateful to Marianne Keddington, editor of the
Political Economy Research Center. Marianne demonstrates a competence and a commitment that are only rarely encountered. An
evaluation of her work is perhaps best presented by Professor Ted
Schultz, a Nobel-Prize-winning economist who has had a very long
and distinguished career, who said: ''I have over the years dealt with
many different editors, most of them from my point of view make the
mistake of changing the precise thought that I try to express as they
edit. Few of them have the ability of improving the sentence
structure so that what is said is clearer than I had put it. My
congratulations on your fine talent.''
This book is dedicated, then, to the American farmer and to
viii
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Marianne Keddington, who in this book helps to present their story
to those of the American scholarly community who work in agricultural policy.
John Baden, Director

Political Economy Research Center

ix
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1
The Issues
Pierre Crosson

Spurred by a rising demand for crops, particularly for export,
American farmers brought over 60 million acres of additional land
under cultivation between 1972 and 1982. 1 A survey by the United
States Soil Conservation Service (SCS) suggested that erosion on
the additional land was higher than on land already in crop production
and that many farmers were giving less attention to soil conservation
than previously. 2 Another SCS survey in 1977 indicated that the
annual rate of conversion of agricultural land to urban and other
nonagricultural uses had increased sharply from 1967 to 1975, as
compared with the previous ten years. 3
For many people this perception of events stirred deep concern
about the long-run adequacy of agricultural land in the United States.
The concern found expression in books and newspaper articles, 4 and
in 1981 it prompted Congress to authorize a major study of
agricultural land issues, the National Agricultural Lands Study
(NALS). Some of the NALS's suggestions for protecting agricultural
land were written into the 1981 Farm Bill and are now the official
policy of the United States government.
What, precisely, is the nature of the concern about agricultural
land, and how solid are the facts and arguments on which the concern
is based? Over the longer-term future, are market forces unlikely to
provide enough land, thus indicating a need for strong governmental
intervention to protect the presently available supply?
Many people who are interested in agricultural land issues
believe that these questions have not been properly addressed in
1

Pierre Crosson

discussions of the adequacy of agricultural land and in the deliberations of Congress. It is this belief that inspired this volume and that
unites the authors of the chapters contained in it.
Analysis of the discussion of agricultural land issues reveals two
sets of concerns about adequacy. One has to do with the nation's
capacity to meet future demands for food and fiber at reasonable
costs. These costs affect all participants in both domestic and foreign
markets and are fundamentally a national issue. The second set is
fundamentally local, having to do with the preservation of amenities
associated with open space and with the economics of shifts in land
from agricultural to nonagricultural uses. These local concerns
frequently are discussed in terms of ''maintaining orderly growth,''
and this is the rubric used here.
The distinction between national and local concerns is often
blurred in discussions of the adequacy of agricultural land, resulting in
confusion about both the analyses and the proper policy roles of
federal, state, and local governments. Issues of maintaining the
national capacity to produce food and fiber are a proper concern of
the federal government, while maintaining orderly growth poses a
different set of problems and is primarily a concern of state and local
governments.
THE CAPACITY ISSUE
When does the nation's capacity to produce food and fiber
become a problem? Participants in the discussion of the adequacy of
agricultural land vary in the answers they give to this question, but
most seem to have in mind costs of producing food and fiber. Many
argue that intergenerational equity requires that we manage the land
to avoid imposing higher production costs on future generations. This
may be an unduly restrictive definition of intergenerational equity.
Robert Solow, for example, argued that we meet our obligation to
the future if real per capita consumption is maintained. 5 Clearly, this
is consistent with some increase in food and fiber costs if there are
offsetting declines in costs of other consumer goods and services.
For purposes of this discussion, however, I accept the stricter
imperative that each generation should avoid imposing higher costs of
producing food and fiber on subsequent generations.
It follows that to assess the adequacy of agricultural land as an
issue of capacity, two questions must be asked: First, are production
costs for food and fiber increasing or likely to increase over the
2
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longer term? Second, what is the contribution of agricultural land to
the trend in production costs? These questions are considered, first,
with respect to the period since the end of World War II and, second,
with respect to the longer-term future.
II
Real prices received by farmers were lower from 1976 to 1980
than they were from 1950 to 1954 (see table 1.1). This was true for
all farm output and for the three main land-using crops: com,
soybeans, and wheat. Trends in prices are not a perfect measure of
cost trends, because prices are affected by transitory events and by
noncost factors, such as price-support programs. Nonetheless, the
price data are strong evidence that real costs of producing food and
fiber declined after World War II. By the standard adopted here,
agricultural capacity was not a problem during that period.
THE RECORD SINCE WORLD WAR

TABLE 1.1
REAL PRICES RECEIVED BY FARMERS, 1950-54 AND 1976-80

PERIOD

ALL COMMODITIES

1950-54
1976-80

(1967 = 100%)
136%
105

WHEAT
CORN
SOYBEANS
(IN DOLLARS PER BUSHEL)
2.65
1.95
3.36
1.53
1.14
3.22

United States, Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics (Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1972, 1981).
NOTE: Nominal commodity prices and the index for all commodity prices have been deflated by
the Consumer Price Index, 1967 = 100%.

SOURCE:

The contribution of land to production costs depends on the
demand for land and on the quality and quantity of the land available at
various prices. Data and space do not permit a detailed analysis of
land costs, but some useful insights are possible. Average land
quality is affected over time by shifts in production among soils of
varying quality and by soil erosion. A cautious generalization is that in
the last forty years, shifts in crop production from the thin, relatively
infertile soils of New England, the eastern Piedmont, and the
Southeast to the deeper, richer soils of the Midwest and the
Mississippi Delta probably tended to improve average soil quality.
In this volume, Schultz, drawing on a study by Mayer, 6 argues
that soil erosion has declined over the last several decades. I came to
the same conclusion, 7 although I noted that erosion probably in3
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creased in the 1970s because of the expansion of land in crops.
Although erosion evidently declined after World War II, it was high
enough to depress the growth of com and soybean yields by a small
but significant amount. 8 Specifically, because of erosion, com and
soybean yields grew an estimated 4 percent less from 1950 to 1980
than they would have otherwise. Wheat yields, also considered in the
analysis, were unaffected by erosion. For com and soybeans,
however, erosion 1 s effect on land quality must have tended to
increase production costs. Shifts in production to better-quality land
may have tended to offset this cost-increasing tendency. The net
outcome is uncertain, but overall the cost effect of changes in land
quality must have been small.
Some of the discussion of the adequacy of agricultural land
seems to assume that the quantity of such land is in fixed supply, so
that conversions to nonagricultural uses inevitably reduce the amount
available for agriculture. This, of course, is a misconception, as
Schultz, Gardner, and Luttrell point out in this volume. Although the
total land mass of the country is fixed, only about 40 percent of it is in
farms, and only about one-third of that is in harvested cropland. 9
Land shifts among uses, moving into those for which rates of return
are highest. Among agricultural uses, there was a net shift of land out
of crops from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, followed by a net
increase until 1982, when the amount of land in harvested crops was
at a record high. 10 There is nothing in this record to suggest that
constraints on the quantity of agricultural land tended to increase
production costs.
Thus, changes in land quality and quantity since the end of World
War II appear to have had little effect on the costs of producing food
and fiber. That these costs nonetheless declined points up the fallacy
of focusing just on land (or on any other single production factor) in
considering the capacity issue. The decline in costs reflected the
technological revolution that has transformed American agriculture
over the past several decades. The main reasons for that transformation are well known: a massive substitution of knowledge and other
forms of improved capital for land and, especially, labor. As a
consequence, total crop production increased by 67 percent between
the periods 1950-54 and 1976-80; crop output per acre, by 69
percent; total output per hour of labor, by 394 percent; and total
productivity (ratio of total output to total input), by 62 percent. 11 The
key point here is that at the margin, technology can substitute for
land in the production process. Should reductions in either the quality
or quantity of land threaten to increase production costs, technologi4
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cal advance may permit substitution of more abundant or more
productive resources, thus staving off the increase in cost.
FUTURE CAPACITY

Few, if any, of those who are concerned about agricultural land
as a constraint on capacity argue that the constraint has so far been
operative, no doubt because of the record just summarized. Instead,
the focus is on the future, and the concern is that the demand for
agricultural land will increase faster than the supply, resulting
inevitably in higher production costs and violation of the commitment
to intergenerational equity. The recommended responses, as in the
NALS, are greater efforts to control soil erosion and stronger
measures to slow the conversion of agricultural land to nonagricultural uses.
Two issues arise: First, what is the likelihood that the demand
for land will outrun the supply, taking into account both qualitative
and quantitative aspects of supply? Second, if the likelihood is high,
are the recommended responses the most appropriate ones?
Speculation about future pressure on the land typically begins
with consideration of prospective growth in the demand for crops.
Until the early l 980s it generally was expected that demand would
continue to grow briskly. It is noteworthy that the NALS assumed
that there would be unusually fast growth in the demand for crops,
and this was a major reason for the study' s finding that there was a
sharply rising pressure on the land. 12 At this writing, these expectations have been considerably dampened. Exports had been the
dynamic element in demand, and these declined in 1982 and 1983,
reflecting the combined effect of the world recession beginning in
1981, the partial embargo by the United States on grain exports to
the Soviet Union, and the high foreign-exchange value of the dollar. If
the demand for exports does not revive strongly, American agriculture will not confront any issue over capacity, as defined here.
Assuming recovery in the world economy and some decline in United
States interest rates, however, the demand for exports will probably
strengthen. In any case, continued growth in the demand for crops
over the next several decades is assumed here for purposes of
discussion.
The impact of a rising demand for crops on the demand for land
depends crucially on the pace and nature of technological change. As
indicated above, technological change since the end of World War II
has been fast and has saved land. Yields increased rapidly, and the
amount of land in crops declined from the late 1940s to the early
5
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FIGURE 1.1
ILLUSTRATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOIL DEPTH AND CROP YIELD

Crop

Yield

T
Soil Depth
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1970s, despite a substantial increase in crop production. From the
early l 970s until the early 1980s, however, crop yields grew more
slowly than during the l 950s and 1960s .13 The reasons for this and
whether it presaged a downward break in trend or only a momentary
interruption have been much discussed. 14 I have argued that in the
future, increases in prices for energy and fertilizer will probably
induce American farmers to adopt relatively land-intensive technologies, as they did in the 1970s. The result would be a relatively slow
growth in yields, as during the 1970s, and an increasing demand for
land to accommodate rising demand for crops. Others, notably Simon
in this volume, regard the increase in energy prices during the 1970s
as a blip on the long-term declining trend and assume that the trend
will soon reassert itself. Since energy and energy-intensive nitrogen
fertilizer are the key land-saving inputs, an implication of Simon's
assumption is that land-saving technologies will once again becomeattractive to American farmers. In this case, future growth in yields
will more closely resemble the relatively fast growth during the
1950s and 1960s than the relatively slow growth during the 1970s.
Should this occur, any growth in the demand for crops that could
reasonably be expected would stimulate little if any increase in the
demand for land.
Thus, the future agricultural demand for land is highly problematical. The future supply, both in its qualitative and quantitative
aspects, seems to be less so. Studies done in 1980 in connection with
the Resource Conservation Assessment (RCA) of the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) indicated that, over the next fifty
years, the continuation of 1977 rates of erosion would reduce crop
yields by about 8 percent from what they otherwise would be. 15 A
model developed by soil scientists at the University of Minnesota
showed that continuation of 1977 rates of erosion for one hundred
years would reduce yields by 5 to 10 percent from what they
otherwise would be .16
These results suggest that current rates of erosion present only
a small threat to the future productivity of the land. The threat no
doubt would grow should erosion increase, as it probably would if the
growing demand for crops were to induce farmers to bring substantially more land under crops. Even a doubling of the loss in
productivity, however, would probably have little perceptible effect
on costs of crop production unless technological advance should fall
far below that experienced over the last forty years. Unless there is a
failure of technology, impairment of land quality would not appear to
be a major issue.
7
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Questions concerning the future quantity of agricultural land
probably have aroused more controversy than any other aspect of
the issue of adequacy. The controversy has focused on rates of
conversion of agricultural land to nonagricultural uses and what these
may portend for future supply. Using data from a 1975 survey by the
SCS, the NALS argued that the annual rate of conversion had jumped
from less than one million acres per year from 1958 to 1967 to three
million acres per year from 1967 to 1975, almost one million of which
was either cropland or potential cropland. In this volume, Simon and
Fischel argue persuasively that the apparent increase in the conversion rate was an illusion, probably reflecting differences in definitions
between the 1967 and 1975 surveys. 17 Their argument was confirmed, at least in part, by Jerry Lee, director of the Inventory and
Monitoring Division of the SCS, in a seminar given in Washington,
D.C., on 22 November 1983. Reporting some of the results of the
1982 National Resources Inventory (NRI), Lee stated that the
estimate of urban land in the 1975 survey was erroneously high,
although he did not say by how much. Consequently, the NALS
estimate of the rate of conversion of agricultural land to nonagricultural uses between 1967 and 1975 was overstated. Lee also
indicated that the rate of conversion from 1975 to 1982 was about the
same as from 1967 to 1975.
Both the 1977 and the 1982 NRis showed that the nation had
about 415 million acres of cropland. The 1977 NRI also indicated that
about 125 million acres of land in pasture, range, and forest had high
or medium potential for conversion to crops. (Potential cropland data
from the 1982 NRI were not available at this writing.) Lee's report of
1982 NRI results suggests that current rates of conversion of
cropland and potential cropland are well under one million acres per
year, and there is reason to believe that the rate will decline over the
next several decades. 18 Consequently, when measured against
present and potential cropland of some 540 million acres, prospective
rates of conversion to nonagricultural uses would seem to pose little
threat to the future supply of cropland. 19 I conclude that neither soil
erosion nor conversion to nonagricultural uses, nor the two in
combination, would pose a serious threat to the future supply of
agricultural land. If pressure on the land threatens an increase in
costs, this almost surely will arise from the demand side, reflecting a
combination of a relatively fast growth in demand for crops and a
relatively slow advance in land-saving technologies. It is by no means
certain that this combination will emerge, but for the sake of
argument let us suppose that it will. As a society, how should we
8
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respond? In particular, what role should be assigned to policies to
reduce soil erosion and to slow the conversion of agricultural land?
Since the threat of erosion to productivity appears to be small,
policies to reduce the threat would not seem to need a high priority.
The real issue here, however, is whether the amount of soil
conservation that farmers undertake voluntarily is equal to the
amount that is consistent with society's interest in the land. Even
-though the erosion-induced loss in productivity may be small, it may
still be in society's interest to reduce it.
Here Schultz's admonition at the end of his chapter in this
volume is relevant: '' Above all, let us not sell short the sell-interest
of farm people in their soil resources.'' The land is the farmer's most
important single asset, and he has more incentive to protect it against
loss than anyone else has. What are the arguments for believing that
the protection he voluntarily provides would be less than socially
optimal? One set of arguments that is typically advanced has to do
with various kinds of market failure stemming from ignorance about
erosion's effects on productivity, about other future events that will
affect the demand for and supply of land, and about such institutional
conditions as short-term leasing and credit rationing.
In a review of these arguments, I concluded that with one
exception they are shaky at best. 20 Ignorance about the future is
inherent in the nature of things; it is not evidence per se of market
failure. In particular, as Pasour argues in this volume, there is no
reason to believe that those who would intervene in the land market
are less ignorant than are farmers about future conditions regarding
the supply of and demand for land. On the contrary, farmers are
closer to the land market than anyone else is, and they have powerful
incentives to inform themselves about it.
The one argument about market failure that has merit is the one
based on the farmers' ignorance about the long-term effects of
erosion on productivity. Farmers may be less ignorant of these
effects than anyone else, but they may still not be as knowledgeable
as, in the public interest, they could be. Farmers are not soil
scientists. Most of their knowledge about the relationships between
erosion and productivity comes from their own experience and that of
their neighbors. But this experience may be a poor guide to the
future.
Evidence suggests that on many soils the curve relating erosion
to productivity is like the one shown in figure 1.1. A farmer with soil
depth T may have experienced high erosion for years without having
any perceptible effect on yields. He may believe that he can continue
9
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to lose soil at the old rate without paying any penalty in yield, but he
would be quite wrong. Because of year-to-year weather-induced
variations in yields and of technological advance, he may find himself
well down on the slope of the depth/yield curve before realizing what
his problem is. As he was moving toward T, the present value of
future losses in yield was in fact increasing rapidly, but his experience
did not provide any indication of this. Had he known, he probably
would have made plans to bring erosion under control at soil depth T,
or possibly before.
The research needed to develop information about relationships
between erosion and productivity is expensive, and it is unlikely that
any farmer or group of farmers could exclude others for long from the
economic gains that this would provide. That is, the social payoff for
the information would probably exceed the private payoff. This
makes a case for public investment in research to develop the
information.
In principle, intergenerational equity could provide an argument
for more soil conservation than farmers, responding to market
signals, would voluntarily undertake. Market failure is not the issue
here. Intergenerational equity has to do with the distribution of
income between generations. Market failure has to do with the less
than socially optimal allocation of resources within a given income
distribution. Public intervention in soil conservation in order to
c;;ecure intergenerational equity thus does not rest on arguments
regarding market failure, nor does it require the assumption that the
intervenors are more knowledgeable about the future than are
participants in the market. The rationale for public intervention is
that since the play of the market reflects only the interests and values
of the present generation, it cannot be assumed to satisfactorily
protect the interests of those who will come afterwards.
The concept of intergenerational equity raises both philosophical
and empirical issues. One may grant the legitimacy of the concept yet
find great difficulty in giving it operational content. In the present
case, since farmers can be depended on to do much of society's work
in protecting productivity and since the erosion threat seems small,
the extra effort needed to assure intergenerational equity would
probably be smaller still.
Public intervention to slow the conversion of agricultural land to
nonagricultural uses is not a promising response to increasing
pressure on the land. In this volume, Fischel cites evidence that
around urban areas, conversion is sensitive to relative rates of return
to the land from agricultural and nonagricultural uses. If the relative
10

THE ISSUES

value of the land in agriculture rises, the market can be counted on to
slow the shift to other uses. Gardner also emphasizes the role of the
market in allocating land among competing uses.
Beyond this, as Gardner points out, public intervention to slow
the rate of conversion would be expensive and would raise questions
of equity. It also would contribute little to solving the problem of
increasing pressure on the land. As noted above, if the problem
emerges, it will be because of increasing demand for land in
agriculture, particularly for crop production. In work done at Resources for the Future, it was estimated that over the next several
decades, farmers might demand an additional 60 million acres of
cropland. 21 During the same period, additional demand for cropland
for nonagricultural uses probably will not exceed 20 million acres. Let
us suppose that a massive effort to slow the rate of conversion would
reduce this to 10 million acres. The contribution toward meeting the
increased demand for land for crop production clearly would be small.
It would also be expensive. The 10 million acres that would not be
converted would have earned substantially more in nonagricultural
uses. The failure to convert would sacrifice that additional income.
The failure to convert would also affect the distribution of
income, raising questions of equity. Farmers would be deprived of
capital gains in land unless they were somehow compensated.
Whether they were or not, the increased scarcity of nonagricultural
land would force up rents, rewarding holders of such land at the
expense of others who were purchasing its services. No particular
distribution of income is sacrosanct, but public measures to change
the distribution inevitably raise questions of justice. It is not at all
clear that the discussion about preserving agricultural land has given
this issue the attention it deserves.
A future problem of capacity for American agriculture cannot be
ruled out, but public policies to slow the conversion of agricultural
land would be a poor response to the problem. Erosion-induced loss
in productivity would not be apt to contribute much to the problem;
so the case is weak for heroic measures to reduce erosion beyond
those that farmers voluntarily undertake. There is a much stronger
case, however, for publicly supported research on relationships
between erosion and productivity that would provide farmers with
better information about the long-term effects of erosion on productivity. 22
Since any future problem of capacity will most likely arise
because the growth in demand for crops outpaces the development of
land-saving technology, restraining the growth of demand for ex11
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ports, in principle, could ease the pressure. However, this would cut
against the grain of United States commitments to freer markets and
freer trade. A more promising response would be to invest more in
the development of land-saving technology. Rising pressure on the
land would induce the private sector to undertake some of this.
However, some promising lines of development-for example, improvements in photosynthetic efficiency and biological fixation of
nitrogen-require advances in basic science. It is difficult for private
investors to capture all the benefits from such advances, which
indicates that there is a role for public investment in this kind of
research.
Protecting future generations against rising costs of food and
fiber is a legitimate objective for each generation of Americans, and
there is a role for federal governmental policies to achieve it. But
development of new technology, not preservation of agricultural
land, is the better way.
MAINTAINING ORDERLY GROWTH
Apart from the issue of capacity, the drive to preserve agricultural land is fueled by a desire to protect local amenities that are
associated with open space and to avoid some of the economic and
aesthetic costs that result from urban sprawl. All of the contributors
to this volume who address the issue (Gardner, Nelson, and Baden)
recognize that local land markets cannot be counted on to provide the
socially optimal amount of scenic amenities. E. N. Castle also argues
the existence of this particular kind of market failure. 23 It results
from the ''public goods'' nature of the scenic amenities that are
provided by local open space: the owners of the land cannot charge
for the visual pleasures they provide, nor does any individual's
enjoyment of the view detract from that of anyone else's. Land
values thus do not reflect these amenities; so they do not affect
decisions to convert the land to nonagricultural uses. To the extent
that this occurs, more land is converted than is socially optimal, thus
making a case in principle for public intervention to slow the rate of
conversion.
In this volume, Nelson argues that there is a collective property
right in local scenic amenities and that land-use zoning is an
institutional device that is designed to protect the right against failure
in the land market. The legitimacy of zoning for this purpose seems
to be beyond serious question. Of course, as urban economic growth
12

THE ISSUES

occurs, the opportunity cost of locally preserved open space will
probably increase, but the increasing congestion that is associated
with growth may also increase the amenity value of the space. Zoning
processes, as they affect alternative uses of the land, should have
sufficient flexibility to adjust to these dynamics of urban growth.
Publicly funded systems of roads and highways and the economics of ownership of automobiles have combined to promote landextensive patterns of residence and economic activity in urban areas.
Urban sprawl is the somewhat pejorative name for this pattern. The
unit costs of public services are higher with this pattern than with
more compact settlement. The higher costs cannot properly be
ascribed to failure in the land market. But since they result in good
part from one kind of public action-subsidization of road systemsthere is a case for another kind of public action-zoning-to achieve
more compact settlement. Zoning some land for agriculture, of
course, is one way to achieve this.
So-called urban encroachment-the spread of nonfarm people
and activities into farming areas-can impose costs on farmers. Dogs
attack farm animals, people tramp through cultivated fields, and
ordinances are passed against the noises that are associated with
farm machinery and against the spray application of pesticides. Some
states (New York is a leader) have passed legislation to protect
farmers against these encroachments. The objective is to maintain
the profitability of farming in the threatened areas, and where this
legislation succeeds, it probably slows the conversion of land to
nonagricultural uses.
The rationale for "right-to-farm" legislation is not failure in the
land market; it is equity. While not formulated in so many words, it
rests on the argument that farmers were there first and should be
protected against damages imposed on them by latecomers. As in the
case of zoning, the issue arises from conflicting property rights.
Right-to-farm legislation grants precedence to the property rights of
farmers.
Enough has been said to make the point that local land markets
will not necessarily achieve the several objectives that local people
have in mind when they advocate land-use planning to achieve
'' orderly growth.'' Two problems arise, however, in implementing
these planning enterprises. One involves unwanted results despite
the best of intentions. Fischel notes that zoning against moreintensive land use on the edge of urban areas can result in' 'leapfrog''
development to areas further out on the fringe, precisely the kind of
''urban sprawl'' that the advocates of orderly growth wish to avoid.
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The other problem arises when the argument for preserving
farmland to "promote orderly growth" is in fact used as a cloak for
protection of vested interests. Fischel argues that this is the prime
motive behind the movement to preserve farmland. The ''real
force" behind the movement, he asserts, is "local anti-development
interests" that are intent on protecting themselves against crowding
and other disagreeable concomitants of growth. One need not accept
Fischel's indictment in toto-1, for one, do not-to recognize the
potential for skillful and determined people to use for their own
purposes the political processes that are designed to serve the public
interest. But the problem, of course, is not confined to preserving
farmland. The abuse of political power is as old as mankind, and its
control is the central problem of all systems of government. Experience shows that strong democratic institutions offer the best, though
still imperfect, protection against abuse. The question to ask about
the movement to preserve farmland is whether decisions to restrict
conversion flow from genuinely democratic processes. Where they
do, the movement can serve legitimate local interests. Where they
do not, it is fraudulent and has much to answer for.
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The Market Allocation of Land
to Agriculture
B. Delworth Gardner

Since antiquity, beginning in the Nile Valley, Mesopotamia, and the
valley of the Indus River, some of the world's best agricultural land
has been converted to urban uses, especially at the urban-rural
fringe. 1 Successful farming efforts initially stimulate agriculturally
related economic activities, such as marketing and trade; then
farmers are able to produce enough surplus on good land to support a
nonfarm population and to allow investment in nonagricultural industries. 2 Furthermore, land that is most conducive to agricultural
production-that is, land favored by a moderate climate and without
too much slope-is also the land that is most attractive for nonagricultural development.
During the 1950s and l 960s, when large agricultural surpluses
were common, the federal government began to subsidize the
retirement and nonuse of land. There was not much concern during
those years about the conversion of farmland to nonfarm uses. In the
mid 1970s, however, agricultural exports increased dramatically,
commodity prices rose sharply, surpluses disappeared, and there
was a growing concern that the nation's cropland base might be
limited. Public opinion swung from one extreme to the other, and
there is now a spate of appeals and studies purporting to show that
the nation has a serious shortage of agricultural land.
The National Agricultural Lands Study (NALS) argues that since
the mid l 960s, American farmland has been converted to nonagricultural uses at a rate of about 3 million acres a year, with 1
million of those acres allegedly taken from the cropland base. 3 The
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annual loss of 3 million acres represents a half-section of farmland
every hour; a million acres of cropland from the plow to the bulldozer
represents a half-mile strip from New York to California. 4 Former
Secretary of Agriculture Bob Bergland expressed the dimensions of
his concern: "In my lifetime, we've paved over the equivalent of all
the cropland in Ohio. Before this century is out, we will pave over an
area the size of Indiana. '' 5
Coupled with this concern is the implication that the free market
is no longer able to handle the allocation of land efficiently. Some
think that social intervention is the best available way to remedy the
misallocations that would occur under the market system. State,
county, and local governments have used a variety of approaches to
halt the process of conversion, including comprehensive planning,
agricultural zoning, agricultural districting, purchases of development
rights, restrictions on the use of purchased or leased land, transfer of
development rights, differential tax assessment, development permits, and right-to-farm legislation. 6
The federal government has also tried to protect the nation's
farmland. In 1976, for example, the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) directed federal agencies to "consider the loss of
prime and unique farmland'' in preparing environmental-impact
reports for their projects. 7 Special provisions have been enacted in
the Internal Revenue Code to lighten the burden of income and
estate taxes for farm families, indirectly helping them to keep their
land in farm use. The United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) has also declared its support of the preservation of prime
agricultural land. After studying the results of the 1975 Seminar on
Retention of Prime Lands, the subcommittees of the USDA's Land
Use Committee came up with several recommendations, the first of
which is: "USDA should take a major, defined, and well promoted
role in the national questions of utilization, enhancement and retention of agricultural lands as an advocate of retaining the maximum
possible base for the production of food, fiber, and timber products,
and minimizing actions that will diminish the nation's capacity to
produce these essential commodities.'' 8 This is surely not meant to
be taken literally, for actual maximization would require stopping all
development that competes with agriculture for land. Still, since
1975, it has become increasingly clear that many persons in the
USDA support the retention of prime agricultural land by extramarket means.
When social action is called for to retain prime land in agricultural
use, it is on the assumption that the land market cannot efficiently
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allocate land resources among competing uses. Tax preference
provisions that have been enacted to make it less costly to use land
for agricultural purposes do not completely remove the land from the
market. Changes in use could still occur if value differ~ntials were to
become great enough to offset the production-cost advantage created by the preference. The proposed plans for preserving prime
land, however, are quite different. They would remove decisions
made on land allocation from the market entirely by using productivity criteria in qualifying land for preservation and by granting to
designated boards the power for making exemptions and changes in
use.

DEFINING PRIME AGRICULTURAL LAND
Historically, prime agricultural land has been defined by its
physical characteristics: the land ''that ranks first in importance or is
of highest quality for production of food and fiber.'' 9 Over the years,
various systems for classifying land have been devised to determine
whether a parcel is "prime." The Storie Index, designed primarily
for use in California, considers only soil factors and defines prime
agricultural land as that ranking between 80 and 100 points, or 60 and
100, or even 50 and 100. 10 The Land Capability Classification (LCC)
of the USDA's Soil Conservation Service (SCS) is the best known
and most widely used system. 11 Under LCC, prime land has been
defined as that in classes I, I and II, II, or III. Both systems use
approximately the same soil factors, but they combine and weight
them differently. LCC uses two climatic variables as well. One of the
problems with using the two systems is that occasionally land that is
classed as prime under one may not be so classed under the other.
In applying the criteria from either system, a moderate level of
management is assumed but the profitability of the land is not
considered. Noting the obvious absence of economic criteria from
either index, John Reganold made a beginning in determining the
connection between the physical characteristics of a parcel and its
actual productivity. 12 On 22,000 acres in the San Joaquin Valley he
found statistically significant relationships between high land ratings
on LCC or the Storie Index and low input-output ratios and concluded
that it was important to preserve the prime lands; that is, those lands
that require less input (particularly from petroleum products) in order
to obtain a given output.
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William Wood emphasized the need to consider characteristics
other than physical ones in the designation of prime land. 13 The
location of the land (for example, its proximity to market or
processing facilities) is an extremely important consideration. Presence of air pollution can inhibit production on the best of soils. Some
lands are suitable for the production of fifty to one hundred crops
(adaptability), others for just one or two. Some sites are uniquely
suited for a particular commodity. Soils that are high in loam content
and permeability may rank high on LCC and the Storie Index but be
totally unsuited for growing rice. If land is to be designated as prime
for policy purposes, then land must be evaluated on the basis of all
relevant variables, not just soil and climate.
Setting aside these definitional difficulties for the moment, at
least four reasons have been advanced for the preservation of prime
land: (1) the need for sufficient food and fiber at reasonable prices to
meet the nutritional requirements of a growing national and world
population; (2) local economic benefits that derive from a viable
agricultural industry; (3) more efficient, orderly, and fiscally sound
urban development (as opposed to scattered, leapfrog development);
and (4) open space and other environmental amenities that accrue
chiefly to urban residents. Given that these benefits will be achieved
by retaining certain lands in agriculture, what is the rationale for
extramarket social action? What is the nature of the alleged failure of
the market to allocate socially optimal quantities to agricultural use?
To move toward an answer, it is useful to relate the benefits that may
be derived from the use of agricultural land to an analysis of the
market failure and to the theory of market allocation of resources.
MARKET FAILURE AND THE RETENTION OF PRIME LAND
Economists have identifed four major sources of market failure:
(1) departures from a perfectly competitive market, (2) merit goods,
(3) distortions in prices caused by public policies of various kinds, and
(4) collective or public goods and externalities. It is useful to consider
each of these in light of the benefits from the retention of agricultural
land.
DEPARTURES FROM A PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKET

The model of perfect competition calls for input and output
markets that operate free from any interference, a large number of
buyers and sellers of a homogeneous product that precludes control
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over price, an easy (free) entry and exit from the industry, and
consumers and producers who are endowed with perfect market
information. Obviously, the ideal market does not exist, but it is
thought that the food-and-fiber sector comes closer to the ideal than
any other. Each unprocessed farm product, from wheat to tomatoes,
is a homogeneous commodity, at least when compared with most
other outputs of our modem industrial society. Farmers in general
are "price takers," who have little control over the prices that they
receive. Reflecting the competitive nature of agriculture, prices for
farm products adjust rapidly to changing conditions in supply and
demand unless they are constrained by target prices and loan rates or
other devices of public policy.
The enormous increases in prices for agricultural land that
occurred before 1981 were due principally to expectations of higher
prices for food and fiber at the farm gate, although other factors were
also at work. Because of the severe recession in the agricultural
sector in 1981 and 1982, land prices have declined in many parts of
the country. If the situation turns around and if land prices are
expected to rise again, there is nothing inherent in the land market
that would prevent these expectations from yielding even higher
prices for land. The more productive the land, the higher the price
for agricultural land can be expected to be and the more competitive
agriculture will be for land vis-a-vis other uses for land. The greater
the comparative advantage of American agriculture and the fewer the
impediments to free world trade in agricultural commodities, the
greater will be the demand facing our producers, the higher will be
the profitability of producing food, and the stronger will be the
competitive position of agricultural producers who bid for prime land.
In fact, there appear to have been no advocates of retaining
prime land who have justified agricultural zoning on the grounds that
land markets have been monopolized or monopsonized, although the
issue of speculation is often raised. The land "speculator" is the
person who makes his living predicting the future more accurately
than the rest of us. He has an incentive to do his job well, and market
prices reflect his anticipations of future scarcity. What reasons can be
advanced, however, for believing that a part-time member of an
agricultural board or even a professional land-use planner can do a
better job of predicting the future and of reliably estimating land
values?
Another alleged departure from the perfectly competitive market is that high prices for land and other capital costs have erected a
serious barrier for those who wish to begin farming. Granted,
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formidable obstacles do exist for some, but the number of part-time
farmers and of new farmers who have off-farm income is growing.
Also, a dramatic increase in part ownerships of the operating units
has occurred in cases where entry costs are reduced by leasing at
least part of the land.
The assumption of perfect market information on inputs, outputs, or land values is certainly not met within the farming sector.
Because the market is an institution in which preferences can be
freely expressed, although these preferences are constrained by
limits on purchasing power, there is always some uncertainty
associated with market allocation. 14 There is also uncertainty involved with allocation decisions made by governmental fiat, probably
more so than by market processes. It is almost beyond dispute that
there will be more freedom of choice in the market and that there will
be better information about foregone alternatives. Thus, there
seems to be no justification for removing from the market the
decisions made on land allocation because of radical departures from
the perfectly competitive market.
MERIT GOODS

It is sometimes argued that food is such a basic human need that
the private land market should not be allowed to determine the
acreage devoted to production of food. Food and fiber should be
provided to all as a basic right and should not be governed by market
criteria. 15 If one believes that food and fiber are somehow special, as
safety and education apparently are, then a cheap food policy (setting
prices below marginal costs of supply) may be recommended. Even
with such a policy, however, the food still ought to be produced with
an eye toward minimizing the costs to society. Some system will be
required to establish land values both within agriculture and between
agricultural and other uses. It is not easy to see how this can be
better accomplished by removing the allocation of land from the
market and instead using noneconomic criteria in making these
allocations.
DISTORTIONS TO PRICES CAUSED BY PUBLIC POLICIES

Numerous distortions in prices are caused by public policies,
from environmental and safety regulations to policies on agricultural
income and prices. Two especially significant and vexing practices
that affect the allocation and ownership of land are (1) the taxation of
real property by local government and (2) the provisions in the
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Internal Revenue Code that make agricultural land an attractive way
of holding wealth.
The first of these may discrinnnate against holding land in (lowvalued) agricultural use if property taxes are based on the land's
market value for potential development. There have been, however,
numerous attempts to alleviate this bias toward development by
taxing property according to its use value rather than its market
value. One such attempt is the California Land Conservation Act of
1965 (the Williamson Act), whereby the landowner contracts to keep
his holdings in agricultural use for a ten-year period in return for
having it taxed at its agricultural-use value. Another is contained in
the federal Tax Reform Act of 1976, which enables qualifying
farmland to be taxed at its use rather than its market value for
purposes of estate taxes.
The second practice includes various Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) regulations that provide tax loopholes that make it especially
profitable to own agricultural land. It is quite clear that IRS regulations have had a significant impact on who owns agricultural land, if
not on the aggregate acreage in agricultural use.
Although both practices distort land prices and in that sense
create a market failure, neither results in having decisions on land
allocation completely removed from the marketplace. If the price
differential between uses is sufficiently large, even given the distortions created by public policy, land use will be induced to change
accordingly.
COLLECTIVE

Goons AND EXTERNALITIES

Collective (public) goods have two fundamental characteristics:
(1) it is impossible to exclude consumers who do not pay for the good
in question, and (2) one consumer can consume the good without
reducing the quantity that is available for other consumers. 16 National defense is probably the example that is most frequently cited; a
lighthouse is another. Market failure occurs because the cost of
extending the consumption of the good to yet another person is zero;
and at zero price, no entrepreneur would be willing to invest in
supplying the good.
External effects may be defined as unpriced or improperly
priced effects that emanate from production or consumption activities
that impinge on the welfare of third parties . 17 Such externalities may
be positive or negative. They permeate our everyday lives, from a
neighbor's loud radio or barking dog to painting his house or planting
flowers; from a factory's smoke or a polluted stream to the
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beekeeper's contribution in pollinating the neighboring apple orchard. The market failure results because none of these effect~
comes with a price tag.
A review of the four benefits derived from land in agricultural
use will indicate which, if any, involves a collective good or external
effect kind of market failure.
Food and fiber. Food and fiber products are private goods that
have no significant external effects in their consumption. Some
externalities do exist in production, however, such as in burning
straw, dusting crops, or chemical pollution that cannot be traced to a
particular source. To improve the welfare of society by reducing such
externalities may involve the use of less rather than more prime land.
By the same token, the preservation of prime land might generate
still more externalities. Thus, that food and fiber production involves
externalities certainly cannot be used as an argument for preservation of prime land.
Economic benefits from a viable agriculture. Decision makers in
agriculture-for example, farm operators, processors, farm suppliers, transporters, financial firms, university professors in agricultural fields, and personnel in governmental agencies-have
obvious stakes in a viable and stable industry. Landowners are
directly affected by the issue of retaining prime land. If land is
immobilized in agricultural use, they forfeit the direct wealth gains in
price appreciation that would have occurred with the possibility of
changing use in a free market. Others are affected more indirectly,
although the positive or negative impacts on wealth could be
substantial for them also. Both the direct and indirect impacts of
policies on retaining agricultural land, however, are primarily pecuniary, or "price effects," and thus do not qualify as nonpriced
collective goods or relevant externalities in justifying interference
with the land market.
Orderly urban development. Pecuniary effects are also associated with producing a more efficient, orderly, and fiscally sound
urban development by using agricultural zoning. If prime agricultural
land cannot be developed for urban purposes, demand will shift to
parcels that are not so zoned, thus conferring wealth gains on the
owners of these parcels. Whether the result is a more or less
efficient urban development depends on where these parcels are, on
how efficient they are in producing urban amenities, on what the
costs are of bringing public utilities and transport to these parcels,
and so forth. It is not obvious, in principle, that urban ''leapfrogging''
will be reduced over what the free market would have produced.
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Much also depends on jurisdictional boundaries and on the ability of
local governments to tax the parcels affected and to charge the
average costs of supplying public services. In any case, most of these
impacts are also pecuniary and thus offer at best only a weak
justification for interference with the land market.
Open spaces and environmental amenities. Market failure is most
apparent in the creation of open space and environmental amenities.
The enjoyment of a waving field of grain, a shady walnut orchard, a
green pasture with mares and foals, or a hillside vineyard obviously
meets the criteria of a collective good and offers external benefits.
Since there are no market signals, there is little evidence as to how
much these amenities are worth; but it seems clear that because of
their greater scarcity, their value would be much higher in Los
Angeles County than in central Wyoming. In principle, the market
will not provide the optimal quantity of these amenities, and there
may be some justification for social action to remedy this market
failure.
In summary, the only market failure that seemingly justifies
social intervention in the land market is the provision of open space
as a collective good. There is no reason to think, however, that any
of the schemes to retain prime agricultural land will provide the
optimal amount of open space for urban recreators. The proposals
would preserve land on the basis of physical characteristics without
taking location into consideration, whereas the location of a parcel is
the primary criterion for the provision of open spaces. If there is a
critical shortage of open space, then a sensible and efficient solution
would call for establishing criteria to select open space and would
either zone on that basis or publicly acquire the requisite lands in the
market.

EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IMPLICATIONS
EFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS

The effect of the proposals for retaining prime land is to remove
from the market the decisions made on land allocation and to give
them to local or state planning councils. There are many reasons for
believing that the efficiency costs of taking this step will not be
inconsequential.
Consider two parcels of land. 18 Parcel A generates $100 per
acre in annual net agricultural revenue and has the potential of
generating $150 in annual net returns in some developed use. Parcel
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B returns $90 in agriculture annually and a potential $130 in the
developed use. Assuming a capitalization rate of 10 percent and a
free market, a developer would have to pay an agricultural owner at
least $1,000 per acre for parcel A in order to acquire an asset worth
$1,500 per acre to him in the developed use. For parcel B he would
have to pay only $900 per acre to capture $1,300 per acre. The
amount of his potential wealth gain is $500 per acre in the case of A
and $400 in the case of B. Thus, a rational developer would use the
land market to choose parcel A for development, even though the
price is higher; and that choice would be socially optimal, assuming
no market imperfections.
A planning board, however, looking only at agricultural productivity, necessitated by some criterion on prime land, would probably
choose to retain parcel A in agriculture since A's annual net revenue
from agriculture is higher than B's. If so, society would suffer a
wealth loss of $100 per acre (A's potential of $500 minus B's
potential of $400).
If society really has a scarcity of agricultural land and if farm
prices are not artificially controlled at lower than equilibrium levels
by, for example, a "cheap food" policy, then the land market will
reveal this scarcity. If this effective instrument is replaced by
schemes for retaining prime land whereby inadequate economic or
political criteria would dictate the allocation of resources, there will
be no reliable way of knowing whether agricultural land is becoming
scarcer or more plentiful.
EQUITY IMPLICATIONS

If it is granted that public interests are served in supplying open
spaces and in feeding the world's population by retaining prime land,
an issue of equity arises. Creating these benefits by imposing a
wealth loss on the owners of prime agricultural land is accomplished
by immobilizing land in that use, thereby preventing shifts in land use
at higher prices. Unless compensation is given, these landowners will
absorb wealth losses in order to provide collective goods.
There are, however, several devices designed to at least
partially mitigate this problem. Zoning by eminent domain permits
state or local governments to acquire land for development, and
landowners are then compensated. Transfer of development rights
permits property owners whose land is restricted to agriculture to
sell development rights to those whose property is zoned for
nonrestricted uses .19
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Differential taxation-basing property taxes on the agricultural
value of the land rather than on its market value-is used in at least
forty-three states to give landowners some incentive to keep land in
farming; other states offer outright tax credits for the promise to
keep the land in agricultural use. 20 Such tax policies serve to partially
mitigate the inequities brought about by directly intervening in the
market, but they cannot begin to compensate landowners for the loss
of foregone lucrative land values in areas in which conversion of land
uses could change were it not restricted. This is the reason that
enrollment in tax-preferential programs is not at a high rate where
use conversion is imminent.

CONCLUSION
More and more voices clamor for the government to do
something about our vanishing farmland. For example, ''A concerted
state and local government effort-buttressed with federal technical
and financial support-combined with a redirection of federal loan
programs could, if begun now and carried out over the next two
decades, channel much of the growth and development onto less
productive agricultural land.'' 21 As development is channeled from
where it would otherwise occur, there may be serious inequities.
The equity problem needs to be brought to the attention of
overenthusiastic land-use planners so that corrective actions (usually
expensive) can be incorporated into their plans.
Even if wealth losses that are suffered by individuals as they
provide a collective good in the form of open space could be
adequately compensated, the problem of efficiency would remain. As
planners decide which parcels should remain in agricultural use, price
signals are either removed or distorted and the market can no longer
function to indicate whether or not farmland is becoming scarce. So
far, it has not been adequately demonstrated that in the decades
ahead, more American land than the market will make available will
be needed to produce food and fiber. Granted that the market will not
provide optimal quantities of open space and that more can be
justified, what sense does it make to use criteria of agricultural
productivity to select the parcels of land desired? Further, even if
urban growth needs to be better managed and if agriculture needs to
be more profitable in order to shore up rural economies and
communities, immobilizing land in agricultural use probably will not
be an efficient way of reaching these goals.
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Reexamining the ''Shrinking''
Farmland Crisis
Clifton B. Luttrell

The final report of the National Agricultural Lands Study (NALS),
undertaken by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
and the president's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) with the
support of ten other federal agencies, concluded with a series of
recommendations that would result in major governmental subsidies
for the preservation of farmland, the loss of most property rights by
farmland owners, or both. The prime movers in the proposal would
be state and local governments, with the federal government
providing technical and financial assistance. The NALS report recommended that
the President or the Congress enunciate the national interest in
the protection of productive agricultural land and direct the
appropriate federal agencies to adopt an agricultural land policy to
assure that they consider the potential negative effects of their
activities on agricultural land.
The federal government should not finance or subsidize
development projects that occur on good agricultural land.
. . . federal loan programs should provide positive incentives
in the form of lower interest rates to encourage development
away from good agricultural land and onto land less suited for
agricultural uses. Specifically ... : Federal direct loan and grant
programs for housing, commercial and industrial development;
Loan Guarantee Programs for development projects, community
services, or infrastructure development; Home Mortgage Assis-
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tance; and Capital Improvement Loan Programs for water, sewer
and electrification.
. . . By declaring the State's commitment to protect good
agricultural lands because they are a vital and irreplaceable
resource, state programs can provide the policy and legal foundation on which local programs can be based. 1

The arguments for social planning are based on the assumption that
the quantity of cropland is shrinking and that shortages of food are
imminent. There is no evidence, however, of either a decline in the
quantity of cropland or a food shortage.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHRINKING FARMLAND CRISIS
Several implications are immediately suggested by claims that
there is a crisis in farmland. First, if the quantity of farmland is
declining, we should be able to observe it in the acres and yields of
cropland that are being harvested. Second, and more important, if
the amount of such land is declining, it should be reflected in the
relative price of farm products and food. Unless offset by other
factors of production, a constant or rising demand for food, coupled
with a declining quantity of prime cropland, would lead to declining
farm production and rising prices for farm commodities and food
relative to prices of other products. Finally, if food is becoming more
scarce in relation to nonfood products, given a relatively inelastic
demand for food (a 1 percent change in the supply of farm products
results in a larger than 1 percent change in price), a rising proportion
of disposable personal income (after taxes) would be spent on food.
In other words, with a fixed relationship between land and farm
production, a reduction in the real quantity of cropland, with a
constant or rising demand for food, will lead to rising prices for farm
products and food, higher real costs for food, and a smaller percentage of personal income available for nonfood purchases. None of
these is supported by the data.
MEASURING THE QUANTITY OF CROPLAND

As Theodore W. Schultz has noted, the economic analysis of
land is not a simple matter: ''Land as an economic variable is
exceedingly hard to get at .... The fact that land is open and
aboveboard, physical and concrete, and legally divided into neat,
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carefully described parcels or lots . . . does not help one determine
the supply of land. ' '2
In the early 1800s, economists such as Thomas Malthus and
David Ricardo believed that the contribution of land to food production was relatively fixed and concluded that the real value of food
would inevitably rise with population growth, eventually necessitating the use of poorer land, more machines, and more labor to
produce additional food. Consequently, food prices and rent would
rise relative to other prices. 3 While this view recognized that
cropland did not refer to a fixed number of acres, the potential real
output of the land was assumed to be predetermined and relatively
fixed. 4 It is now recognized that the surface area that can be used for
crops and the output per unit of surface area are more variable than
Malthus and Ricardo imagined possible.
The quantity of cropland that is actually in use at any given time
depends on a number of factors, such as new technology for changing
the productivity of land, other costs of farm production, and prices of
farm products. Because new technology either reduces the costs of
land development or increases crop yields or both, thus providing
favorable returns on the investment, land areas that are currently
being used for other purposes can be developed into profitable
cropland. As Martin Bailey has noted, ''mountainous land good only
for grazing could be leveled and made arable, and marshy lands, lake
bottom and the fringes of the ocean could be filled to make arable
land.'' 5 Examples of such conversion include the Imperial Valley in
California, whlch was irrigated and developed into cropland, and the
Obion River Valley in Tennessee, much of whlch was developed into
cropland through construction of a drainage system.
Furthermore, although there is a vast amount of acreage (such
as grazing, range, or forest land) that is not currently being used for
cropland at present prices, it could be converted to crop production
within a short period of time if relative prices made it profitable to do
so. If the net return on an acre of land is greater when used for crop
production than when used for grazing, it will probably be used for
crops. Conversely, if the expected net return on land is greater when
it is used for grazing or forestry, the land will probably be used for
these purposes.
Only a small portion of the land area in the United States has
ever been used for crops (see table 3.1). Of the 2.3 billion acres of
land in the United States, only about 40 percent is farmland and less
than one-third of this has been used for crop production. Hence, a
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TABLE 3.1
TOTAL U.S. LAND AREA, FARMLAND, AND CROPLAND (IN MILLIONS OF
ACRES) AND CROP YIELDS

YEAR

TOTAL LAND

LAND IN FARMS

CROPLAND
HARVESTED

1910

1,934
1,934
1,934
1,934

879
956
990
1,065

1,934

1,161

2,314
2,314
2,314
2,316
2,316
2,316

1,124
1,110
1,063
1,017
1,049

317
351
360
331
336
317
292
286
332
338
341

1920
1930
1940
1950
1959
1964
1969
1974
1979
1980

1,042

YIELD PER ACRE

(1967 = 100)
56
61
53
62

69
85
95
106
104
129
115

SOURCES: United States, Department of Agriculture, .Agricultural Statistics (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 419; idem,Changes in Farm Production and
Efficiency (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 19; idem, Agricultural
Outlook (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office); idem, Crop Production, 1979, 1980
Annual Survey (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Jan. 1980, 1981).
NOTE: Beginning in 1959, the figures include Alaska and Hawaii.

large amount of land area is available for conversion into crop
production should economic conditions warrant it.
Data on cropland that is harvested indicate that there have been
sizable changes during the past eighty years in terms of the land area
used for crop production. Harvested acres rose from 317 million in
1910 to a peak of 360 million in 1930. By 1970, harvested acres had
declined to 289 million but increased again during the l 970s, rising to
343 million in 1980. Although governmental programs of production
control and crop diversion reduced the acreage of some crops
harvested from 1934 through 1974, the effectiveness of these
programs in terms of total crops harvested can be overemphasized,
since the production of uncontrolled crops on diverted acres was
permitted during most years. Furthermore, the impact of these
production controls has been sharply reduced since 1969.
The change in acres of crops harvested has been positively
correlated with the change in prices for farm products in relation to
other prices. For example, when the cropland acreage was declining
(0.8 percent per year during the period 1950-69), the index of prices
received by farmers declined in relation to other prices (see table
34

REEXAMINING THE "SHRINKING" FARMLAND CRISIS
TABLE 3.2
CHANGES IN CROPLAND HARVESTED AND SELECTED PRICES (ANNUAL RATES)

Acres harvested
Prices received by farmers
Price of industrial commodities
GNP price deflator
Consumer price index, all items
Producer price index, finished goods

1950-69
-0.8
0.2
1.6
2.6
2.2
1.6

1969-80
1.6

7.8
9.0

6.7
7.6

7.8

Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1981), pp. 239, 289, 295, 298, 340; United States, Department of Agriculture, Changes in
Farm Production and Efficiency (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 19;
Economic Indicators (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981).
SOURCES:

3. 2). During this period, prices for farm commodities rose only 0. 2
percent per year-1.4 percentage points less per year than the
prices of industrial commodities, 2 percentage points less than the
consumer price index, and 2.4 percentage points less than the gross
national product (GNP) price deflator. From 1969 to 1980, however,
when the number of acres harvested was rising, prices received by
farmers rose at about the same rate as most other prices. Farm
prices rose at an annual rate of 7.8 percent per year, compared with
9 percent for industrial commodities and less than 8 percent for each
of the other series. This relative increase in farm prices, in
comparison with the 1950-69 period, along with rising yields per
acre, provided farmers with sufficient incentive to convert additional
land to crop production.
The increase in prices for farm products relative to the GNP
price deflator and consumer prices during the period 1969~80 is not
an indication of potential famine either in the United States or abroad.
Rather, it represents a rise in export demand for American farm
products, attributable primarily to a gradual reduction in restrictions
on foreign trade and to the large volume of accumulation of United
States currency abroad (as a result of petroleum imports following
the sharp increase in petroleum prices). 6 The farm sector, having a
comparative advantage in the production of farm products (it is
relatively cheaper in terms of resources used to produce farm
products in the United States than in other countries), exported an
increasing proportion of its total farm output. Farm exports rose
from 12 percent of farm marketings in 1969 to 30 percent in 1980.
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YIELDS PER ACRE

While output per acre of cropland varies as a result of weather,
the sharp increases in crop yields over the longer run indicate that
yields are sensitive to other factors of production, such as technology
and prices. New technology or a change in the price of crops relative
to the cost of farm inputs leads to a change in output per acre. For
example, technology that reduces the real cost of fertilizers, that
improves the control of insects and plant diseases, and that provides
improved seed that increases the output per acre may have the same
impact on output as does an increase in the acreage of farmland. In
essence, the increase in the quality of farmland produces the same
result as an increase in quantity.
Similarly, an increase in the price of crops relative to the returns
on land from alternative uses gives farmers incentives to use more
yield-increasing factors per acre (e.g., more fertilizer), as well as
more acres of land for crop production. With the increase in the value
of farm products in the early 1970s, greater quantities of yieldincreasing inputs were added to cropland; consequently, yields
increased, as did the number of acres harvested.
The use of yield-increasing factors caused corn yields to rise
from an average of 70 bushels per acre in the period 1964-66 to 100
bushels per acre from 1978 to 1980, despite the increase in acres
harvested during the latter period. 7 The trend in growth in crop
yields is not limited to com (see table 3 .1). Yields of all cropland
harvested rose from an average index of 69 in 1950 to 115 in 1980, an
increase of 67 percent. Furthermore, there is no indication of a
slowing in the trend.
Although rates of change in crop yields are difficult to interpret
fully in the short run, there is no conclusive evidence that growth in
yield has slowed in recent years. The rate of increase varies from
-2.47 percent for the period 1927-31 to 1932-36 to 4.36 percent
for the period 1932-36 to 1937-41 (see table 3.3). This variation,
however, resulted from some periods of extreme drought during the
mid 1930s, especially in 1934 and 1936, when yields were 20 percent
or more below the previous ten-year average.
Over the entire series of five-year periods, average yields rose
at a 1.19 percent rate; and since the beginning of World War II
(1942-46), yields have risen at a rate of 1. 71 percent. The more
recent rate of increase (1.93 percent from the 1972-76/1977-81
average) was thus greater than the average rate of increase since
1912-16 or 1942-46. Furthermore, since 1942-46, yields rose at
their highest rate from 1952-56 to 1962-66, when acres of crops
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TABLE 3.3
CHANGES IN PRICES, INCOME AGGREGATES, AND EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF FARM COMMODITIES

Prices, rate of change:a
Received by farmers (USDA)
Food (CPO
All commodities, minus food (CPO
All services (CPO
Industrial commodities (PPD
Percentage of disposable personal income
per capita (rate of change)b
Percentage spent on:
Total food
Food at home
Percentage of total sales of farm
commodities: c
Exported
Imported

1950-59

1960-69

0.8%
1.7
1.4

3.6

1.5%
2.7
1.9
3.8

2.0

1.4

3.6

5.6
20.0-17.2

1970-79

1950-79

8.3%

8.3
9.6

2.9%
4.2
3.4
5.2
4.3

9.1

6.1

8.3
7.0

22.4-20.0
17.8-16.0

16.0-13.2

17.2-16.6
13.2-12.2

22.4-16.6
17.8-12.2

10.1-14.1
14.0-11.1

14.1-14.6
11.1-11.4

14.6-29.9
11.4-12.6

10.1-29.9
14.0-12.6

Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 292, 298, 340; Economic Indicators
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981); United States, Department of Labor, Consumer Price Index . For (b): United States, Department
of Agriculture, National Food Review (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Winter 1980, Spring 1981), pp. 5, 26; and Economic Indicators.
For (c): Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979)J pp. 187, 196; United States, Department of
Agriculture, U.S. Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistical Rej)orl (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 2; idem, Agricultural Outlook
(WashingtonJ D.C.: Government Printing Office); idem, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States (Washington, D.C. ~ Government Printing Office,
Jan./Feb. 1981), p. 5.
NOTE: CPI= Consumer Price Index; PPI = Producer Price Index.
SOURCES: For (a):
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harvested were reduced through governmental programs of acreage
control. During these years, the less fertile acres were taken out of
production. In contrast, the recent yields were harvested subsequent to the elimination of most controls, when acres harvested were
rising sharply and less fertile acres were brought back into production.
A comparison of yield growth using ten-year average yields (as
shown in table 3.3) indicates similar conclusions. The more recent
growth rate (1962-71 to 1972-81) of 1.49 percent was above
average for the series since 1912-21. The recent rate of increase
was above that from the 1942-51 period to the 1952-61 period but
less than the rate from the 1952-61 period to the 1962-71 period,
when acreage harvested was declining sharply. Thus, when analyzed
along with movements in acres harvested, the evidence suggests
that the rate of growth in average yield has not declined in recent
years.
RELATIVE PRICES OF FOOD

The cropland-shortage thesis is even more suspect when
analyzed on the basis of trends in food prices relative to other prices.
In a market system, increasing scarcity for a good is always
accompanied by relative increases in its price. From 1950 to 1980,
prices for farm products rose at a slower rate than those for other
major series and less than half as fast as disposable personal income
(see table 3.4). Consequently, the proportion of disposable personal
income spent on food declined from 22.4 percent in 1950 to 16.6
percent in 1980.
During the period 1970-80, prices for farm products rose at
about the same rate as prices of most nonfarm products. Farm prices
rose at an 8.3 percent rate, slower than the 9.6 percent rate for
industrial commodities, above the rate of increase for all commodities
except food, and equal to that for all services. The relative increase
in prices for farm products during this decade, however, was related
to a sharp increase in demand for American farm products, primarily
for export, rather than to a shrinkage in cropland. Exports as a
percentage of sales started rising during the 1950s, rose moderately
during the l 960s, and accelerated sharply during the 1970s. Exports,
for instance, accounted for 10 .1 percent of sales during the early
1950s and totaled only 14.6 percent of sales in 1970. During the early
1970s, however, exports accelerated from the 14.6 percent of sales
in 1970 to 29.9 percent in 1980 (table 3.4). Furthermore, the sharp
increases in exports of farm commodities were not offset by rising
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TABLE 3.4
CHANGES IN PRICES, INCOME AGGREGATES, AND EXPORTS
AND IMPORTS OF FARM COMMODITIES DURING THE 1970S

Prices, rate of change:
Received by farmers (USDA)
Food (CPI)
All commodities, minus food (CPI)
All services (CPD
Industrial commodities (PPD

1970-75

1975-80

11.0%
8.8
5.8

5.8%
7.7
8.3
10.2

6.5
9.3

Percentage of disposable personal income per
capita spent on:
Total food
Food at home
Percentage of total sales of farm commoditiesa

Exported
Imported

9.9

17.2-17.0
13.2-12.7

17.0-16.6
12.7-12.2

14.6-25.2
11.4-10.6

10.6-12.6

25.2-29.9

SOURCES: Same as for table 3.3.
a

Beginning and end of period.

imports of farm commodities. Imports of farm commodities declined
from 14.0 to 12.6 percent of sales of farm products during the period
1950-80 and rose from 11.4 to only 12.6 percent of sales during the
period 1970-80.
An analysis of exports of farm commodities during the first and
second halves of the l 970s indicates the impact of the export market
on farm prices. Exports increased sharply during the first half of the
decade, rising from 14.6 to 25.2 percent of sales (see table 3.4).
During the second half, however, exports tended to level off, rising
from 25.2 to 29.9 percent of sales. From 1970 to 1975, when exports
were accelerating, prices of farm commodities rose at the annual rate
of 11 percent, or 5 percent per year faster than the price of all
commodities except for food.
By 1975, when exports as a percentage of sales began to
decelerate, prices for farm commodities began to decline again
relative to other prices (see table 3.4). From 1975 to 1980, farm
prices rose by only 5.8 percent per year, 2.5 percentage points less
than the rate of increase in the price of all commodities minus food
and 4.1 percentage points less than the price of industrial commodities. The price of food, which had increased at about the same
rate as disposable personal income during the first half of the 1970s,
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rose 1. 8 percentage points less rapidly than disposable personal
income during the second half of the decade.
Much of the increase in farm exports since the mid l 950s can be
attributed to a gradual reduction in restrictions on foreign trade,
which were almost prohibitive following the passage of the SmootHawley Tariff Act in 1930. A number of major reductions in average
ad valorem rates have been negotiated since the 194 7 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and studies show that these
reductions have had a major impact on trade. 8 Reductions in tariff
duties do not increase trade immediately, however, as evidenced by
the gradual rise in exports during the 1950s and 1960s. 9
In addition to the impact of the reduction of tariffs on farm
exports, part of the sharp increase in exports during the early 1970s
may be attributed to the petroleum policies of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which resulted in a sharp
increase in the accumulation of dollars abroad and in the reduction of
the value of the dollar in terms of foreign currencies. After the
decline in the value of the dollar abroad, American farm products
became cheaper to foreign importers.
Despite the accelerating demand for exports of American farm
products during the 1970s, the farm sector produced enough food to
maintain relatively stable real prices for food in the United States,
further reducing the proportion of disposable personal income spent
on food. Furthermore, after farm exports decelerated during the last
half of the decade, prices received for farm products returned to a
relatively low rate of increase.

PLANS TO PRESERVE CROPLAND
Considering that cropland acreage is not shrinking, that crop
yields have increased, and that food costs as a percentage of personal
income have declined, allegations of a shrinking farmland appear to be
unfounded. Consequently, the arguments for developing comprehensive social plans to prevent the conversion of cropland to urban uses
seem to have little validity. Moreover, even if the claims had been
substantiated, proponents of social cont~ol of cropland have not made
a convincing case for such action.
There are certain circumstances that might call for social
planning for land use: (1) if farmers are not price conscious-that is, if
they are not responsive to current or expected crop prices since they
do not recognize the real value of prime cropland; (2) if farmland
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prices do not reflect the true value of the product of the land; and (3)
if the social planners' knowledge about future land values is superior
to that of current landowners and developers.
First, research clearly indicates that farmers are highly responsive to current and expected future prices .10 They sell their land to
urban developers because its value is greater if used for urbanization
than for cropland (cropland value being determined by the current
and expected future prices of the crops grown on it). When the value
of land that is converted to urban use exceeds the value that is
obtained from farming, the farm owner, the land developer, and the
general public will profit from conversion. 11 In the absence of harmful
effects on the neighborhood (hidden costs), the costs and benefits of
such shifts are carefully assessed by the transacting parties. In other
words, the cost to the individual and to society is the foregone value
of the land's contribution to farm output. Unless the gain from the
new use exceeds the loss, the individual involved would have no
incentive for making the change.
The second argument for social planning implies that effects on
the neighborhood are important. Some external costs, such as
reduced water quality and impaired landscapes, have been mentioned
by proponents of social control over cropland. This argument is
subjective, however, and one can easily visualize rural scenes that
are quite the opposite of the beautiful landscape depicted by advocates of social control. Cattle-feeding pens, swine-producing areas,
and other livestock facilities are often sources of pollution. Other
unsightly views include dilapidated buildings, unmended fences, and
abandoned equipment.
In regard to water quality, most authorities contend that both
rural and urban uses may result in water pollution. Those types of
pollution that result from farming activities include runoff from
livestock habitats and chemicals used for controlling crop diseases,
insects, and weeds. Allen Kneese has stated that agricultural
chemicals present a special problem '' as they are delivered to
streams in storm runoff from the land and bypass waste treatment
plants. " 12
The third argument for social planning-that social planners
possess superior knowledge-implies that individual farmers and
users of urban land distribute their resources between the present
and the future on a relatively uninformed (of true value) basis.
Individual landowners are perceived to be somewhat myopic in
assessing the future value of cropland, whereas social land-use
planners can foresee the ' 'correct'' future value of land in its various
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alternative uses. This argument fails to consider that such vision
would provide social planners with amazing opportunities for personal
gains in investments, so that they would not be likely to remain
"planners" when they could make money as "doers."
Of even greater importance for the public welfare is the
assumption that programs of social planners operate in the public
interest rather than in self-interest. There is little justification for the
view that self-interest is eliminated when social groups are given
monopolistic power over economic functions. As pointed out by
George Stigler, alleged market failures are not evidence that social
planners can provide more services at reduced costs: ''We may tell
the society to jump out of the market frying pan, but we have no basis
for predicting whether it will land in the fire or a luxurious bed. ' ' 13
Any impediment to the transfer of cropland to urban use will increase
the cost of land for housing, factories, hospitals, parking, and other
uses vital to the public well-being. There is no evidence that social
groups can more equitably resolve the conflict between costs and
benefits of land use than can private markets.
SUMMARY
As prime farmland is converted into highways, streets, shopping
malls, and residential areas, some observers have concluded that the
quantity of farmland is declining sharply and that this decline will
eventually lead to food shortages. Often unobserved, however, are
the less noticeable but dramatic increases in acres of cropland during
the last decade and in production per acre since the l 930s. The
number of acres from which crops were harvested rose from 289
million in 1970 to 343 million in 1980. In contrast to the thesis that
there is a relatively fixed amount of cropland, the amount of cropland
varies, especially over the long run, according to the relative demand
for farm products. The number of harvested acres increased rapidly
with the more favorable prices for farm products during the 1970s.
Yields per acre of cropland likewise have continued to rise in
recent years. While year-to-year yields are highly variable, there is
no conclusive evidence that the rate of increase in yields has slowed
down. The gain in average yields from 1978 to 1983 was above the
average rate of gain since 1912 or the average since 1942.
More important than yields and cropland harvested as a measure of the supply of cropland, however, is the relative cost of farm
products and food to consumers. Prices for farm products and food
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have consistently declined relative to other prices except during the
first half of the 1970s, when demand for exports rose sharply. By the
last half of the decade, when exports decelerated, prices for farm
commodities had returned to a slower rate of growth than the other
price indices.
Since 1950, consumers have spent a decreasing proportion of
their disposable personal income on food. In 1950, almost 18 percent
of disposable personal income per capita was spent on food; by 1980
the percentage had declined to 12.2. Furthermore, the percentage of
income spent on food continued to decline even during the rapid
increase in farm exports during the first half of the 1970s.
Given that the acreage of cropland is variable, that yields
continue to rise, that prices of farm products remain on a downward
trend relative to other prices, and that the percentage of personal
income spent on food continues to decline, there is little reason to
fear either a decline in United States farmland or a crisis in food
production.
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The Dynamics of Soil Erosion
in the United States
Theodore W. Schultz

It is difficult to forget the dust-darkened skies at Ames, Iowa, during
the 1930s. The skies of eastern cities were also darkened by these
storms, which the urban press and Washington officials blamed on
farmers and their plows. In 1946, James C. Malin of the University of
Kansas published a historical account of dust storms, placing in doubt
the then official and popular view of their causes. 1 He pointed out that
the eastern United States had experienced dark days on 21 October
1716, 19 October 1762, 19 May 1780, 16 October 1785, and 3 July
1814. There were clouds of dust so intense ''that it was impossible
to distinguish objects jit a distance of a dozen yards.'' 2 Clearly, dust
storms had occurred before the plow had turned the prairie of the
Great Plains into farms. Malin concluded that ''there is no reason to
assume that dust storms can be prevented altogether, because
without question they were frequent and severe prior to white
settlement and the plowing of the sod.' ' 3
Water erosion also has a long history. Only fifty years ago the
deeply eroded gullies in parts of western and southern Iowa provided
indisputable evidence. I have learned that not all soil erosion can be
stopped. Where labor is cheap, as in China, manpower has been used
for centuries to hold erosion in check, but cropland erosion has still
not been stopped. Nor can American farmers, with all the available
technical knowledge and modern equipment, stop all soil erosion.
Even if there were no agriculture, there would still be erosion.
Public and private •soil conservation is now deemed to be
inadequate, and'all manner of reasons are being advanced to account
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for the inadequacy. Would that there were some agreement on the
validity of the evidence on the state of and causes of soil erosion in
the United States. Most of the flood of so-called evidence is highly
politicized and self-serving, publicized by major urban newspapers
and other media that are bent on proving that soil erosion is
catastrophic. As a rule, these stories have a political ax to grind.
Environmental groups have their own motives for attributing the
prevailing soil erosion to the failures of government, land-grant
experiment stations, and farmers.
Their evidence is also self-serving. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) seeks to accommodate the conflicting
political pressures it faces and endeavors to put the best possible
interpretation on its soil-conservation performance. There are also
those who see the large increases in agricultural exports as a new
cause of soil erosion.
The most important and difficult task in assessing problems of
soil erosion is to establish reliable evidence on its extent, magnitude,
and causes. This paper will consider four issues and then conclude
with some interpretations and implications: (1) erosion effects of the
dynamics of weather and climate, (2) interactions between increases
in crop yields and erosion, (3) markets and erosion, and (4) the
farmer and his soil.
WEATHER AND CLIMATE
Most agriculture of the United States is dominated by a
continental climate, subject to turbulence from the interactions
between the moisture-laden air from the Gulf of Mexico and the
Pacific storms that manage to cross or get around the western
mountains. It is all too convenient to ignore the soil erosion effects of
the dynamics of this climate. Despite advances in knowledge,
scientists cannot predict the natural phenomena that determine the
occurrence and distribution of our destructive winds and rainstorms.
Farmers are keenly aware that they face uncertainties as to when
hail, violent winds , and torrential rains will destroy their crops and
impair their soils.
The natural environment is not invariant over time, nor was it
invariant before there was agriculture. In this context, weather and
climate per se are dynamic. Agriculture is always vulnerable to the
vicissitudes of our continental climate, and an analysis of soil erosion
must include weather and climate and treat them as secular variables.
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Nature has always ordained secular changes. Our vast river deltas
are products of erosion, and silting and soil transport would continue
even if man had not complicated the process. Our museums display
all manner of skeletons of species that did not manage to survive
nature.
Even if we leave the handiwork of man aside, the theory and
evidence pertaining to biological evolution are too firmly a part of my
thinking to doubt that animals, plants, and other organisms have not
faced changes in the natural environment. The ecology, viewed as a
branch of biology dealing with the relation of living things to their
environment and to each other, has been and continues to be a
dynamic process.
Nor should we forget that nature is not in the habit of being
bountiful. She is, in fact, niggardly in satisfying man's food requirements. Driven by necessity, man invented agriculture, an invention
that reduces the niggardliness of nature. Agriculture has been
altering the natural environment ever since it was first practiced, and
the alterations have enhanced man's capacity to survive and made it
possible for him to develop a long series of civilizations. 4 Modern
agriculture is reducing to a remarkable extent the amount of human
effort that is required to satisfy the demand for food. It is widely
presumed, however, that the environmental price is too high,
implying that modem agriculture is a primary environmental hazard.
But this contention is beset with strange and exciting ambiguities. It
is alleged that agriculture is rapidly spoiling our spaceship, the earth;
but surely such imagery recalls Don Quixote and his windmills.
Tilting with windmills and riding spaceships may make for good
literature, but they are bad concepts for analysis.
As the hills and mountains are leveled by the inexorable forces
of nature, soil particles are deposited at lower locations. Their value
at the new locations should not be omitted in accounting for the net
cost of erosion. To rephrase Mark Twain's fascination with science
and his penchant for the absurd, '' A calm person who is not blind or
idiotic can see that seven hundred and forty-two years from now the
Mississippi River will have filled the Gulf of Mexico with good soil and
New Orleans will have become a provincial landlocked town. " 5 All
the king's ·experts and all the king's laws cannot stop all soil erosion.
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CROP YIELDS AND EROSION
High crop yields are accused of being one of the new culprits
responsible for erosion. Lest we forget, wheat yields were only 11
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bushels per acre in 1933 and 12 bushels in 1934, when the toll of wind
erosion was high. Droughts, not wheat yields, set the stage for dust
storms.
There was no yield revolution in the United States before the
mid 1930s. D. Gale Johnson has put it succinctly: "Between 1910-14
and 1937-41 crop production per acre increased [only] 8 percent. " 6
The increases in cotton yields began earlier than the increases in
grains. 7 In comparing the average yields of the 1920s with those of
1981, one must bear in mind that 1981 was a year of bumper crops:
1981 yields ranged from 2.4 times higher for soybeans to 4.1 times
higher for com. The gains in yield of sorghum and cotton approached
that of com, and wheat did slightly better than soybeans (see table
4.1).
TABLE 4.1
INCREASES IN CROP YIELDS FROM THE 1920S TO 1981

CROP YIELD

Wheat, in bushels
Com, in bushels
Sorghum for grain, in bushels
Soybeans for beans, in bushels
Cotton, in pounds
a

1920S

1981

INCREASE

(PER ACRE)

(PER ACRE)

(1920S = 100)

14.0
26.8
16.7
12.7a
154.0

34.5
109.9
64.l
30.4
546.0

246%
410
384
239

355

For 1924-30.

The effects of changes in crop yields on soil erosion are complex
and far from obvious. Where declines in yields and increases in
erosion are both evident, there is the problem of determining which
is cause and which is effect. When droughts in the Great Plains cause
wind erosion, the direction of the causality is apparent. There are
some specific locations where the area of particular row crops has
been extended onto land that is vulnerable to erosion, and over time
the yields on this land have declined. I know of no estimates of this
yield-erosion type.
As the pattern of crop acreage changes in response to higher
yields, increases in productivity have gone hand in hand with
decreases in soil erosion, as is evident in the following assessments:
(1) The productivity of cropland per acre in the United States has
increased greatly over time. (2) The soil erosion of cropland has
declined decidedly. Leo V. Mayer has compared the results of two
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national surveys of soil erosion conducted in 1934 and in 1977: "The
1977 survey found 77 percent of cropland with only slight erosion
compared with 47 percent in the 1934 survey, and 10 percent with
severe erosion compared with 15 percent in 1934. Even taking into
account differences in the ways the two surveys were conducted, the
improvement is so substantial as to warrant the conclusion . . . : The
nation's soil resources have improved vastly over the past half
century." 8 (3) Whereas both the demand and supply of these farm
commodities have increased, the acreage devoted to cotton and corn
was 55 million acres less in 1981 than it had been during peak years.
Sorghum acreage has also declined from its peak. The acreage
devoted to soybeans has grown like topsy; and as a row crop, it is
next to corn in area. The net effects of these changes have
contributed substantially to the decline in soil erosion.
Some supporting evidence, by crops, is warranted at this point.
COTTON

The reduction of the soil erosion effects of cotton has been
greater than that of any other crop. Acreage devoted to cotton has
declined greatly, and cotton is currently produced on soils that are
not, in general, nearly as prone to erosion as was the vast area
planted during earlier periods. In 1981, 13.8 million acres of cotton
were harvested, compared with 4 7 million in 1926-a strong 33
million acres less (see table 4.2).
TABLE 4.2
CHANGES IN THE COTTON AREA HARVESTED AND
ITS RELOCATION BETWEEN 1926 AND 1981
AREA

1926
1981
1926
1981
(IN MILLIONS OF ACRES) (PERCENTAGE OF ACRES)
Seven southeastern states
29%
13.54
1.1
8%
Arizona, California, and
New Mexico
.44
2.2
1
16
Other states
10.5
70
33.00
76
U.S. total
13.8
47.00
100
100
SOURCES: For 1926, United States, Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1928
(Washington, D.C.: USDA, 1928), p. 838, table 251; for 1981, idem, Crop Production, 1982
Annual Summary (Washington, D.C.: USDA, 15 Jan. 1982), p. B2.

The relocation of the cotton crop is also relevant. The decline in
cotton acreage has been most marked in the erosion-vulnerable areas
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in the Southeast. Acreage in Arizona, California, and New Mexico,
however, has increased sharply; there, irrigation of nearly all cotton
acreage has produced little or no erosion. California is now the
second largest cotton-producing state. In Texas, the leading state, a
third of the cotton acreage is irrigated.
CORN

Although the area devoted to corn is six times as large as that
given over to cotton, the pattern of changes is similar. The com area
harvested in 1981 was 22 million acres less than it was in 1931,
implying a good deal less erosion. More important is the relocation of
the crop. In producing com, the comparative advantage of the heart
of the Com Belt has increased decidedly since 1931, 9 as is evident
from observing that the harvested area increased by 37 percent in
the best part of the com area (see table 4.3). Given the topography
TABLE 4.3
CHANGES IN THE CORN AREA HARVESTED AND
ITS RELOCATION BETWEEN 1931 AND 1981

AREA

1931

1981

PERCENTAGE OF

(IN MILLIONS OF ACRES)
Best Com
Belta
Rest of com
area

U.S. total

37.5

CHANGE

1931

1981

(PERCENTAGE OF ACRES)

51.6

+38%

36%

62%

--

-

31.4

-53

64

38

105.0

83.0

-21

100

100

67.5

SOURCES: For 1931, United States, Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1932
(Washington, D.C.: USDA, 1932), p. 609, taele 47; for 1981, idem, Crop Production, 1981
Annual Summary (Washington, D.C.: USDA, 15 Jan. 1982).
• Includes Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, Indiana, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Michigan.

of the land and the attributes of the soil, the relocation has further
reduced the soil erosion associated with corn. 10 As of 1978, 11
percent of the com acres were irrigated.
SORGHUM

Sorghum is another row crop that is grown mainly in the
southern parts of the Great Plains. The number of acres harvested
peaked in 1957 at 19.7 million and by 1981 had declined to 14.5
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million. Wind erosion becomes a threat in dry years. By 1978, 16
percent of the acres were irrigated.
SOYBEANS

The erosion effects of soybean production are far from clear. In
1981, 66.7 million acres were harvested for soybeans. Fifty years
ago, soybeans were an exotic curiosity; but like the medfly, soybeans
spread rapidly throughout the best parts of the Corn Belt and the
more humid parts of the cotton South. To the extent that soybeans
are being grown on land released by the decline in the acreage of
cotton, does the soil receive a better deal? I suspect the answer is
yes, but firm evidence is not at hand. In the heart of the Corn Belt,
the acreage in both corn and soybeans has increased at the expense
of oats. In other parts of the corn area, soybeans have taken up some
of the land released from com. The net erosion effects of the large
acreage in soybeans has not yet been determined,
WHEAT

Since the 1920s, yields of wheat have more than doubled (see
table 4.1). In 1981, 80.9 million acres were planted in wheat, which
exceeded the earlier peak in 1949 by 5 million acres. Since wheat is
not a row crop, water erosion is less likely. In the Palouse wheat area
in the Northwest, however, water erosion is a long-standing problem. In general, the erosion woes caused by wheat are the result of
the vicissitudes of the weather on the Great Plains.
Periodic dust storms have long been the hallmark of wind
erosion on the Great Plains. There is evidence, however, that
farmers are now measurably more successful in coping with dry
years of given severity. D. Gale Johnson and Robert L. Gustafson
have shown that the weighted average annual rainfall in nine Great
Plains wheat states was not only very low but was also virtually the
same during the periods 1930-39 and 1950-56 (20.4 and 20. 7
inches). 11 Wheat yields per seeded acre, however, differed markedly: 10.6 bushels during the 1930s and 15.2 during the period
1950-54. 12 There were no dust storms between 1950 and 1956.
Farmers were learning the art of using summer fallow and less
cultivation and were thus able to reduce the exposure of the soil to
windstorms. During very dry years when storms are at their worst,
the farmers' last line of defense is to repeatedly ridge the soil in
order to capture the windblown soil, a practice made possible by the
use of modem machinery.
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MARKETS AND EROSION
It bears repeating that most of the soil resources of the United
States are vulnerable to the vicissitudes of climate, and it is not
feasible for man to eliminate all of the soil erosion that climate and
weather cause. Advances in knowledge pertaining to agriculture,
which occur in considerable part from the work of agricultural
scientists, do alter the effects of agriculture on soil resources.
Except for soybeans, the large increases in crop yields of the major
row crops have had two important, favorable effects: a reduction in
the area devoted to these crops and a relocation of them onto soils
that are less vulnerable to erosion.
Most of the public confusion about soil erosion arises from a
misinterpretation of the economic roles that markets and farmers
play. I shall attempt to clear up some of the confusion by discussing
two issues: first, the effects of markets and prices in the large, as a
macro process; and second, the effects of the microeconomic behavior of the farmer as he responds to incentives.
The doctrine of market failures has many devoted supporters,
and it is no surprise that it supplies one of the convenient explanations for soil erosion. No doubt, if there were no markets for cotton,
com, soybeans, and sorghum, the major row crops, these crops
would not be grown, and the erosion effects from this source would
be zero. The issue obviously is not' 'no markets.'' What is at issue is
the presumed adverse effects that our large foreign markets for
American crops have on our soil resources. The issue is confounded
by the paradox that the prevailing export prices are deemed to be
insufficient to compensate whoever should be compensated for the
loss of soil resources that these exports presumably entail.
Does erosion decrease and increase in concert with the fall and
rise of farm exports? Consider the early 1930s, when foreign
markets for American farm commodities declined sharply as a
consequence of world-wide depression and restrictions on trade. No
informed person would contend that the rate of soil erosion was
reduced because of the drop in foreign markets during that period.
Farm exports rose rapidly in the United States during the 1970s; and
by 1977, when the soil survey was made, farm exports totaled $23
billion, compared to only $787 million in 1934. 13 As noted earlier,
there was much less soil erosion in 1977 than in 1934. These facts
imply that increases in farm exports are not necessarily inconsistent
with reductions in soil erosion. They also suggest that caution should
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be exercised in relating assumed future increases in farm exports to
more soil erosion.
Markets and farmers have one thing in common: both are
maligned. The essential roles that they play are increasingly incomprehensible to urban people. It is necessary to distinguish
between the economic function of markets and that of farm entrepreneurs. It takes buyers and sellers to make a market. To
describe an organized competitive market as a dynamic activity for
arriving at prices that equate changes in supply and demand is too
cryptic for the purpose at hand. Traders on organized markets of
major standardized agricultural commodities are indifferent about
whether the commodity is grown on soils that are or are not subject
to erosion, since the commodity is the same in either case. There is
no reason for the price to differ.
That markets do not and cannot make this distinction implies
that proposals to use commodity markets in order to reduce soil
erosion are ill-advised. Various arguments are being advanced in
favor of an export tax on farm commodities to compensate for soil
losses, but such a tax would reduce the domestic price for the
commodity. All farmers who produce this commodity would be taxed
by way of the lower prices, regardless of whether or not their soil
was eroding. Since there is no significant soil erosion on most farms,
such a tax would be all the more unjust. Although competitive
commodity markets perform an essential economic function, reducing soil erosion is not part of it. Land markets~ however, play such a
role.

THE FARMER AND HIS SOIL
It should be evident that soil erosion does not occur in all parts
of agriculture. It is not a nationwide phenomenon. A map of the
distribution and intensity of erosion in the United States shows ''little
or no erosion'' in the New England area and in the coastal area from
Virginia south, including Florida and the Gulf region. 14 The same
rating is attributed to the Mississippi Delta from southeastern
Missouri, a considerable part of Arkansas, and a part of Mississippi ·
and Louisiana. So, too, little or no erosion is indicated for the welldrained prairie soils in the heart of the Com Belt and for much of the
farm area of California and eastern Oregon. Moderate and severe
erosion, localized and spotty, prevailed in the Great Plains, including
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Texas, in some areas of the com states, and throughout the
southeast, except in the Coastal Plains.
Clearly soil erosion is location specific. Its technical and economic attributes vary widely both within and between locations. For
the purpose at hand, the unit of land on which erosion occurs is a
farm, and the decision entity is the farmer. This being the case, a
nationally administered program of soil conservation that is politically
designed to provide funds and services to all parts of agriculture is
bound to be a model of inefficiency. Federalism would be a small step
in the right direction, but it, too, would have a long way to go to attain
the decentralization necessary to become moderately efficient.
There is an odd ambivalence in assessing the performance of
farmers. We proclaim to the world that American farmers are second
to none in their agricultural achievements; but when it comes to soil
erosion, the prevailing assumption is that American farmers have no
perception of the value of their soil resources and that they act as if
they were indifferent to soil losses. The dynamics and success of
agriculture in the United States is ample proof that farmers are
competent entrepreneurs; they do not shed their entrepreneurial
ability when it comes to investments to improve and maintain their
soil resources.
Farmers calculate the value of their soil resources to a fine
degree, and the value of their land is not so small a detail as to be
overlooked. The value of the land in farms in 1981 in prices then
current was $695 billion, 15 a figure so large that even official budget
experts would pause. Reduced to a per farm basis, it comes to
$287,000. Using a productive asset worth over a quarter million
dollars is not an allocative detail. Since most agricultural production is
accounted for by farms that sell products worth $20,000 or more, the
per farm value of the land in 1981 was approximately:
Amount of Products Sold
Value per Farm
$ 20,000-39,999
$ 237,000
40,000-99,999
401,000
100,000 or more
1,008,000
Not all farmland is owned by farmers, but this does not imply
that retired farmers who retain ownership or other investors are
indifferent to soil losses. There is a corresponding interest on the
part of other owners of farmland. In 1935, 42 percent of 6.8 million
farms were classified as tenant farms. By 1974, only 11 percent were
in this category. The 1978 Census of Agriculture shows a total of
2,478,000 farms, of which 1,451,000 were farmed by full owners,
713,000 by part owners, and 314,000 by tenants.
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Within their own domain, farmers are active entrepreneurs who
have a large stake in the soil resources of their farms. While it is true
that in perceiving, interpreting, and acting on new information, they
differ because of variation in their education, health, and experience,
they perform an essential role in soil conservation. It is very much in
their interest to do so.

INFERENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
First, part of the soil erosion that is caused by weather and
climate cannot be stopped. It is pointless and unfair to blame the
government or plant breeders or farmers for that part of soil erosion
that nature insists upon. Soil scientists can no doubt determine the
amount of soil erosion that nature will exact by specific locations and
crops. We need to know.
Second, the revolution in yield puts additional stress on soils. It
also has made possible large reductions in the area devoted to cotton
and com, and the relocation of these crops implies less erosion.
Reliable estimates of the net effects are needed. From the limited
evidence at hand, however, we can assume that further increases in
crop yields will continue to have the net effect of reducing soil
erosion.
Third, two national soil surveys, the first in 1934 and the second
in 1977, provide no support for the pronouncements that soil erosion
has been going from bad to worse. On the contrary, the proportion of
our cropland that experienced only slight erosion increased from 4 7
percent in 1934 to 77 percent in 1977. To the extent that this
evidence is reliable, it represents a remarkable achievement. I know
of no compelling reason why this favorable secular trend cannot be
continued.
Fourth, organized commodity markets do not classify and sort
farm products on the bases of whether or not they are grown under
conditions that cause soil erosion. The products are the same, and so
is the price. Proposals to intervene and alter competitive market
prices as a means of penalizing the farmers who are guilty of causing
some erosion would also penalize those farmers who produce no
erosion. An export tax would do exactly that.
Fifth, national programs of soil conservation that are designed
politically to be administered nationally are often models of inefficiency. Soil erosion occurs on particular farms in specific locations,
and it must be approached and dealt with accordingly.
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Finally, conference reports do not produce food or other farm
products, nor do they reduce soil erosion. Advances in the agricultural sciences are a plus on both counts. The self-interest and the
large stake that farmers have in the economic value of their soil
resources hold the key to soil conservation.
Where I was born and reared in South Dakota, the landscape has
been tamed. Gone are the awesome prairie fires. They no longer
take the lives of animals and birds, nor do they destroy people's
homes. Cyclone cellars have been replaced by better protection
against tornadoes. Belts of trees now serve as windbreaks, sheltering pheasants and deer, improving the attractiveness of the countryside, and slowing down the wind a bit. Farmers have adopted
other and better ways to reduce wind erosion. Let there continue to
be trade and science to provide useful knowledge and reliable
information. Above all, let us not sell short the self-interest of farm
people in their soil resources.
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This paper was prepared for a conference on soil conservation, Agricultural
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Some False Notions about
Farmland Preservation
Julian L. Simon

"Vanishing Farmlands: Selling Out the Soil," "Farmland Losses
Could End U.S. Food Exports," and "As World Needs Food, U.S.
Keeps Losing Soil to Land Developers'' are some of the headlines
that have appeared in newspapers and magazines over the last few
years, stirring up public concern and painting a disturbing picture of
overurbanization and frighteningly low agricultural productivity . 1 The
source of many of these stories was the National Agricultural Lands
Study (NALS), which issued its final report in 1981. Secretary of
Agriculture John Block has agreed, saying that the loss of agricultural
land is '' a crisis in the making, '' similar to the energy situation of the
1970s. According to Block, NALS ''has built a strong case for
protecting good agricultural land. " 2 The central question is, How
much of our present and potential cropland is being transformed into
urban uses? I suggest that the amount is only about one-third of that
claimed by NALS, a rate that is probably no greater and probably
rather less than in the past.
Farmland preservationists have suggested that the United
States is riding negative trends and that bad things are happening to
the country because valuable agricultural land has been converted to
built-up uses. These arguments are based on three supposedly longterm trends. 3
The first trend involves the quantity of food. Food production in
the United States has been increasing by leaps and bounds. To avoid
trying to add apples and oranges, which can only be done by summing
their monetary value, let us look at a representative crop-com.
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Total com production has been rising rapidly during recent decades,
which means that there is more com available for consumption and
more to sell abroad. There are no grounds for believing that we are
running out of food.
The second trend has to do with the price of food. Some
analysts say that we are on a trend of rising prices; but with each
successive year, a smaller proportion of our income has been needed
to buy farm products. Even compared to other products, as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the price of food has not
been going up. 4
The third trend relates to cropland. For some crops, such as
com, the trend in cropland has been somewhat downward; but this is
a response to increased yields and to the demand for other valuable
crops, not from the encroachment of cities on agricultural land.
Furthermore, taken together, land in field crops has been increasing,
not decreasing. The Crop Reporting Board has reported that
cropland being harvested rose from just over 190 million acres, from
between the mid 1960s and the early 1970s, to approximately 340
million acres near the end of the 1970s. 5
What, then, is the basis for the claims made by NALS, the Soil
Conservation Service (SCS), the Department of Agriculture
(USDA), the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), and other
organizations that we are losing farmland at a dangerous rate? NALS
and SCS have not denied that the trends described above are
correctly represented; but they have said that there has recently
been a major break with the past in the rate of urbanization of
farmland and that recent trends are fundamentally different from
those experienced in earlier decades. Specifically, they have claimed
that the conversion rate of farmland jumped in 1967 from an annual
rate of less than 1 million acres to 3 million acres. A close
examination of the evidence in the SCS survey, however, reveals
that it is flawed.
SURVEYS OF THE SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE
THE 1958 NATIONAL INVENTORY (ND OF SOIL AND CONSERVATION
NEEDS

In 1958 the SCS conducted a field survey of nonurban land areas
in every county in the United States. The standard size of a primary
sampling unit (PSU) was 100 acres in thirteen northeastern states
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and 160 acres in all other states. The basic sampling rate of area was
2 percent. 6 Before beginning the field work, county committees
worked with maps to subtract the acreage of urban and built-up areas
and of water areas smaller than 40 acres and streams less than oneeighth of a mile wide. Larger water areas and federal land had already
been eliminated. Urban and built-up areas were officially defined as
"land in cities, villages, and other built-up areas of more than 10
acres; industrial sites, railroad yards, cemeteries, airports, golf
courses; the intensively used and built up parts of shooting ranges
and institutional and public administrative sites; and highways, public
road, railroads and airports. The acreage of farmland inside city and
village limits was included.' ' 7
The detailed instructions used by county committees and agents
who mapped the land are not available; but written discussions
suggest that census data, previous soil surveys, county records, and
personal inspection were used to determine urban and built-up areas.
It appears that not more than a page or two of the instructions was
ever devoted to identifying urban or built-up areas and that no effort
was made to measure the reliability of mapping them, although it was
recognized that a degree of judgment would be involved. 8
Michael Brewer and Robert Boxley, the members of the NALS
staff who were responsible for the SCS data, wrote:
Neither the 1958 nor 1967 efforts "inventoried" urban and
built-up areas except in the sense of accounting for total land area
of states and the nation. Enumerator instructions for the 1958 CNI
permitted several procedures for developing estimates of urban
and built~up areas. One of these involved use of county records
describing incorporated areas. If followed for an incorporated land
unit, this procedure could overestimate the urban and built-up
category of land use (relative to 1977 NRI procedures) since areas
in non-urban or built-up uses within the incorporated boundary
would be treated as though they were developed. On the other
hand, if applied to an entire county, this procedure would not
record unincorporated built-up areas, resulting in under-estimation. The extent to which enumerators elected to use this method
is not known. In 1967, enumerators were instructed to update the
1958 estimates. Again, a range of procedures were permitted.
Both of these earlier series thus contain unspecified errors from
this source. 9
THE 1967 CONSERVATION NEEDS INVENTORY (CNI)

The major change in the 1967 inventory was that specific sample
points were selected within primary sampling units (typically 34 to 38
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sample points on a 160-acre PSU). The 1967 sample was thought to
be simpler to use in the field, but again no effort was made to
determine the reliability of the measurements or whether the new
procedure affected the results.
As far as I can detennine, not one of the areas that were
classified as urban or built-up in 1958 was rechecked to see if it had
reverted to agricultural use. The 1967 figure (in table 5.1) represents
either new areas that were classified as urban or built-up in 1967 or
TABLE 5.1

ESS AND SCS ESTIMATES OF URBAN AND BUILT-UP AREAS,
INCLUDING TRANSPORTATION AND EXCLUDING WATER, IN MILLIONS OF ACRES

scs

YEAR
TOTAL
ACREAGE
1950

for ESS

ESS

AVERAGE
ANNUAL CHANGE

TOTAL
ACREAGE

39

NAa

1958 for SCS
1960 for ESS
1967

1.1
51

for SCS

1970 for ESS

AVERAGE
ANNUAL CHANGE

50

LO

1.1
60

61

2.0
1975

for SCS

77b

NA

2.9
1977

for SCS

90

NA

3.3
1977 for NALS

94

NA

from memo from H. Thomas Frey to Ernie McGill, 2 Apr. 1981; 1977
SCS data from NRI release, Nov. 1977; 1977 NALS data from Agricultural Land Data Sheet.
a NA= not available.
h Total is sum of 1967 acreage (61 million), plus indicated increase of 16 million acres from 1967
to 1975.
SOURCES: 1950-75 data

that had been included in the 1958 inventory. No one checked to see
whether the reason for reclassification was an actual change in land
use or simply a redefinition. Again, several procedures were used in
an unspecified manner to classify areas as urban or built-up. As
stated in a NALS memo, ''Urban, built-up, rural transportation,
water data were updated where necessary using a variety of sources
(census, soil surveys, county records, and field measurements). " 10
62

SOME FALSE NOTIONS ABOUT FARMLAND PRESERVATION
THE 1975 POTENTIAL CROPLAND STUDY

Unlike the 1958 and 1967 inventories, the 1975 Potential
Cropland Study was intended to measure shifts in land use and to
observe previous observation points. For budgetary reasons, however, the sample sites were only a small subset of the 1967 locations.
Samples were located in 506 counties, about 5,300 of the 1967
PSUs, 11 within which one-fourth of the 1967 sample points were
revisited. 12 There was no change in the definition of urban and builtup areas, and again no effort was made to measure reliability.
Relevant for our purposes are those sample points indicated as
urban that were formerly cropland, pastureland, and so forth. This
estimate of 16.3 million acres and the estimate of 6. 7 million acres
converted to water form the base of the NALS' s overall estimate of
the amount of agricultural and cropland being urbanized per year (21
million acres urbanized from 1967 to 1975, or 3 million acres per yer
"lost").
THE 1977 NATIONAL RESOURCES INVENTORY (NRI)

For the 1977 National Resources Inventory, SCS field personnel
visited 70,000 of the 1958 sample plots and examined three points
per PSU (two points in 40-acre PSUs) to provide data that would be
reliable at the state level. Again, there was no consideration of the
reliability of the classification procedures. Most of the workers who
conducted the field classifications had not been involved in the earlier
surveys. As in previous inventories, it is safe to assume that land that
had earlier been classified as urban was not rechecked. Subtracting
the urban and built-up areas in the 1967 inventory from those in the
1977 inventory yields an estimate of 29 million acres, a figure used in
some NALS writings. NALS used the 1967-77 comparison to make
the state-by-state estimates.13
SOURCES OF ERROR
The NALS's interest lies in the conversion of agricultural land to
built-up areas and water, and we are interested in how the surveys
influenced that issue. The 1958, 1967, and 1977 surveys, however,
were not designed to measure change, but rather to compile an
inventory of various categories of land in the nation. Furthermore,
the 1975 resurvey was not intended to measure shifts of farmland to
built-up uses and water. The main defects in the NALS studies flow
from this mismatch of original purpose and later use.
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VARIANCES IN SAMPLING

The SCS estimated that land converted from agricultural use in
1967 to urban use in 1975 was 1.2 percent of the total land in the
1967 inventory sample (16.6 of 1,370 million acres). My concern is
not with the accuracy of this estimate, but with the order of
magnitude. Given that there were either 5,300 or 4,554 PSUs and in
the absence of any additional information, it can be estimated that
about 1.2 percent-either 64 or 55 PSUs-constituted the entire
group that represented land shifts from agricultural to urban uses
between 1967 and 1975. Going further, the Potential Cropland Study
reported that cropland represents about 30 percent of agricultural
land; so, there were less than twenty observations of PSUs that
were converted from cropland to urban land. This is too small a set
upon which to base an estimate of the amount of cropland that shifted
to urban uses, let alone to make estimates for various regions (which
the Potential Cropland Survey also publishes).
There is no indication that the stratification plan for the 1967 and
1975 surveys weighted observations in order to observe a largerthan-proportional number of PSUs that might have shifted to urban
uses (with a consequent adjustment in the results). That is, the
number of effective observations was apparently no larger than the
numbers calculated here. Furthermore, given the small number of
observations, the estimates of the size of the sampling variances are
themselves subject to substantial variances.
It may be true that not all of the observed change between 1967
and 1975 was simply due to sampling variance, but some fraction of
the observed change and a substantial part of the differences in rates
of annual change between the periods 1955-67 and 1967-75 might be
caused by such variances. The amount of change is in question, but
not whether any change occurred. While it is possible that sampling
variances could cause an underestimate or an overestimate in the
rate of change, other information (presented below) makes an
underestimate seem unlikely. In brief, the sample in the 1975
resurvey was apparently too small to provide reliable information
about the properties of agricultural land and cropland that had shifted
to urban and built-up uses and to water.
ERRORS OF MEASUREMENT
An important aspect of the 1967, 1975, and 1977 studies is the

progressive narrowing of the areas that were inventoried. Land that
was at one time classified as being urban, built-up, or water was
removed from the inventory and subsequently was not studied. This
64

SOME FALSE NOTIONS ABOUT FARMLAND PRESERVATION

procedure will not cause any error if the classification procedures
have no measurement error and no possibility of the land's ever
reverting to another category. Neither assumption is supported by
any evidence, however, nor is either likely to be true.
Consider the two kinds of measurement errors that could have
occurred in the 1958 and 1967 studies: (1) An area might have been
classified as urban when it was really nonurban, or (2) an area might
have been classified as nonurban when it was really urban. For
example, wooded suburban areas on the fringe of a large city might
be classified as forest by one observer and as built-up by another.
Incorrect classification of land as nonurban could be corrected in a
later study; but areas that were incorrectly classified as urban, builtup, or water had no chance of being correctly classified in subsequent
studies, since they were omitted from the sample. How many such
errors occurred cannot be determined without doing additional field
work; but it would not be surprising if the rate of error were 10
percent or more, including clerical errors as well as actual errors of
misclassification.
The United States Geological Survey (USGS) has provided an
example of how classification errors of considerable magnitude could
occur. The USGS compared results gathered from aerial photographs, using the same procedures used by the SCS in the 1977 NRI
surveys, which were similar or identical to those used in 1958, 1967,
and 1975. Discrepancies between the two methods amounted to 28
percent of the total urbanized land estimated by the SCS, the USGS
estimate being the lower. 14 The USGS personnel who made the
estimates were experienced analysts who specialize in such work,
while the SCS estimates were made by district conservationists who
are expert in appraising land quality but not in judging urbanization.
If 10 percent of urban areas were classified as rural in 1967 and
reclassified as urban in 1975, even though conditions had not
changed, this would account for about 6 million acres, or more than
one-third of the estimated total change. If 15 percent of urban areas
were classified in such a fashion, it would account for one-half of the
change estimated by SCS, which would almost bring the SCS
estimates into line with other sources of data. Without knowing how
reliable the classifications were, it is impossible to know exactly what
fraction of the annual change was caused by the unreliability of
measurements. Nevertheless, no satisfactory estimate of annual
change is possible without estimating the effects of unreliability.
The second assumption required by the procedures used by the
SCS/NALS studies is that there is no possibility of land being
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converted from urban, built-up, or water to other categories. Shifts
in land that has been classified as being out of the inventory (that is,
as urban, built-up, or water) to agricultural categories were simply
not measured by the SCS surveys. This does not bias the results of
the 1967-75 resurvey, but it does bias any calculations of changes in
the quantity of urban, built-up, and water classifications from an
earlier to a later survey.
In the short run to the medium run, the amount of land used or
set aside for industrial sites, railroad yards, and highways that is
converted to agricultural uses is probably small; but the amount of
land covered by water that might be drained and converted into
cropland or that is simply reclassified by an observer is not small.
The large increase in land area covered by water in Florida, for
example, can be accounted for by a change in the classification of the
Everglades. There is apparently no way for a similar shift to take
place in the opposite direction; that is, from cropland to swamp.
BIAS OF OBSERVERS

The lack of clarity and precision in the specification of procedures allows considerable freedom for observer bias to operate
unconstrained by mechanisms that are usually incorporated into
scientific investigations as a control for this source of error. John
Fraser Hart found evidence of such bias in the NALS/SCS data: '' A
number of county committees, especially highly urbanized counties,
seem to have made no effort to update the 1958 figure for the 1967
inventory because precisely the same figure is reported for both
years. Some 'changes' may have resulted from a consistent statewide bias in one of the two inventories. For example, the figures for
built-up area in 1958 were suspiciously low for almost all counties in
several states, notably Wyoming, Michigan and North Carolina. " 15

EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY: CONFLICTING EVIDENCE
In the past, the Economics and Statistics Service (ESS) of the
USDA was the main governmental agency charged with estimating
the amounts of land in various uses. ESS estimates for urban areas
are derived primarily from the decennial census data, which are
developed from maps. While this method has its limitations, the
Bureau of the Census has at least been consistent in the techniques it
has used to conduct the 1950, 1960, and 1970 censuses. To check for
internal consistency, the ESS compares census estimates of other
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categories of land use from other original sources. Use of land for
transportation, for example, is estimated from quite reliable statistics
on road mileage gathered by the Department of Transportation. The
shift in interest at SCS has probably introduced some inconsistency.
NALS itself commented: ''The emphasis of instructions on a particular category may change in different inventories. In early SCS
inventories (1958 and 1967), urban and built-up uses of land were
only considered so these acreages could be excluded from the
inventory. In the 1970s urban and built-up became subjects of
interest and enumerators were given instructions to include and
report these uses.' ' 1 6
ESS and SCS estimates of urban and built-up areas are listed in
table 5 .1, which shows that the rates of change for the periods
1950-60 and 1960-70 were far below the rate of change estimated
for the 1967-75 period. Furthermore, the SCS estimate of the rate of
change from 1958 to 1967 is comparable to the ESS estimate for that
period, partly because the SCS estimation process in those years
included ''urban area data from the Census of Population used in the
ESS series. " 17 The ESS data show a decline in the rate of change
over the 1950-70 decades, whereas the SCS 1967-75 estimate
shows a rapid increase (see table 5.1). If the ESS data are taken as
being correct through 1970, because of the overlap between SCS and
ESS data for the peirod 1967-70, the rate of change from 1970 to
1975 would have had to be extremely high if the SCS estimates for
1967 to 1975 were to be correct (unless the rate of change at the
beginning of the 1960 to 1970 decade was much faster than the rate
at the end).
A time series of aerial photographs is an effective method of
investigating urbanization. No nationwide study has yet been made,
but Kathryn Zeimetz et al. studied photographs of the 53 counties
that grew fastest between about 1960 and 1970. 18 According to
William Fischel's analysis, the results of Zeimetz et al. imply "a
decade increase of 23 percent (3/13) in urban development for the 53
fastest growing counties. Compare this to the SCS estimate of a 4 7
percent increase in urban land / or the entire country in the period
1967-77. '' 19 Fischel found that the SCS estimates yield untenable
conclusions when compared with the available aerial photographs.
The USGS data based on aerial surveys also lend credence to the
unjustifiable nature of SCS estimates.
In the absence of a replication of the Zeimetz et al. study,
Fischel made a
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conjectural projection to compare the Zeimetz et al. data to the
SCS 's. The counties Zeimetz investigated accounted for 20
percent of the population increase of the U.S. in the 1960's. This
showed that 85,560 acres per year were converted to urban use.
If all U.S. population increase in the 1960's occurred at identical
densities, this would be 427,800 acres converted per year. Since
it is likely that even non-growing areas also expand, let us
(generously, I think) raise this figure by 50 percent to 641,700.
This is well below the 1,135,100 estimate by the 1967 NRI. Even
if it doubled during the following decade, an exceedingly unlikely
event, it would still be less than haH the 2.8 million acres per year
suggested by the 1977 NRI. Thus I surmise that the SCS figures
overstate the conversion of farmland to urban uses by at least a
factor of 3 or 4. 20

The NALS/SCS studies concur with other analyses that the total
urban and built-up area in the United States, excluding transportation, was between 31 and 35 million acres as of 1967. 21 There is also
agreement that the rate of urbanization had been constant or slowing
between 1950 and 1970. Yet, SCS/NALS suggested that from 1967
to 1977 there was an increase of 29 million acres in urban and built-up
land. 22 To put this into perspective, the long-run trend from 1960 to
1970 was about 1 million acres of land urbanized per year, with the
rate being constant or falling. 23 SCS/NALS asserted that the rate
then jumped to between 2 and 3 million acres a year from 1967 to
1975 (or 1977). Furthermore, if the annual trend of 1 million acres
had held until 1970, SCS/NALS would necessarily be estimating an
annual rate of land conversion to urban or built-up use of 5 million
acres between 1970 and 1975.
Between 1967 and 1977, the years during which SCS suggests
there was a doubling or trebling of the rate of land conversion to
urban use, migration patterns changed away from established metropolitan areas; that is, patterns of population distribution changed in
favor of smaller, more rural areas. This turnaround, however, must
be put into a longer-term perspective. For more than two centuries
in the process of settling the land mass between the Atlantic and
Pacific oceans and between Canada and Mexico, roughly 200 million
people (by 1967) had built towns on between 31 and 35 million acres
of land. Then, according to SCS/NALS, in the course of only ten
years, 1967 to 1977, and with a total population increase of only 18
million, urban and built-up areas increased by 29 million acres, almost
none of which was due to increasing acreage for transportation.
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SCS shows the biggest loss of agricultural land in general, 12. 0
out of 23.2 million total acres, and of cropland in particular, 2.5 out of
5.4 million acres, in the South (see table 5.2). An analysis of
TABLE 5.2
AGRICULTURAL LAND CONVERTED TO URBAN, BUILT-UP, TRANSPORTATION,
AND WATER USES (BY SELECTED CENSUS REGIONS) AND FORMER
AGRICULTURAL USES (FROM THE NRI DATA SERIES,
1967-75, IN MILLIONS OF ACRES)

CENSUS

OTHER AGRlTOTAL
CROPLAND PASTURE AND FOREST
RANGE LAND
LAND CULTURAL USES

0.7
1.6

1.3
0.8

South

2.5

Northeast

0.6
5.4

2.1
0.1
4.3

West
North-Central

Totals

0.5
0.7
3.9
1.4
6.5

~

0.5
2.1
3.5
0.9
7.0

3.0
5.2
12.0
3.0
23.2
~

SOURCE: ''Potential Cropland Study,'' USDA-SCS, 1977.
NOTE: In its text, the NALS talks about 24 million acres-17 million connected to urban and 7
million to water. Therefore, I have adopted their usage in the text, despite the 23.2 million acre
total in this table.

purported conversion of agricultural land to urban and water uses in
the Southeast indicates that there might be something wrong with
the SCS' s data on land conversion. Four states in the Southeast
census region-Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina-account for 5.9 million acres of land converted from agricultural to urban, built-up, transportation, and water uses between
1967 and 1975, fully 25 percent of the total acres said to have been
converted to urban uses during that period. 24 These four states
contain about 7. 7 percent of the total population of the United States.
Part of the explanation for these numbers is that much of the land
was converted to water-3.3 million other acres of the total 5.9
million acres in the Southeast. This does not seem to signal an
agricultural problem. 25 Much of the area is probably swamp land; 26
and because this quantity is much larger than the 2.6 million acres
that the SCS/NALS estimate as having shifted into urban uses in the
Southeast, it undoubtedly does not represent reservoirs or other
bodies of water used by urban areas. Given the measurement of
classification problems discussed above, it is possible that the shift of
3.3 million acres is simply due to the reclassification of the Everglades.
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In short, concern over the loss of agricultural land to urbanization in the South appears to be groundless. Any discrepancies or
classification errors in just four southeastern states could account for
much of the total estimates made by the SCS/NALS on the amount of
agricultural land that was urbanized between 1967 and 1975. The
SCS/NALS estimated that ''conversions'' in the southeastern region
represent a substantial part of SCS/NALS United States estimates,
and removing them would lower the ''loss'' figures by about half. A
similar argument can be made for the Northeast. In 1860, for
example, New Hampshire had 2,367,000 acres of tillable land; and by
1974 the tillable area had declined to 172,000 acres. 27 The land went
out of cultivation because it was stony and hilly and because it
became cheaper to grow crops in the Midwest. The land was not
necessarily converted because of ''encroaching'' cities. Does it
make sense, therefore, to worry about the ''loss'' of farmland in
places like New Hampshire?
The SCS and the NALS offer large amounts of data on the
overall agricultural land base, which includes pasture land, range
land, forest land, and so forth. Regardless of their degree of
reliability, such data on changes in the overall agricultural land base
tell virtually nothing about whether the United States is losing prime
farmland (or any farmland) to urbanization. The shifts between
farmland categories obscure any shifts from agricultural to urban
uses when the urban category is treated as a residual-as is the case
with some NALS/SCS estimates. For example, NALS claimed that
between 1967 and 1978, 74.2 million acres shifted out of cropland,
while another 48. 7 acres shifted into cropland. 28 These shifts dwarf
the shifts to urbanization. Urbanization rates can only be correctly
estimated from direct data on urbanized acres, and such data were
not developed by the SCS inventories.
REVISING PROCEDURES FOR ESTIMATING URBANIZATION
The methodological problems incorporated into the SCS surveys make it impossible to determine how rapidly land in the United
States is being converted from cropland and other agricultural
purposes to urban and built-up areas. The cheapest and simplest
improvement in the procedure would be to obtain an estimate of the
reliabilty of the observers' judgments. A new observer could be sent
to the roughly 60 PSUs (or a sample of them) that were reclassified in
1975, or even to the less than 20 PSUs that were listed as shifting
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from cropland to built-up. The observer would need to determine if
the area were indeed urban or built-up and if the usage that caused
the classification occurred prior to or after 1967. A shift in usage after
1967 would indicate a real change in classification, and shifts that
occurred earlier would indicate errors in measurement.
A more expensive solution would be to conduct a new survey
designed to estimate changes in the rate of urban growth and in the
use of land. To be unbiased, no land areas could be excluded; but to
be efficient, the sample would need to be stratified with a heavy
oversampling of the urban fringe areas in which most of the
conversion from farm to urban and built-up is occurring. The new
survey would require more detailed instructions and training for
observers, and the sample design and methods would have to be held
constant over time so as not to disguise real changes. The SCS
National Resources Inventory scheduled for 1982 does not appear to
be particularly well designed to measure urbanization in this respect. 29 Unless the problems are eliminated, the same shortcomings
may be expected.
Surely the best method, and perhaps the easiest, is to analyze
the aerial maps that are in the possession of the SCS and the USGS.
Progress is being made in this direction, and I hope it will continue.
PROTECTING THE NALS'S ESTIMATES
Changes in urbanization and cropland are not perfectly correlated; but the amount of cropland, especially prime cropland, is said
to be of most interest in the discussion. An increase in cropland at the
same time that the NALS announces a loss of prime farmland seems
to contradict its basic position. This explains why the NALS, reacting
to the 1980 Census of Agriculture report that cropland had been
rising from 1974 to 1978, quickly published an adjustment that
showed this increase to be the result of underreporting in earlier
years. Only through analysis and using later data was this initial
adjustment shown to be incorrect.
In 1979 the Illinois Farmers Home Administration of the USDA
publicized the "loss of 100,000 agricultural acres every year" in
Illinois. On 22July 1980, Governor James Thompson cited this figure
as he issued an Executive Order for Preservation of Illinois Farmland. Subsequently, the data from the 1978 Census of Agriculture
were made available, showing substantial increases in cropland for
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Illinois and for the United States as a whole since 1974. Kenneth
Cook explains what happened afterwards:
Ironically, the new information came out of a feud between
the Illinois Department of Agriculture and Julian Simon [who
argued] ... that environmentalists have produced "an oversupply of false bad news'' about the state of the planet. Citing figures
from the Census of Agriculture that showed an increase in the
amount of land in farms [the articles were about cropland, not
farmland] in Illinois, Simon dismissed farmland preservation as
''scaremongering.''
''We were also confronted at the national level by experts in
the field who contended the 1974 and 1978 census showed about
an 8~rnillion-acre increase in the land in farms (nationally),'' said
Gray and Benbrook. "On this basis, they questioned what all the
fuss over conversion was about.''
. . . Illinois agriculture officials . . . decided to contact the
Bureau of Census in Washington because they could not believe
that land in farms had increased. The Bureau responded that the
1969 and 1974 censuses had underenumerated land in farms.
Revised figures showed that between 1974 and 1978 Illinois' land
in farms had declined by 425,000 acres. The earlier figures had
shown a 639,000 acre increase.
''When we became aware of the underenumeration problem
in Illinois, we made our own inquiries and were told that similar
adjustments were needed nationwide,'' said Gray and Benbrook.
The result: The latest data show a national decline of 88
million acres in land in farms between 1969 and 1978-an annual
rate of 9. 8 million acres. 30

The Bureau of the Census's Agriculture Division and NALS had
produced ''adjusted'' figures, apparently based on a change in
definition, plus an allowance (derived from a special sample) for farms
that were not included on the mailing list of farms that were brought
into the 1978 census. The adjusted figures sent to the Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) by Arnold Bollenbacher, chief of the
Agriculture Division of the Bureau of the Census, showed a decline
from 30,209,337 farmland acres in 1974 to 29,733,904 in 1978,
instead of an increase from 29,094, 794 acres. These figures have
been offered as evidence by the DNR and others that cropland
declined between 1974 and 1978. The main problem with the figures
is the estimate that in 1974, 3. 7 percent of the farmland was not
counted, whereas a special sample to remedy the undercount was
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included in the 1978 figure. Therefore, they multiplied the published
1974 figure by 1.037 to get an adjusted 1974 figure.
There are two things wrong with this adjustment. First, the
1978 coverage was not complete, so 3. 7 percent is too big an
adjustment. More important, the adjustment refers to all farms,
including animal farms, tree farms, and pastures. The special Census
Bureau sample shows that the adjustment applies much less than
proportionally to field-crop farms than to other farms. Hence, the
adjustment for all farmland does not show that cropland has decreased.
The Census of Agriculture has now published detailed data on
the appropriate adjustment. 31 For land in farms, 253,284 acres
should be subtracted from the published total of 29,733,904, for an
adjusted total of 29,480,620 acres, to be compared with the
29,094, 794 acres for 1974. So, land in farms did increase from 1974
to 1978. For cropland, the adjustment leaves 1978 cropland at
25,170,007 (25,366,407 -196,400) acres, to be compared with
24,399,588 acres for 1974. Corroborating evidence comes from the
excellent yearly data from the Crop Reporting Board, where no such
adjustments are involved. Those data show that there have recently
been substantial increases in Illinois cropland. As Bollenbacher
summed up, "Even with some decrease in total land in farms,
cropland increased in Illinois and in the United States. " 32
The complexity of the economic system's responses to needs
for food and housing can easily cause misunderstandings, which can
lead to calls for preservation of farmland. But preservation of
farmland can also be used to make other concerns. Crosson has
noted that
some of those ostensibly concerned with the adequacy of land as a
factor of agricultural production are really concerned about it as a
source of amenity values ... . If much of the concern about the
adequacy of agricultural land is really concern with preservation of
amenity values rather than of productive capacity, why is the
discussion typically cast in terms of [productive] capacity? ...
two reasons come to mind. One is muddled thinking, a simple
failure to recognize that agricultural land provides both commodity
values and amenity values, but not in fixed proportions. The other
reason is that maintenance of capacity is more likely to enlist
political support for preservation of agricultural land than maintenance of amenity values. . . . Threats to our ability to feed
ourselves and meet our felt obligations to a hungry world are more
likely to mobilize a political response to pressure agricultural land
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than threats to the pleasures of a Sunday afternoon drive through
the countryside. 33

The NALS was created in 1979 with the sponsorship of the
Council of Environmental Quality and the Department of Agriculture
and the participation of many other governmental agencies, including
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Water Resource
Council. Robert Gray was appointed head of the NALS, and he
publicized the figure of 3 million acres and the dangers of loss of
farmland even though members of his research staff protested that
their studies did not support such statements. The NALS research
director, Michael Brewer, wrote: "Efforts to determine the 'nature,
rate, extent and causes of reductions in the land base,' led NALS into
a morass of inconsistent and conflicting numbers that left issues
possibly more confused than previously.'' 34
Nevertheless, in Brewer and Boxley's paper for Resources for
the Future, the conversion figure of 3 million acres (including water)
is given, and the authors comment that ''the conversions are
relatively irreversible, the rate appears to have increased, and the
phenomenon warrants scrutiny. " 35 It is not clear who was saying
what to whom and when. Gray was told by persons who had worked
on urbanization and farmland data that 1 million acres or less, not 3
million acres, are being built up yearly. Some of those persons were
,mder considerable pressure to change their views.
Most agricultural economists think that the loss of prime
farmland is not a national problem. Marion Clawson of Resources for
the Future has said: "Preservation of prime agricultural land is
important, but so is the preservation of land prime for other uses.
Agricultural land use must be viewed in a wider context than
agriculture alone. Prime land is important, but so are all the other
inputs in the agricultural production equation. Agricultural research in
particular must be fostered and protected.' ' 36 Clifton B. Luttrell has
found that ''there is no evidence that the quantity of cropland is
shrinking or that shortages of food are imminent. Furthermore, even
if the alleged problem did exist, there is no evidence that it could be
solved more efficiently by social planning than by market participants. '' 37
Philip Raup, an agricultural economist at the University of
Minnesota, has noted that the crucial competition is between
cropland and forest, not cropland and built-up land. ''The short-term
prospect is for a substantial reduction in the pressure of urban
demand on rural lands. " 38 Crosson summed up a recent Resources
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for the Future conference by saying that the consensus of the
distinguished participants was that ''while one should not be complacent about the agricultural land issue neither is it a matter of pressing
current national concern. ''39
Geographer John Fraser Hart ended his review of "Urban
Encroachment on Rural Areas'' with the question: ''If urban encroachment on rural land is not a serious problem in the United
States, then why has so much arrant nonsense been written and
spoken on the subject?'' He then answered: ''It is all too easy for the
layman to generalize New York to the entirety of urban America or to
believe that the unique agricultural situation in parts of California is
typical of the entire nation. Some people seem to want to believe that
the world is going to hell in a handbasket, and some simply do not
know any better than to repeat what they have read or what
someone else has told them.'' 40

NOTES
This paper owes much to H. Thomas Frey, a heroic public servant who guided
me to valuable information. I also appreciate useful comments from Marion Clawson,
Pierre Crosson, William Fischel, John Fraser Hart, and Seymour Sudman; I also
benefited from the research assistance of Andrew Jaske. Bruce Little was helpful in a
variety of ways. An extended critical analysis of the surveys made by the Soil
Conservation Service, from which the sections in this paper on the subject are
drawn, may be found in "How Much Farmland Is Being Converted to Urban Use?"
by Julian L. Simon and Seymour Sudman, International Regional Science Review 4:
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Urban Development and Agricultural
Land Markets
William Fischel

Compare the cultivation of the lands in the neighbourhood of any
considerable town, with that of those which lie at some distance
from it, and you will easily satisfy yourself how much the country
is benefited by the commerce of the town. Among all the absurd
speculations that have been propagated concerning the balance of
trade, it has never been pretended that either the country loses by
its commerce with the town, or the town by that with the country
which maintains it.
-Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations

Try this thought experiment: Divide the population of the United
States into households of four, and house them at the suburbansprawl density of one household per acre. What percentage of the
land area of the United States, excluding Alaska, would thereby be
occupied? 1 Guesses typically range from 10 to 70 percent, with 30
percent a frequent median. The correct answer is 3 percent. This
exercise usually dissuades people from seeing urban development as
a threat to the total supply of land.
To counter objections that this experiment could be misleading,
I propose a more sophisticated one. Consider the Urbanized Area
(UA)-the contiguous built-up parts of a Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area (SMSA)-in which "built-up" could mean as little as
a tract of single-unit homes on two-acre lots. In 1970, approximately
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58 percent of the United States population lived in UAs, which take
up about 1.2 percent of the country's land area. 2 From the twentyfive largest UAs, subtract both the land area and the population of the
central city or cities in order to calculate a gross residential density of
4. 9 persons per acre. This includes suburban housing, roads,
highways, shopping centers, parks, golf courses, and industries. If
everyone lived at existing densities of suburban sprawl, less than 2.5
percent of the country's land area would be used. The result is not
appreciably different for smaller UAs. For a few isolated small towns
whose boundaries correspond reasonably well to developed areas,
gross densities are three or four persons per acre. We do not take up
much land.
Nevertheless, many people believe that urbanization threatens
farmland. 3 Although most states have responded to the perceived
threat by adopting some kind of program for agricultural preservation, until recently the federal government had no involvement in the
preservation movement. Congressman James Jeffords (Rep., Vt.)
attempted to change this in 1977 by introducing legislation that would
have established a commission to study the problem of farmland
conversion and provided guidelines for federal agencies. 4 Jeffords's
bills were not approved, but his purpose was substantially met when
the secretary of agriculture and the chairman of the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) established the National Agricultural
Lands Study (NALS) in June 1979. Robert Gray, one of Jeffords's
legislative analysts, was named executive director of the NALS; and
Michael Brewer, an agricultural economist with the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA), was named research director.
By most accounts, the NALS quickly became a battleground between
the environmental advocates in the CEQ and the Soil Conservation
Service (SCS) and the agricultural economists and allies within the
USDA's Economic Research Service. Gray headed the former
group; Brewer headed the latter. 5
The NALS's Final Report reads like an uneasy compromise. 6
For example, many statements made about the threat to farmland
and the consequences of conversion are tempered by qualifiers
stating that the problem will not become serious until far in the
future; data showing loss of land are not very reliable; growth in rural
manufacturing may make part-time farming more viable; and high gas
prices may slow down urban decentralization. Despite the occasional
ambivalence, however, the pessimistic position dominates the report.
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The amenity values of farmland are hardly mentioned in the
NALS' s report. Instead, the focus is on the adequacy of future
production of food and fiber. The NALS's argument goes like this:
During the 197Os, two events made urbanization a serious problem.
First, a dramatic rise in world grain prices and an accompanying
increase in United States exports eliminated the excess capacity that
had characterized American agriculture since World War II. Second,
SCS studies indicated that there was a quantum leap in the rate at
which rural land was being converted to urban and built-up uses. The
NALS projected these trends into the next century and suggested
that the United States will not have enough farmland to meet world
demand, at least not at 1976 real prices. 7
To stem the tide of agricultural land conversion, the NALS
concluded that governmental intervention was necessary. Both state
and local governments should be encouraged to adopt comprehensive
policies for managing growth, in order to preserve agricultural land.
Further, ''the national interest in agricultural land should be articulated by a presidential level and/ or Congressional statement of
policy,' ' with suitable attention being given to implementing such
policies by federal agencies. 8 While the NALS's Final Report was
somewhat circumspect in sounding the alarm, no such caution was
exercised by their public-information section. Where Have the Farmlands Gone? and various press releases were thoroughly disturbing
statements of the perceived problem and were written well before
the actual research had been conducted. 9 Are these fears justified?
Perhaps the best place to find an answer is in an examination of the
data that the NALS used in making its predictions.
There are three reasons to suspect the NALS's data. First, the
methods used to calculate the rate of urbanization had an upward bias
during the 197Os that was not present during the 196Os, since the
procedures and definitions of urban and built-up areas in the 197Os
collection of data were significantly more inclusive than those used
during the 196Os. Second, alternative data on housing, road, and
other construction show only a slight increase during the 197Os when
compared with the 1960s, certainly not enough to explain how the
NALS detected a more than 100 percent increase in urban development. Third, some alternative estimates and checks on the data used
by the NALS suggest that the true rate of urban development is far
below what the NALS claims it to be. 10
Even if the time frame used by NALS is wrong, won't the
United States eventually have to face the issue? Even if the total
supply of land is not affected,· shouldn't we still be concerned about
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the location and quality of the land converted? Does it really make
any difference whether we preserve agricultural land? If there is an
abundance of land, why not zone it for exclusive agricultural use?
These issues will be addressed in this paper.
MICROECONOMIC MODELS OF URBAN EXPANSION
Nearly all of the literature on the issue of farmland conversion
treats urban development as something that happens without regard
to the market for agricultural land. 11 There are, however, three
approaches that treat urbanization as endogenous, each of which
provides insights into the conversion process. First is the capitalutilization model, which is a simplified analysis of the use of capital
(machines, equipment, and buildings) in two different sectorsagriculture and housing. Second is a more general model that draws
on the literature on the depletion of natural resources. Third is the
standard model of urban land rent, modified to focus on the urbanrural boundary.
The capital-utilization model is based on the assumptions,
shared by the NALS, that there is no danger that the total land area
of the United States will be urbanized and that crops are likely to be
grown on only a fraction of the available land; that is, total land area
does not impose an economic constraint on crop production. Crops
have been grown almost everywhere, including in areas that were
once deserts, mountains, lakes, and swamps. The capital-utilization
model recognizes that there are substitutes for land in crop production: these include machinery, buildings, fertilizer, and pesticides. In
this paper, these substitutes are referred to as capital, and the
agricultural labor force is assumed to be fixed. The supply of capital is
the serious constraint on production per capita, and the question is
how best to allocate scarce capital among the desirable uses for it.
Food and fiber are not the only goods that people care about;
they also desire housing, which will be surrogate for all other urbanproduced goods. Like agricultural products, housing is produced with
both land and capital. The problem is how to allocate capital between
agriculture and housing so that utility is maximized subject to the
constraint of capital. The standard microeconomic result equates the
marginal-revenue-product of a unit of capital used in agriculture to
that of one used in housing. Rather than derive this, it may be more
illuminating to give an example.
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It must be made clear, however, that to assert that the total
stock of land is not a constraint is not to say that all land has the same
qualities .12 Land that is especially well suited for growing crops may
also be good for growing houses. Two basic propositions have been
either overlooked or denied by most farmland preservationists:
First, the private market will normally guide developers to use land
that is less suited for crops when it is in society's best interest to do
so. Second, sometimes it is in society's best interest for the
developer to use good farmland and to induce the farmer to take up
alternative land, even if it has poorer qualities.
Suppose that site A has a present value of $10,000 for use in
agriculture (i.e., it would sell for that amount if it were forever
restricted to agricultural use) and that adjoining site B has a present
value under the same conditions of $4,000. Site B is less desirable
because it is hilly and requires more capital-intensive measures of
conservation and production than does site A. Assume that a housing
developer must choose between site A and site B. If the cost of
constructing a house is the same on both sites, the developer will
choose site B, since its cost to him or her will be lower. It need not
be $6,000 lower, for there may be competition among developers. If
only one site will be developed, however, site B will always be
cheaper and thus more attractive to the builder. This establishes the
first proposition: Society has preserved its resources solely because
of the actions of profit-seeking developers.
Suppose, however, that in order to build houses on site B the
developer must incur larger capital expenditures for grading, drainage, fuel, and sewerage than he or she would have to bear on site
A. 13 If the differential is greater than $6,000, it will be both in the
developer's and in society's best interest to acquire site A. For
example, suppose that choosing site B would cost the builder $8,000
more in capital costs than would site A. Since it would cost the farmer
only $6,000 to move to site B to produce the same goods, society
would save $2,000 by allowing the builder to acquire site A. Since the
farmer must move to site B and incur greater expense in farming
there, food prices might rise (depending on demand); but the
alternative advocated by farmland preservationists, which would
require the builder to acquire the less desirable site, would result in
an even more damaging increase in housing costs.
This example does not depend on the value of the housing itself.
It holds whether the houses are mobile homes or mansions. It is
housing's high value of capital to land that may lead many people to
believe that developers can disregard agricultural land values.
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The capital-utilization model does have one drawback: It does
not address the irreversibility of urban development, which is an
important issue for the preservation movement. Data show that even
if urban development is irreversible, we are such a long way from
having to worry about it that it is hard to take it too seriously. Like
many other environmental issues, however, the question of what will
happen decades from now is persistent and requires one of two
responses: (1) questioning the whole idea of irreversible development or (2) accepting the concept and drawing analogies to the
economics of the depletion of nonrenewable resources.
It would be expensive, but not impossible, to raze houses and
then to convert suburban tracts to commercial agricultural land. A
more benign view is to regard suburban housing tracts on former
cropland as a conversion from one agricultural use to another. The
structures and pavements take up only a fraction of the total area; the
rest is in lawns, ornamental shrubs, shade and fruit trees, and flower
and vegetable gardens. Without being too whimsical, the suburban
backyard can be seen as a marvelously decentralized method of
hedging against high food prices . 14
This raises the question of the extent to which scatter-site rural
development actually impinges on agricultural potential. Can one
seriously argue that a single-family home on a multiacre lot will cause
the entire area to be "paved over or built up"? Yet, it is precisely
this specter that the NALS used to account for the huge increase in
urbanization and the loss of agricultural lands over the past decade.
There is a simple analogy between the so-called loss of agricultural land and the exploitation of a finite amount of a nonrenewable
resource, such as oil. There is an extensive and growing economic
literature on this topic, most of it stemming from Harold Hotelling' s
classic article. 15 Hotelling proved that competitive private ownership
of a known resource with fixed extraction costs would result in a
socially optimal rate of depletion. The rate of depletion would be
governed by interaction between the price of the extracted resource
and the interest rate, and the socially optimal path of exploitation
would set the growth rate of prices equal to the rate of interest.
Private owners of rural land near cities would have incentives to
follow this path as well. If prices for urban land were to grow faster
than interest, it would pay rural landowners to sell less this year and
more next. This would raise prices this year and lower them next,
until the spread between prices became equal to the interest rate. 16
Most current research has extended Hotelling' s model to
account for market imperfections and other deviations from his basic
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assumptions. It is interesting that agricultural land comes very close
to meeting all of Hotelling' s assumptions for his simplest model.
There is no problem of monopoly, the existing stock is well known,
and the extraction costs (of conversion to urban uses) are most likely
to be constant over a broad range . 17
One drawback of the resources analogy is that urban land
constitutes a reusable stock. Thus, conversion to urban land is more
like mining a substance that can be infinitely recycled than it is like
extracting oil. The NALS made much of the '' cumulative effect'' that
conversion would have on remaining agricultural land, without once
considering the opposing cumulative effect that conversion would
have on the supply of urban land.
Another drawback is that the res011rces approach does not take
into account location, which is the focus of most urban research.
Most decisions made about location are constrained by the transportation costs of moving back and forth between home and job and, to a
lesser extent, between home and school, shops, and recreational
facilities. 18 This simultaneously affects the consumption of housing.
The farther people live from the city center, the more costly it is to
commute, since destinations are more dispersed. To equalize utility,
it is necessary to provide lower costs for land and housing to those
who live farther from the city center. Those who live on the far fringe
of suburbia will consume more land and housing than those who live
closer in. In equilibrium, the advantage of lower prices for housing to
be had by moving a mile farther away from the city center will be
exactly counterbalanced by the additional cost of transportation
(including time).
The graphical summary of this process for the land market is the
rent-offer curve shown in figure 6.1 as Ru- The curve slopes
downward because the distance from the center adds to the costs of
commuting and thus lowers the bids for land. It is convex (even if the
costs of commuting are linear) because one can substitute capital for
land in housing. At locations closer to the city center, profitmaximizing developers will erect buildings that are taller or closer
together.
The simple urban model is constrained at its outer boundary by
the rent for agricultural purposes. The rent-offer curve is designated
Ra. Point Bis the outer boundary of the urban area, outside of which
the maximum that households will pay for land is less than what
farmers would pay or accept as payment. A developer would not find
it profitable to buy land and build houses outside of B, because
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FIGURE 6.1
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households would not pay both the agricultural rent and the increased
costs of commuting.
Within the context of this simple model, several issues suggested by the NALS can be examined. For example, do prices for
agricultural land form a serious constraint on urban development at
the outer edge? Little research has been done on this, but there are
two sources of indirect evidence. Edwin S. Mills used a numerical
analysis of an urban model to test the sensitivity of various parameters .19 From the initial equilibrium values that he calculated, it was
found that a 20 percent increase in Ra caused a 9 percent decrease in
the land area of the city, while a 20 percent decrease in Ra caused a
24 percent increase in land area. This suggests that the role of
agricultural rents in determining city size should not be ignored, since
variations of this magnitude in prices for agricultural land are
plausible. Kathryn Zeimetz et al. found that the density of new
residential development was greater in areas where there was a
large percentage of cropland. 20 Since cropland is typically more
valuable than other rural land, this suggests that developers attempted to conserve on land by building houses closer together.
Thus, the land market may promote land conservation, even in the
rapidly growing areas that were the subject of the Zeimitz study.
The principal value of the urban model is not its conditions of
static equilibrium but the insights that it can provide into the process
of suburbanization. Urban areas in the United States have been
suburbanizing for more than a century as the average distance of
households and firms from the city center has increased. 21 This
process has induced a relative shift in land values, with greater
growth in the suburbs than in the city's center. The shift is shown by
~ in figure 6 .1; the new equilibrium border between urban and
agricultural uses is now B'. Within this context, several issues can be
discussed.
Has suburban development been subsidized to the extent that it
has usurped a significant amount of agricultural land, thereby locating
B' farther from the city center than it would be in a market where all
prices equal the marginal social cost? The NALS and much of the
literature on farmland preservation list all manner of subsidies to
suburban development. 22 In the context of figure 6 .1, the result of
these subsidies ought to be that the urban-rural boundary would end
up to the right of B'.
It is generally recognized that the two most important areas of
subsidy are transportation and housing. Suburban housing is subsidized insofar as federal and state governments do not tax the imputed
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rent from owner-occupied housing, and ownership of these assets is
encouraged by allowing deductions for payments of mortgage interest and property taxes. Various federal programs of mortgage
guarantees are also mentioned, but the magnitude of these programs
is dwarfed by the tax subsidy. 23 Although owner-occupied housing
can be obtained in central city locations, it is likely that the net effect
of these provisions has encouraged suburban housing, contributing to
an urban/rural border that is farther from the center than it would be
if there were no such subsidy.
Although there is a large literature on the general effects that
tax subsidies have on housing, to my knowledge there is no estimate
of what effect they have on the size of metropolitan areas. I submit
that it is probably not large. The subsidy is to ownership of both land
and capital, not just land. Indeed, the subsidy can be obtained even
though the taxpayer does not own the land on which a structure is
located, as in the case of condominiums and mobile homes. Even if
the subsidy resulted in having every household consume . 20 acres of
additional land (about a third more than the current gross sizes of
suburban lots), urban uses would still only take up an area less than 4
percent of the land currently being used to grow crops and less than 1
percent of the total land area.
Transportation subsidies are the other favorite target of farmland preservationists. The so-called subsidy that receives the most
attention from economists is the underpricing of urban roads during
congested hours. Literature on urban economics has suggested that
this may result in more suburbanization than would have taken place
if rush-hour tolls were instituted. Again, there are no convincing
estimates of the magnitude of the effect that this would have. Neither
is there reason to believe that there is a serious impingement on the
stock of agricultural land. 24
Other forces that may encourage suburbanization are pollution
of the central city, the declining quality of schools or other public
services, and high crime rates. Since none of these factors is
regarded as being politically desirable (unlike the consumption of
housing), the obvious solution is not to prevent people from trying to
escape them, but to combat them in order to give people less
incentive to move away.
Subsidies for suburbanization and other forces that might push
the ultimate urban-rural boundary out too far constitute only one side
of the issue. We should also ask whether the subsidies to agriculture
have not raised agricultural rents (Ra in figure 6.1) to the degree that
B' might be too close to the center of the city. Many state and federal
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programs that are designed to support agricultural prices may be
capitalized in land values. Moreover, a number of governmental
programs are designed to make farm life more desirable, such as
programs of rural electrification and home loans for farmers. A
serious evaluation of the role of the land market in determining the
ruran/urban boundary would have to take into account programs that
may offset the subsidies to urban development. The NALS seems to
have conducted no such evaluation.
The NALS regarded leapfrog development and land speculation
as important causes of excessive suburban development. Suppose
that it is anticipated, without certainty, that the city will suburbanize
and that land rents will shift from Ru to R' u, as seen in figure 6.1.
Assume that there are two concentric development zones, D1 and
D2 , both between the original boundary B and an expected but
uncertain boundary B'. Speculators will buy land between B and B'
from farmers who either do not care to be speculators or who have
lower estimates of the land's eventual value.
The speculators must decide how to time the development of
housing on their land. It is usually desirable that development in area
D1 should ultimately be more dense than development in D2 . If the
Ru curve shifts only slowly over time, however, the initial demanders
of D1 lots may be those who demand large lot sizes. If developers at
D1 myopically choose to meet this demand, they would not be able
later to meet the demand for greater-density housing. Thus, they
might choose to wait and allow developers at D2 to build the lowerdensity housing that is currently being demanded. This will result in
developing D2 before D1 ; that is, there will be leapfrog development
and subsequent filling in.
In this situation, leapfrog development is socially desirable. 25 If
the speculators guess right about the suburban boundary, higherdensity housing will be located closer to the city center than lowerdensity housing. What is to guarantee that speculators will correctly
anticipate demand? Nothing. As everyone knows, speculators are
sometimes wrong. The only advantage that speculators have over
anyone else, including planning officials, is that if they guess right,
they make money. If they guess wrong, they lose money. I submit
that it is difficult to overestimate the power of the prospect of making
or losing money in focusing the energies of people on gathering
market information.
It has been argued that the property tax distorts this process.
The property tax on undeveloped land raises the holding costs of
farmers and other speculators in area D1 and may tempt them to sell
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too soon for a low-density use that cannot easily be reversed. 26 This
argument has some merit, but the recommended policy of taxing
open land at its current use value has been adopted in some form by
nearly every state. 27 Of course, reducing the holding costs and
thereby increasing the profits of land speculators is not usually the
justification that is offered for such legislation.
Another cause of leapfrog development may have more permanent consequences. Suppose that area D1 is composed of one or
more units of suburban government. As development takes place,
the early immigrants draw up stricter zoning laws, part of whose
purpose is to prevent more development. If this action prevents
development that would have paid its full social costs, then permanent leapfrog development will occur, since the demand for housing
in area D1 can only be met in other unzoned areas. Theoretical
studies of this process suggest that such strictures could result in
having new housing expand beyond B', thus creating unnecessary
sprawl. 28 This kind of sprawl is more damaging than that created by
speculators who guess wrong, since community authorities who
enact excessive zoning restrictions do not consider the opportunity
costs of their actions. 29 If the zoning authorities guess wrong, they
lose very little and have correspondingly little incentive to make
amends.
It may be that zoning does contribute to an excessive amount of
suburban development, both by requiring large lots and by imposing
growth controls that encourage permanent leapfrog patterns of
development. The major cost is probably not the agricultural land
that is lost but the excessive costs of commuting that are suffered by
those who must live farther away and the excessive costs for housing
for renters and immigrants to the metropolitan area.
The NALS raised another issue-the impermanence syndrome-which is supposed to account for much of the farmland that
has been idled but has not currently been developed. The NALS
argued that farmers have abandoned their land in anticipation of urban
development. The most common finding is that land is idled prior to
development in some areas, 30 but there are many instances where
this is not the case. Throughout the Midwest and in California,
cropland adjoins the lot lines of subdivisions, and farming is continued
until the housing is completed. The impermanence syndrome, then,
may be an example of the post hoc fallacy. Agricultural land has been
abandoned in the vicinity of urban development, especially in the
Northeast; but other factors may have been the dominant cause.
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To deal with the theoretical side of the impermanence syndrome, let us return to the stylized characterization of suburban
expansion in figure 6.1. Suppose that some farmers are located in D2
prior to development. Like nonfarmer speculators, they will have
some estimates about the timing of suburban development, but they
cannot be certain of when or even if their land will be developed.
Under the impermanence syndrome, many farmers will disinvest in
their land and permanent structures by foregoing measures of soil
conservation or maintenance. Where is the harm in such a response?
If a farmer suspects that he will be selling his land to a developer soon
and if the developer is not interested in the barn or the fertility of the
soil, it is a net loss to both the farmer and society to continue to
maintain them.31 Without the impermanence syndrome, resources
would be used to maintain buildings and land that would soon be out
of production.
It is possible, of course, that farmers will make bad estimates of
the timing of development, but it is not obvious that uncertainty
causes more or less investment in current farming methods. Even if
uncertainty did cause disinvestment, extreme measures would not
be justified. Making certain that each of us will die on our fiftieth
birthday would allow us to optimize our lifetime paths of consumption, but it is not a very good way to increase well-being.
Finally, there is the problem that nonfarming rural residents
create for farmers. One argument is that agglomeration economies in
agricultural production may be lost when the number of farms in an
area declines. The local dealer in farm equipment may go out of
business, and farmers may have to trade with someone farther away;
or the costs of milk collection may increase when dairy farms become
more dispersed. These are reasonable concerns, but it is unreasonable to assume that nonfarm development is a significant cause of
such problems. Even very low-density development in an area with a
viable agricultural sector takes up only a small amount of existing
farmland.
More likely causes of the decline in farming in some areas are
changes in technology and in prices that are received and paid by
farmers. It is possible, of course, that traffic or vandalism from
nearby development may accelerate the decline, but it is also
possible that rural development by nonfarmers may be of benefit to
farmers. 32 The NALS does mention that nonfarm development may
provide part-time jobs for families whose farm operations are
marginal, thereby enabling them to continue farming. Likewise, local
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farm markets may become more viable when consumers locate
nearby.
Another problem of nonfarm development is that new residents
may not tolerate some of the nuisances associated with farming.
Nonfarmers may bring nuisance suits against farmers in order to
restrict aerial spraying or noisy equipment, or they may lobby for
laws that will restrict normal farm operations. This argument is an
unconscious vindication of Ronald Coase 's approach to the problem
of extemality. 33 Coase has suggested that it is analytically wrong and
normatively arbitrary to identify one party in a nuisance suit as the
"perpetrator" and the other party as the "victim" because of the
reciprocal nature of the harm caused by alternative remedies. For
example, if a factory is forced to reduce its smoke pollution, the
owners (and perhaps the employees and consumers) will be harmed.
If the owner is not made to reduce the smoke, the people who
breathe it will be harmed. Most people who are concerned with the
environment have a hard time in accepting this approach. It is
noteworthy that the CEQ, a principal supporter of the NALS, should
implicitly subscribe to the idea that people who spray chemicals and
drive noisy machines are the victims of people who want to use the
air for breathing and who want to use the wee hours for sleeping. 34
Some polluters, it seems, are more equal than others.
There can be conflicts, however, when people move to rural
areas and become affected by preexisting farm nuisances. The NALS
has recommended a sensible approach to these problems, advocating
the adoption of ''right to farm'' legislation that would protect farmers
from nuisance suits or other controls designed to restrict normal
farm operations. The key to the success of this legislation is to adopt
a flexible definition of "normal" and to ensure that there is some
mechanism by which new residents can induce (with positive rewards) farmers to adopt less offensive techniques. Guido Calabresi
and A. Douglas Melamed have suggested that residents be allowed
to require nuisance abatement from a farmer as long as they are
willing to pay the cost to the farmer of meeting the requirements. 35

THE NALS AND ANTIDEVELOPMENT INTERESTS
The NALS recommended that the president or Congress adopt
farmland preservation as a national goal, that federal agencies adopt
policies to reduce the impact of their programs on prime farmland,
and that state and local governments be encouraged to enact
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comprehensive programs of growth management to contain urban
development. It should be noted that the NALS failed to mention one
policy: If we are running out of farmland and if prices to farmers are
going to increase, the obvious recommendation is to eliminate the
costly agricultural programs that limit output and keep prices high. At
the very least, we should stop paying farmers for not growing crops
on the land that they do have.
One way to understand the NALS's recommendations and
intent is to determine who benefits from them. Except for ''right to
farm'' legislation, current owners of farmland are most likely to be
harmed by the recommendations, since restrictions will be placed on
the disposal of their property. Farmers who want to develop their
land will find that residents who are opposed to the development
have some highly potent weapons. A national policy statement urging
the preservation of farmland is primarily useful for convincing officials
and judges that zoning for agriculture does not constitute a taking of
property without just compensation. Requiring that all federal programs account for their effects on farmland would make excellent
grounds for court suits by antidevelopment forces who would argue
that the Farmland Impact Statement (or whatever) was inadequate. 36
Some farmers, of course, may also gain from the new rules.
Because most sales of farmland are between farmers, any action that
excludes other buyers (e.g., developers) will tend to benefit the
remaining buyers by lowering the prices for land. Since this benefit
comes at the expense of the seller, who is usually a farmer, farmers
as a class are most likely to be harmed by the recommendations of
the NALS. The lower prices are not a pure transfer; potential sellers
of farmland may respond to the lower price by offering less land for
sale to other farmers and, instead, by inefficiently maintaining landextensive agricultural practices.
The real beneficiaries and the real force behind the movement
for farmland preservation are local antidevelopment interests. The
recommendations of the NALS should not be taken lightly; they have
far more power to restrict development than had any previous grant
of entitlements to antidevelopment interests (e.g., statements on
environmental impact and legislation on coastal zoning). Good farmland is typically the most feasible place for development, since it is
easy to build on and there is a lot of it. A community that zones
swamps, marshes, hillsides, flood plains, and historic districts as
being off-limits to development might restrict a few projects, but
there is usually plenty of land remaining. If farmland becomes part of
the excluded area, the exclusionary mechanism is almost perfect and
93

William Fischel

cost free to current residents. Ironically, the leapfrog development
that is caused by excessive standards of suburban zoning could
become even more pronounced.
Also, the farmland argument lends itself to extracommunity
intervention. If preserving farmland is a national issue, as the NALS
claims that it is, there is an implicit justification for residents of one
community to intervene in the development decisions of another.
Wealthy communities may be antigrowth and may zone themselves
accordingly; others may find that the fiscal or employment benefits of
growth are more important and may attempt to accommodate
development. 37 In Vermont, for example, the issue of farmland
preservation has allowed nonresidents to prevent development in
communities that clearly favor it.
I suspect that the extracommunity use of the farmland argument
is the reason why the benefits of food production are so often
stressed rather than the aspect of public goods. Arguing that
farmland should be preserved because it looks nice makes it apparent
that it is largely a local public good that can readily be handled by
individual communities. 38 Food and fiber are private goods, however,
and it becomes important for farmland preservationists to deny that
the market works in this area. Economists who talk about "market
failure'' should ponder the lengths to which it can be stretched by a
dedicated group of advocates.
Those who feel that I have been too harsh on fannland
preservationists would do well to read William Toner's study of
farmland zoning, which is being promoted by the NALS. 39 The
"new" agricultural zoning is conceived of as a permanent, not a
transitional, category of use. The major device is permanent, largelot zoning that ranges from 10 to 160 acres. More important, most of
the examples of such programs are in or near metropolitan areas and
are not a redundant constraint on development. In nearly every case
that Toner has discussed, zoning for farms appears to be a means by
which initial nonfarmer immigrants effectively ''pull up the gangplank'' to keep subsequent immigrants out.
It has been pointed out that nonfarmer immigrants who want to
adopt exclusive agricultural zoning are often supported by farmers in
the area. 40 It may be that at least some farmers who are renters or
net buyers of farmland may benefit by restrictions on alienability. It
may also be that analysts are using a loose definition of ''farmer.'' As
Bruce Gardner has pointed out, one can meet the USDA definition of
farmer by selling the product of a single dairy cow, of five acres of
com, or of half an acre of tobacco. 41 A good-sized backyard garden
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could qualify if its owner sold the produce commercially. Thus, the
exurban migrant who earns his or her living largely from other
sources would not have much difficulty in qualifying as a governmentally certified farmer.
So much of the literature on farmland preservation uses emotional appeals that I cannot resist responding in kind. The NALS's
argument is that export demand will continue to shift out, while urban
development will continue to "gobble up" the land. The United
States may not be able to export as much food. Although the NALS
pamphlet Ulhere Have the Farmlands Gone? stated that these exports
'' mean the difference between life and death to millions of less
fortunate people whose lives are marred by chronic hunger,'' 42 it is
clear that the vast majority of America's grain exports goes to feed
livestock in countries that are not, by world standards, among the
impoverished. In short, American families are being asked to forgo
their suburban homes so that American farmers can feed Russian
cows.
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7
Lessons from the Economic
Calculation Debate
E. C. Pasour, Jr.

In 1920, Ludwig von Mises began the economic calculation debate
(ECD) by arguing that socialism was incompatible with rational
economic planning. He contended that without market prices, there
is no possibility of allocating resources on the basis of consumer
preferences .1 The significance of Mises' s argument was lost in the
aftermath of the Keynesian revolution during the l 930s. Only in
recent years has the relevance of the ECD been rediscovered. The
limitations of central planning have not been resolved, and many
economists are coming to realize that those limitations apply generally when resources are allocated through nonmarket methods. In
this paper, the implications of the ECD are related to centralized
planning for land use, including the preservation of agricultural land.

THE ECONOMIC CALCULATION DEBATE
In 1920, Mises held that rational calculation-that is, adjusting
production to the satisfaction of human wants-is impossible in a
centrally directed economy in which prices are necessarily absent. 2
The market, in contrast, allocates resources on the basis of expected
profitability. When there is an increase in the expected price of com
relative to soybeans, for example, farmers shift more land into com
production. Mises stressed that producers and consumers do not
make rational economic decisions without market prices. Unless they
have such knowledge, there is no possibility of calculating costs or
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revenues and no way of knowing if the most highly valued products
have been produced. In demonstrating that the use of economic
resources is only possible when prices are applied to intermediate
products and factors of production as well as to final products, Mises
contended that no other process could take into account all relevant
facts as fully as do prices in a competitive market.
Although Mises' s position was hotly disputed for twenty years,
there can be little doubt about the general validity of his position.
Central direction does lead to a reduction in material output. As
Milton Friedman has said, ''Hardly a person in the world will claim
today that nationalized industry or socialism as a method of economic
organization is an efficient way to organize things.' ' 3
Nevertheless, there is still no consensus on the significance of
the ECD. In convincing his critics of the importance of prices, Mises
inspired attempts to duplicate the efficiency of markets through
"market socialism"; that is, to develop methods by which central
planners could determine economically rational product and factor
prices in the absence of private property. 4 Using the market
socialism approach, Oskar Lange contrived a simulated market,
which demonstrated that, given crucial data on preferences, production functions, and available resources, a central planner can determine the efficient allocation of resources. 5 Friedrich Hayek,
however, countered the demonstration by showing that while market
socialism may not be logically contradictory, it is practically impossible because of problems regarding information. Hayek claimed that
the market socialism approach merely assumes away the economic
problem. Even though Hayek's arguments have never been refuted,
it is widely accepted by economists that the critics of market
socialism have not proved their case. 6

MARKET SOCIALISM AND ROBBINSIAN MAXIMIZATION
There is a marked similarity between the approaches taken in
market socialism and in conventional neoclassical theory. Consider
Lionel Robbins's maximization view of economics, which has dominated the profession since the early 1930s. 7 In this approach, the
individual is confronted with an economic problem vis-a-vis the
allocation of given means among given ends to secure the greatest
amount of satisfaction. When the economic problem is conceived of in
this way, the decision maker's role is reduced to mere calculation, 8
even though he is never given enough data. A key function of the
100

LESSONS FROM THE ECONOMIC CALCULATION DEBATE

entrepreneur, however, is to determine the possible means and
ends; and making the right decision calls for far more than correct
mathematical calculation. 9 A farmer's success in determirung the
most profitable pattern of production and land use, for example, is
likely to hinge more on the ability to recognize current opportunities
and to anticipate future conditions than on expertise in mathematical
programming and decision theory.
Successful decision makers must not only economize in situations that are already known; they must also be alert to new
opportunities that others have not yet noticed. 10 In competitive
equilibrium, the decisions of all participants in the market dovetail
completely, so there are no opportunities for profit and no need for
entrepreneurs. Thus, the conventional equilibrium-based approach
obviates the role of entrepreneurship by ignoring or assuming away
problems regarding information. 11
Market socialism and the closely related marginal-cost pricing
also assume away problems regarding information. If it is assumed
that data on preferences, available resources, and production opportunities are given, the Central Planning Board need only solve the
problem of constrained optimization, publish the shadow prices, and
"order factory managers to maximize their profits. " 12 Most economists, however, fail to take into account the information problems
inherent in this approach. 13 Hayek stressed that such procedures to
simulate market activity are not operational because the necessary
data can never be obtained. Information in the real world is vast,
detailed, and constantly changing; and the information that motivates
choice by individual decision makers is not neatly summarized in
objective functions of demand and cost for use by central planners.
The implication of the subjectivity of costs for marginal-cost pricing is
still not recognized by most neoclassical economists and the proponents of market socialism. 14
If the relevant information were given, the problem of the use of
economic resources would be reduced to one of logic or mathematics, and the solution could be stated in terms of the usual optimality
conditions for consumers, firms, and owners of resources. As Hayek
emphasized, however, ''the 'data' from which the economic calculus
starts are never for the whole society 'given' to a single mind which
could work out the implications and can never be so given. . . . The
economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to
allocate 'given' resources .... It is rather a problem of how to
secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of
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society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals
know." 15
The economic problem that faces society cannot be solved by
showing how a solution could be determined if the central planner
knew all the facts. For Mises, it was useless to know that in a
changeless world of perfect knowledge and general equilibrium a
central planner could solve the problem of economic calculation. 16
Any good solution must show how to use the partial knowledge of all
interacting individuals in the market. 17 Thus, both the conventional
maximization approach and market socialism fail to consider the
implications of the subjective and decentralized nature of the data
that motivate choices.
Finally, approaches involving market socialism and conventional
welfare economics are also similar in their use or misuse of the
optimality conditions of competitive equilibrium as a norm. Welfare
theory demonstrates that given a competitive equilibrium, wellknown optimality conditions hold true, and there is efficiency among
consumers, firms, and the owners of resources. The optimality
conditions of the competitive equilibrium, however, are of little use in
assessing the efficiency of real-world activity. Competitive equilibrium in any market implies perfect competition, which requires
price-taking behavior, and a perfect market, which requires perfect
communication, instantaneous equilibrium, and costless transactions.18 All real-world markets fall short of these requirements.
Thus, any real-world market will inevitably appear to be inefficient
when measured against a competitive equilibrium.
Conventional welfare theory assumes a competitive equilibrium
and then uses the resulting optimality conditions as a norm to assess
the efficiency of real-world markets. Since no real-world market
measures up to this standard, market failure is inevitable. When
markets for agricultural land are measured against the competitive
norm, for example, it is fully predictable that problems of monopoly,
extemality, and information will arise. Market socialism, on the other
hand, accepts the same norm and shows how the central planner,
with data given, can simulate these optimality conditions. Since no
real-world socialist economy can measure up to this standard
(competitive equilibrium), socialist failure is inevitable.
It is ironic that the success of market socialism is judged largely
on the basis of theorizing, where data are merely assumed to be
available, rather than on actual results of central planning and that the
market economy is evaluated in terms of real-world markets rather
than in terms of the perfect market. If the perfect market is taken to
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be representative of real-world markets (analogous to the way in
which market socialism is taken to be representative of central
direction under real-world conditions), there is no possibility of
market failure. In reality, as Mises and Hayek emphasized, realworld markets should be compared with the results of central
direction as it operates under real-world conditions.
The widespread acceptance by economists of market socialism
and marginal-cost pricing as realistic alternatives to market competition, then, is due to their inability to appreciate the informational
problems inherent in central direction. The conventional Robbinsian
maximization approach is similar to market socialism in reducing the
economic problem to one of calculation. If data are given to the
decision maker, there is no uncertainty; and without uncertainty,
there is no scope for choice . 19 Moreover, to assume that economic
data are given is to assume the problem away, regardless of the type
of economic system. 20

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESERVING AGRICULTURAL LAND
In order to appreciate the problems that arise if market signals
are ignored, consider how the market makes use of widely dispersed
information and knowledge. It is significant how little individual
participants need to know in order to be able to take the right
actions. 21 Consider the shift of land from agricultural to nonagricultural uses. 22 Individual preferences for housing, golf courses,
and other uses of land are transmitted through the price system and
are then reflected in higher prices for land. Individual landowners
need not know about construction costs or the relative demands for
housing, recreation, or agriculture. In coordinating and transmitting
widely dispersed information, prices act to coordinate the actions of
different people.
USE OF KNOWLEDGE IN MAKING DECISIONS ON LAND USE

Informational problems are crucial in making decisions on land
use, and knowledge of the marginal-efficiency conditions of land use,
which is derived through the logic of choice, does not provide
solutions. The basic problem is to secure the best use of land by
using the knowledge of '' members of society, for ends whose
relative importance only these individuals know.'' 23 In more conventional terminology, on land with multiple uses, the planner faces the
problem of anticipating the pattern of land use that is consistent with
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the forces of supply and demand. Central direction in allocating land
resources is no more feasible than general economic planning; that is,
the theoretical basis of land-use planning is deficient in the sense that
it does not solve the informational problems that are inherent in all
central economic planning. Yet, the lack of an intellectual foundation
in land-use planning has received little attention in the literature. 24
There are similar problems in the "scientific" approach to the
management of public land. The aim of the early conservation
movement in the United States was to introduce scientific management into government. 25 According to this view, if government is to
function efficiently in managing natural resources, politics must be
confined to specifying general directions of policy, leaving the actual
administration to skilled professionals. In view of informational
problems and considerations of public choice, it is not surprising that
there has been dissatisfaction with the results of scientific management. 26
The data required to determine efficient land use are the same
data that Lange indicated were necessary for central planning
generally-namely, data on preferences, resources, and production
opportunities. The land-use planner who attempts to obtain the
relevant statistical data faces problems similar to those identified by
Hayek: ''The statistics which a central authority would have to use
would have to be arrived at precisely by abstracting from minor
differences between the things, by lumping together, as resources of
one kind, items which differ as regards location, quality, and other
particulars in a way which may be very significant for the specific
decision. It follows from this that central planning based on statistical
information by its nature cannot take direct account of these
circumstances of time and place. " 27
Even though the ECD has demonstrated that prices are necessary for rational economic planning, most literature on land-use
planning presents land classification as an alternative to market prices
in allocating land to various uses. A proposed scheme for classifying
state land in North Carolina, for example, instructs local governments to divide land into one of five classes: developed, transitional,
community, rural, and conservation. 28 Land classification is assumed
to be a scientific or technical skill; but as a technique for allocating
resources, it is subject to the same problems that Hayek identified a
generation ago. Planning is to be achieved, not by leaving the
ultimate decision to the people who are familiar with the circumstances, but by attempting to communicate pertinent knowledge to
the central agency that makes the decision. Land classification
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contains no mechanism to use the dispersed bits of knowledge about
the demand and supply of land. 29
Since land typically has more than one use, land classification is
arbitrary; and there is no objective procedure by which the planner
can classify each parcel of land into a particular category of land use .
Moreover, planners often fail to recognize that technical information,
such as soil type, is not as important as the information needed to
carry out the ordinary processes of economic activity; that is,
knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place. 30
Recent efforts in regard to land-use planning in rural areas have
focused on the preservation of agricultural land, but few explicit
criteria or standards have been presented for determining how much
or which land should be preserved. Many of these plans suggest that
''naturally productive'' agricultural land should be retained in agriculture , whatever the cost. 31 Such a charge, however, glosses over
important unanswered (and perhaps unanswerable) questions: What
are naturally productive lands? When are alternative lands available?
Productivity is a matter of degree , and alternatives are always
available at some price and at some location. Moreover, even
naturally productive agricultural land may often be more productive in
other uses. Apart from market signals, no objective procedure has
been discovered to determine what is the most economic amount of
land to retain in agriculture-either now or in the future.
Economic problems are always rooted in change, and in a
dynamic economy, any pattern of land use will eventually become
obsolete. 32 The "public interest" is one criterion used in determining how much land should be in agriculture, 33 but the public interest
is no more identifiable in the area of land use than it is in most other
areas. 34 All political decisions confer benefits on some people and
impose losses on others, and there is no objective way to measure
subjective benefits and costs.
This raises the issue of whose interests should prevail in
decisions made about land use . When a similar question was raised in
the ECD, most proponents of market socialism assumed that the goal
of a socialist economy was to provide for the maximum satisfaction of
private consumer demand. 3 5 Most of the proponents of central
planning failed to realize, however, that the information that motivates choice is decentralized and cannot be objectively determined
except as it is revealed by individual actions. Many advocates of landuse planning do not appreciate that the market, through prices, is
unique in its ability to coordinate and transmit information held by
participants in the market. 36
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Market prices reflect both current and expected market conditions. 37 It is in the owner's best interest to exploit resources in order
to maximize their present value. Under competitive conditions, the
landowner is induced to use land in ways that reflect future as well as
current demands. If there is an increase in the expected future
demand for agricultural land, the current price will rise to reflect the
expected change. In so doing, the price system effectively rations
land resources both at a given time and over time. Since future
benefits, costs, and discount rates are all uncertain, however,
conservation and other decisions about land use are necessarily
rooted in uncertainty. 38 Thus, subjective entrepreneurial decisions
are involved when one analyzes the profitability of alternative
patterns of land use.
UNCERTAINTY AND PRESERVING AGRICULTURAL LAND

A recent study by the Council for Agricultural Science and
Technology stresses major uncertainties about such factors as the
future conversion of farmland to nonfarrn uses, possible long-run
changes in climate, future trends in agricultural productivity, and
future supplies and costs of water and energy. The study concludes
that ''preserving farmland for the future is like buying an insurance
policy for future contingencies.' '39 But the market operates as a
discovery process in selecting from among uncertain profitable
1-ltematives and, hence, in promoting the use of economic resources.
The entrepreneur's crucial role is to identify superior combinations
of and uses for resources. The presence of uncertainty does not
imply that land-use decisions should be made by central direction,
since all entrepreneurial decisions are rooted in uncertainty.
Two problems arise when nonmarket methods are used in
making decisions about agricultural land or other resources: First,
due to the separation of authority and responsibility, bureaucratic
decision makers face perverse incentives. 40 Because private entrepreneurs choose to own land and make decisions about land use,
however, they bear the costs and reap the benefits; and the profit
incentive induces them to allocate land to uses where the expected
returns are highest. If the private entrepreneur bids too much for
agricultural land, he bears the cost. The private decision maker is
'' subject to the incorruptible judgment of an unbribable tribunal: the
account of profit and loss.' ' 41 Under public control, however, society
bears the costs and reaps the benefits of decisions made by central
planners. If more land is retained in agriculture under administrative
controls of land use, for example, the cost is borne by some current
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landowners and by potential users of land for housing and other
services.
The consequences of governmental controls of land use are to a
considerable extent affected by the nature of the planning process. 42
Although public planning for land use to preserve agricultural land is
based ostensibly on widespread citizen participation, in practice,
land-use controls must be carried out by agents of the planning
agency. The decisions are reached through a political process that is
dominated by groups with special interests, and ''goals committees,
citizens advisory boards and endless public hearings only compound
the advantages of certain groups.'' 43
Second, due to the separation of power and knowledge, even if
the bureaucrat who makes decisions about land use were motivated
solely by the public interest, he would have no way of obtaining the
necessary information. The ECD taught us that in the absence of a
market test, a central planner cannot determine whether a specific
pattern of resource use is economic. Further, it is impossible to have
a market test if there are no markets. The implications of separating
power from knowledge and responsibility are clear in efforts to use
land-use controls to preserve agricultural land. Political decision
makers are unlikely to have the incentive to allocate land in an
economic manner. Still more basic, even if these decision makers are
properly motivated, they cannot obtain the necessary information.
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND INFLEXIBLE CONTROLS

Land-use planning through administrative controls does not
adapt readily to change. In much of the literature that advocates
controls on land use, there is an assumption that the bureaucrats who
devise and implement policies to correct for market failure '' act
solely to maximize social efficiency without regard to their own
utility, power, prestige, income or vote appeal. " 44 But bureaucrats,
like other people, are aware of their own interests, and the selfinterest of the political decision maker is generally associated with
' 'playing it safe.' ' The political process is oriented toward the short
run, since the decision maker's power is frequently determined by
the results of the next election. 45 Consequently; the problem of
adjusting land-use patterns to changing economic conditions becomes
increasingly difficult as decisions about land use are centralized at
higher levels of government, 46 where regulations are likely to be
restrictive, inflexible, and partial to established interests. Administrative land-use controls also favor large landowners, who are better
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able to handle the application processes and to hire legal counsel and
experts.
Furthermore, land-use planners tend to minimize the importance of change on the efficient use ofresources. 47 This view varies
dramatically with the Misesian view that rational economic calculation
must take into account the changing tastes and interests of all
affected interacting individuals. Hayek states: ''If we can agree that
the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaption to
changes in the particular circumstance of time and place, it would
seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people
who are familiar with these circumstances and who know directly of
the rel~vant changes and of the resources immediately available to
meet them.'' 48
Land-use planners cannot obtain the supply-and-demand data
that are necessary in order to determine the economic pattern of land
use. Much of the demand for agricutural output, for example,
depends on the growth of the domestic population. Yet, planners
have not been notably successful in predicting population, age
distribution, or areas of urban growth. The demand for United States
agricultural output also varies, depending on demand and supply in
the international market. The production prospects for agricultural
products (including export potential) hinge to a great extent on
governmental policies. Even in estimating future governmental
actions, the planner has no obvious advantage, since the most
important source of uncertainty lies in future plans and policies. The
periodic congressional debate over farm legislation is evidence that
policies developed in the political arena can create an important
sohrce of uncertainty about United States agricultural production and
latid use.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Even though the issues raised by the ECD are closely related to
those involved in land-use controls, the debate has had little effect on
the current movement for comprehensive land-use planning, including the preservation of agricultural land. In studies that analyze the
feasibility of preserving agricultural land, few recognize the problems
involving information and knowledge that lie at the heart of all
questions on the relative merits of the ·market versus central
direction in the allocation of land and other resources. There are two
ways to make decisions about land use: through the market or by
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using administrative controls. The preservation of agricultural land
beyond the level dictated by market forces implies the substitution of
centralized authority for decentralized market forces. It assumes that
planners will be able to discover, announce, and enforce the socially
correct pattern of land use for agricultural and other purposes. The
history of economic regulation, including governmental attempts to
scientifically manage natural resources, reveals several important
limitations of this approach.
Hayek and Mises demonstrated that market prices are necessary for the efficient use of resources and that market socialism and
marginal-cost pricing based on shadow prices are not realistic
alternatives to the decentralized market. No known method of
central direction can match market prices in taking into account the
data held by present and prospective participants in the market.
It is also important to recognize political failure as an analogue of
market failure. Problems of conservation and other so-called imperfections in land use are frequently identified by comparing the actual
pattern against the optimal conditions associated with the competitive equilibrium. Real-world land markets, however, will always
appear to be inefficient if measured against a norm (competitive
equilibrium) that assumes away informational problems. Similarly,
when governmental intervention is compared with an ideal market,
governmental failure is inevitable. Governmental intervention also
encourages private firms to protect their interests through methods
that produce more distortions in the market. 49 Legislation to restrict
the conversion of agricultural land to other uses, for example,
generates countermeasures by landowners in the form of lobbying,
hiring lawyers to find loopholes, and so forth-all of which are no less
important in administrative land-use controls than in other areas of
central direction. so
The crucial problems in land-use planning are to define the scope
of governmental influence and to devise institutional arrangements
that can make these limits stick. It is important to take a principles
approach to appraise each governmental program in terms of its
likely legal, political, social, and ethical repercussions. 51 The principles approach recognizes that the policy maker's task is not to
achieve a specific pattern of land use but to be ''concerned, instead,
with a framework of institutions and rules within which people can
effectively cooperate in pursuing their own diverse ends through
decentralized coordination of their activities. ' ' 52 As Leland Yeager
suggested, this approach ''would go far ... toward reinstating the
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wisdom of the Founding Fathers regarding the scope and power of
government.'' 53
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Agricultural Zoning: A Private
Alternative
Robert H. Nelson

In many respects, agricultural zoning is a new name for an old
concept. Zoning in suburban areas has long been used to restrict
housing construction and other urban development. Although usually
an afterthought, such zoning has left agriculture as the main permissible use. As the National Commission on Urban Problems described
long-standing zoning practices, ''large lot zoning can effectively
prevent economically attractive development until the municipality
grants rezoning' ' ; in the meantime, the land is held in agricultural or
other rural use .1
Explicit measures to protect agriculture are a fairly new element
in zoning. Where protection of continued agricultural use is the stated
purpose, the minimum sizes for lots are often quite large-commonly
10 to 50 acres, but as much as 640 acres in some cases. Although few
instances of formal adoption of agricultural zoning could be found
before 1970, by 1980, 270 local governments had imposed such
zoning, and 15 million acres had been zoned explicitly for agriculture.
Traditional restrictions on suburban zoning were severely challenged in the 1960s as a result of the civil-rights movement and the
war on poverty, movements that sought to curtail the role of zoning
in maintaining economic and racial segregation. Zoning was subject to
major court challenges in the hope that the courts would take an
activist stance in overturning local zoning, as they had already done in
the area of civil rights. The initial efforts, however, were not very
successful. The United States Supreme Court in particular disappointed the challengers of zoning by offering several strong endorse113
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ments of local prerogatives. 2 Nevertheless, by 1978, state courts in
New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania had struck down zoning
ordinances in municipalities that too severely restricted the opportunities for metropolitan housing. 3
Suburban zoning had traditionally been given its legal rationale
as an exercise in comprehensive planning. It had long been obvious to
close observers, however, that the rationale had become a legal
fiction. 4 Zoning based on comprehensive planning was a rarity;
indeed, most plans were sitting on shelves gathering dust. Moreover, the intellectual foundations for comprehensive planning had
been crumbling for some time. The idea that basic decisions on land
use were to be made by experts insulated from politics and, more
broadly, the implicit assumptions of economic predictability that
underlie comprehensive planning proved untenable to many observers.5 It became necessary to search for a more credible legal
rationale for suburban-zoning practices.
For a time during the early 1970s, "managed growth" or
'' growth control'' had considerable support. The old zoning practices
were transformed into a meritorious protection of the environment.
This rationale lost some of its luster, however, as critics pointed out
the obvious lineage, in one case characterizing the use of environmental rhetoric to defend old-fashioned zoning exclusions as the new
''environmental protection hustle.' ' 6
The most recent rationale for zoning restrictions is the protection of agricultural land. Instead of zoning for comprehensive planning, management of growth, or environmental protection, the
purpose of zoning is to protect the future food supply of the region,
the country, and the world. Agricultural zoning is also adopted in
order to protect farmland from other incompatible uses.
The instability of justifications for zoning reflects fundamental
flaws in the basic concepts on which the local regulation of land use is
currently based. Although there are sound justifications to adopt
zoning, they require sharp departures from traditional ways of
thinking. Zoning has usually been portrayed as a conventional public
regulation that is required either to protect property owners from
incompatible uses or to manage land development so as to achieve
broad public plans. A more recent perspective sees zoning as a new
property-rights institution whose real purposes and consequences
have been obscured. 7 When the camouflage has been stripped away,
zoning is revealed to be a collective property right, closely analogous
to corporate, condominium, cooperative, or other private collective
property rights. This interpretation is one manifestation of a much
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greater interest in the economic functions and evolution of property
rights. 8
Under the new interpretation, zoning exclusions are simply
those exclusions that are inherent in the exercise of any property
right. Economic segregation that results from zoning is much like
segregation in other consumption items; for example, the wealthy
also buy cars and houses that are different from those bought by the
poor. The property-right interpretation of zoning also provides a
much clearer standard for determining acceptable zoning practices.
Such standards can be derived directly from widely recognized
principles for the holding and exchange of private property rights.
Thus, some agricultural-zoning practices should be encouraged and,
in fact, carried further. Other agricultural-zoning practices, however,
are highly objectionable and should be eliminated. Ultimately, instead
of the familiar forms of zoning, new institutions dealing with private
property rights should be created-not only on farmland but on all
land-dividing private property rights into one set that is exercised
individually and another set that is exercised collectively.
Before discussing the specifics of agricultural zoning, it is useful
to set the stage with an examination of the historic nature of the
evolution of land tenure.

DIVERGENCES OF FORM AND SUBSTANCE
IN LAND TENURE
It might be proposed as a law of land tenure that its form will
always diverge significantly from its substance. Generations of law
students have studied how modem property rights developed slowly
and circuitously from a feudal system of tenure that was based on
mutual obligations tied to land. In a feudal society, the lord of the
manor was bound to the king by commitments to provide military and
other kinds of support. The serfs were similarly bound to the lord in a
system of mutually accepted responsibilities. Allowing the user of
land to sell his plot would have been as foreign in the feudal world as
the suggestion today that an army officer could sell his command.
Gradually, however, many of these responsibilities evolved into
property rights, transferrable on payment of money. Although feudal
tenure had long been eclipsed in substance, its heritage persisted for
centuries and still exerted an influence on English land law until the
twentieth century. 9
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The evolution of the Homestead Act followed a similar pattern,
although it occurred in much less time. At the end of the Revolutionary War, when the federal government sought to raise revenue from
the sale of public lands, it found that settlers frequently were unable
to pay. Moreover, attempts to keep them off the lands merely
caused widespread illegal entry. Squatters effectively resisted eviction, pressured Congress successfully for relief acts, and eventually
forced the passage of the Preemption Act of 1841, which formally
gave them the right to enter lands and pay for them afterwards.
When the Homestead Act was passed in 1862, it formalized a de facto
tenure system that had been evolving since at least 1800. Paradoxically, it did so at a time when the specific provisions of the act would
no longer work in the arid western lands . 10
As a result, another tenure system had to evolve on the public
lands, one that was characterized by widespread evasion of the
Homestead Act and other land laws. Even the most respectable
western citizens winked at illegal practices that everyone knew were
unavoidable if public land were to be transferred to the private
sector-a necessary condition for rapid development. This informal
system of tenure was brought to an end by creating the national
forest system in the years following the General Revision Act of 1891
and by ending the disposal of the public domain after the Taylor
Grazing Act of 1934 .11 The United States has been left with two main
systems of land tenure, one for public lands and another for private
lands.
Both systems have remained faithful to the principle that form
must diverge significantly from substance. The Sagebrush Rebellion,
for example, might in several respects have simply recognized and
codified the de facto private rights and other elements of the informal
tenure system that have grown up on the public lands .12 On private
lands, the major tenure development of the twentieth century has
been the creation and evolution of zoning. The time may well be ripe
to acknowledge and formalize a system of collective property rights
that has turned out much differently than zoning architects intended.
There are other notable parallels between laws dealing with
public land and with zoning. Formally, at least, public-land and zoning
institutions are both based on concepts derived from progressive
ideology: reliance on scientific decision making and technical expertise; exclusion of political influence from governmental administration; the undertaking of comprehensive planning as a basis for
governmental decisions; strong loyalty to professionalism; and rational efficiency as the basic underlying objective .13
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The progressives looked to government as the ultimate guarantor that rational efficiency would be achieved. Although they greatly
admired the efficiency of the modem business corporation, progressives feared monopoly and believed that optimistic markets often
would not produce efficient results. Indeed, the public lands were
used by many small, uncoordinated firms that lacked technical
sophistication and, as progressives saw it, were highly inefficient.
The disorder of the American urban scene was often contrasted with
the efficiency that was achieved under the tight central management
of German cities .14
For progressives, if the private market could not supply central
coordination and planning, government would have to. Following
such precepts, the government took over the management of the
national forests and, later, the rest of the public domain. Using
zoning, it also took over the planning and management of metropolitan development. The results, however, were seldom in accord
with progressive expectations. Much of the current crisis of government stems from the need for new governing principles and the
failure thus far to find ones that are widely acceptable. 15
It never occurred to most progressives that market inefficiences
could be blamed on an absence of well-defined property rights.
Nevertheless, it was inevitable that public timber and grazing lands
would be used inefficiently when no one held property rights to them.
Similarly, zoning was adopted as a misdiagnosed progressive solution
to another problem of the commons. 16

ZONING AS A CREATION OF COLLECTIVE
PROPERTY RIGHTS

AN URBAN PROBLEM OF THE COMMONS
The original concept of a commons referred to entry on the land
by grazers and other direct users .17 More recently, other kinds of
commons have been identified. Air pollution has resulted from the
unrestricted use of the air for the disposal of pollutants; the depletion
of fisheries has resulted from the common-property status of the
ocean and its contents; even chronic deficits in the federal budget
have been characterized as the inevitable overutilization of another
kind of common property resource-the federal budget. 18 The role of
zoning has been to create property rights in what had heretofore
been still another common-property resource-the environmental
amenities of an urban area.
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If any part of an urban area of neighborhood size acquires an
unusually high level of environmental amenity, it automatically
becomes attractive for many kinds of other uses, much as a lush
piece of grazing commons will keep attracting more livestock. Many
of the urban uses that are attracted would not add to the environmental quality of a neighborhood, however, but would diminish it, in some
cases rather drastically. The problem addressed by zoning is that
under a system of private property rights that has only individual
rights, there will be no feasible way to protect high-amenity neighborhoods from damaging uses. Moreover, in the absence of controls,
the private incentives of individual property owners will virtually
ensure that less desirable uses will gain entry. The resulting general
tendency of neighborhoods to deteriorate in amenity levels is the
urban equivalent of overgrazing the commons.
In the suburbs, lot owners will maximize their returns if they can
build high-density housing on their own lots while the rest of the
neighborhood remains at low density. As a proponent of zoning long
ago explained, the basic reason for zoning was to defeat such
individual incentives: ' 'The important thing is to provide protection
for the character of the neighborhood .... Low density neighborhoods occupied by higher income families should not be faced with
the intrusion or encroachment by small lot developers which would
destroy their character. The danger is always that the less intensive
occupancy will be impaired by encroachment by more intensive
occupancy. '' 19
By adopting zoning, a metropolitan area is divided into many
neighborhoods in which the residents have the collective ability to
exclude undesirable uses. Zoning imposes a division of a metropolitan
area that is analogous to the division of the old grazing commons into
privately owned plots. In this case, however, the new property
rights that are created are collective rights over their neighborhoods,
rather than individual rights.
In theory, collective controls might have been achieved by
condominium or other more conventional private methods, but
perhaps this approach was precluded by the high cost of voluntary
negotiations to obtain the necessary unanimous consent among
property owners in existing neighborhoods. Complicating such negotiations, the private incentive for each property owner to be a holdout
would be large. Instead, government has coercively redistributed
property rights under zoning. In effect, individual rights have been
taken away, and property owners have received a share in a new
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collective property right as compensation. As a New Jersey judge
once said, '' A valid zoning ordinance gives to a property owner a
right which did not exist before the ordinance was adopted, that is,
the right to prevent a use which is forbidden by the ordinance .... In
other words, valid zoning ordinances create valuable property
rights. " 20
The design of new property-rights institutions, such as zoning,
can create a paradox for those who support a minimal role for
government. The best hope of minimizing the government's role
may lie precisely in improved institutions dealing with property
rights. Yet, the actual establishment of such institutions may require
the active use of governmental powers in the most sensitive areas of
individual concern; the negotiation and other transaction costs in
establishing new property rights by voluntary agreement would be
hopelessly large. The grazing-commons problem was solved, for
example, by the uncompensated elimination of centuries-old grazier
rights.
Because a government collectivizes property rights under zoning, critics have often claimed that zoning represents an assault on
private property rights. Such critics fail to recognize that zoning
actually creates de facto private property rights as well. The original
imposition of zoning was similar to an exercise of powers of eminent
domain, but in most neighborhoods, government acted in accord with
the wishes of most residents.
CREATING COLLECTIVE RIGHTS FOR FARMERS

Although some farmers have no objection to urban uses in their
midst, in many areas, farming does not mix well with the use of land
for nonfarm residences. The National Agricultural Lands Study
(NALS) reported:
As scattered development occurs . . . the farmland owners find it
more difficult and expensive to carry on normal farming operations
... land prices and property tax assessments rise, local public
service expenditures increase, and tax rates ... may rise ....
The presence of non-farmers in the area may entail unwitting or
willful damage to crops, harassment of livestock by dogs, or
interference with tractors and other farm equipment on the roads
by increased traffic. It may also result in complaints from the new
urban neighbors about dust, noise, and smells resulting from
normal farming operations, especially those involving the application of pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers. 21
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The Council for Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST) similarly found that "nonfarm development in farm areas, even at an
extremely low density, can have significant adverse effects on farm
operations and economic returns.'' 22
Within a general farming area, most farmers may prefer to
remain in farming, given the price that could be obtained if the land
was sold for nonfarm use. There are likely to be a few potential
buyers who will be willing to pay a higher price for residential use in
the area. For example, a few potential occupants may prefer to live in
a farm area and to commute sixty miles to the city for work, but the
number of such residents will be far too small to acquire more than a
limited portion of the total farmland in the district. In this circumstance, each farmer has the opportunity to profit at the expense of
the other farmers around him. He can sell his property for a higher
price-one that could not be sustained over the entire district-to
meet the limited demand for a few residential units.
If farmers were to behave in a self-interested way, some would
be willing to sell out. The result might be a significant deterioration in
the overall quality of the district for farming use-another example of
the deteporating commons-because nonfarm uses would be intermingled with incompatible farm uses. The total value of all land in the
district might decline. In economic terms, the negative externalities
to existing farmers, caused by the entry of new residential occupants, might exceed the positive externalities that those same
occupants receive from living in the farm district. Hence, for society
as a whole and from the collective standpoint of farmers in the
district, exclusion of residential uses would be beneficial.
This is analogous to the problem of a low-density suburban area
that is facing the potential entry of ''predatory'' apartments or other
high-density housing. Urban zoning was created in large part to solve
this problem. In the 1970s, farmers began to consider whether they
wanted the same kind of solution, which necessarily involves a
governmentally imposed redistribution of property rights. Governmental powers are necessary because, as explained by the NALS,
private voluntary agreements among farmers are unlikely to achieve
farmland protection:
Even if nearly all farmland owners join a voluntary program and
remove their land from the development market, the remaining
farmland may be developed, and, once developed, may result in
intrusions which will cause problems from neighboring farmers
and weaken the agricultural economy. In fact, the price of
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farmland which is withheld from a voluntary program may rise, as
more and more farmland owners join the program and flatland
which is easy to build on and available for development becomes
relatively scarce. Thus, it is possible that the non-participants in a
voluntary program will not only make it difficult for participating
farmland owners to keep farming, but will reap larger profits as
well. 23

The original imposition of zoning in suburban areas was bitterly
resisted by a minority of property owners who valued their individual
freedom more than they valued the collective environmental protection offered by zoning. Traditionally, farmers have been an independent group, resisting any infringement on their right to sell their
property for the highest-value use. One farmer's attitude has been
characterized thus: "His life was his land and it was his pension plan.
If the market for his products is depressed as it has been with
peaches for the last few years, he wanted to be able to sell off an acre
or two to survive'' -and without having to wait for permission from
anyone. 24 Reflecting similar attitudes, a professor of zoning law
commented: ''The principal reason for this failure to apply the usual
tenets of zoning to separate potentially hostile land uses is that
farmers near cities are seldom prepared to support exclusive
agricultural zones. They fear the loss of a profitable sale to a
speculator or developer in the distant future. They don't want zoning
that would 'protect' the amount of their retirement income.' ' 25
Nevertheless, some farmers have been reassessing their traditional hostility, as indicated by the spread of agricultural zoning
during the 1970s. For farmers, it has been the acceptance of the
lesser of two evils-zoning or the more rapid demise of farming.
Agricultural zoning cannot and should not be expected to preserve
farming indefinitely in the face of strong economic pressures, but it
can extend farming's life considerably.
In most cases, agricultural zoning is simply the old large-lot
zoning with much larger lot sizes. In some cases, "conditional"
zoning has been adopted, which requires that special permission be
obtained for all new uses in agricultural districts. Such permission
depends on a review of the proposed use and requires a demonstration of compatibility with agriculture.
A typical example of agricultural zoning can be found in Stanislaus County, located south of San Francisco on the fringes of
metropolitan development. Between 1971 and 1976, the county took
actions that resulted in 90 percent of all county lands being zoned as
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"A-2 exclusive agricultural land districts." Minimum lot sizes,
ranging from 10 to 160 acres, were designated for the A-2 zone,
depending on terrain, proximity to an urban area, and other features.
Subdivisions with more than five lots were prohibited. A local
supervisor explained his support: ''My reasoning behind that was to
prevent non-agricultural uses from spreading to the agricultural area
. . . to the detriment of the farm community. . . . I was concerned
about a proliferation of machine shops, garages, warehouses. About
the farmers who can't spray because there are residences next to
their fields. ' ' 26
In Marion County, Oregon, which includes the city of Salem,
protection of agricultural land has been achieved through ' 'exclusive
farm use'' (EFU) zones.
When new farm parcels are proposed, soil productivity, drainage,
terrain, availability of water, crop types and yields, and marketing
practices and the size of commercial agricultural operations in the
area are evaluated. If this evaluation shows the proposal is
consistent with similar commercial agricultural operations in this
area, the division is appropriate. Fann parcels smaller than
justified by this evaluation may be considered if it can be
demonstrated that, (1) the overall land use pattern of the area will
not be altered, (2) productivity will be increased over that
possible on the undivided parcel and, (3) the farm use represents
a viable commercial agricultural enterprise. 27

Most farmers appear to have supported EFU zoning in Marion
County because, as one farmer explained: ''There's no question.
Without zoning, the County would be a mess. A good share of the
people in the area ... would not be farming. You couldn't farm
because there would be so many houses.'' 28
Another recent innovation that was intended to protect farming
is the formal designation of special agricultural districts. New York
agricultural districts, for example, have no zoning controls; their
purpose, as explained by a legislative author, was to help "facilitate
the co-existence of farming and non-fanning. They give farmers the
option of continuing to farm if they want to. We '11 make sure [through
the districts] that they won't be taxed or regulated out of existence. ''29
The New York law on agricultural districting seems to have had
some success in maintaining a segregation of farm and nonfarm uses,
thereby promoting the continuance of farming in areas where
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residential development is only beginning to occur. According to
reports from New York agricultural extension agents,
agricultural districts, particularly the protection they offered from
high property taxes, had contributed to an optimistic environment
for farming, which in tum had led to increased investments in
silos, farm buildings, tractors, and other equipment. Another
agent, from a county in central New York, stressed the districts'
contribution to a sense of security from nuisance complaints: ''If
someone tells a farmer not to spread manure in his fields, he can
say, 'Yes, I will; I'm in an agricultural district.' " 30

The widespread adoption of agricultural zoning along with other
features of agricultural districting, would effectively establish a new
system of property rights to farmland. Ownership of farm property
would then be separated into two kinds of rights, individual and
collective. Individual rights would include all those pertaining to the
agricultural use of land and the maintenance of farm residences. The
right to convert farmland to residential development would become a
collectively held right among all farmers in the district. The justification for such a radical revision of farmland tenure would be that in
proximity to metropolitan areas there is no other way to maintain the
existing farming way of life against threats of piecemeal residential
intrusion.
If farmers are willing to accept it, the creation of new collective
property rights over the conversion of farmland would significantly
improve the efficiency of land use in farming areas. It would also
promote a desirable segregation of farming and nonfarm uses,
channeling residential growth into those specific areas where farmers
had collectively decided to enter into a transitional stage, a process
that was understood to lead ultimately to abandonment of farming and
to conversion to residential use. Installation of infrastructure could be
phased so as to give priority to servicing these particular areas, thus
avoiding the extra costs of having to provide public services over
wide but sparsely settled areas. One estimate in the Minneapolis-St.
Paul metropolitan area concluded that closer phasing of urban
development and the installation of infrastructure could produce longterm savings of as much as $2 billion.
The prospect of such benefits is clouded, however, by the
uncertainty about whether farmers in new agricultural districts would
actually get to exercise the rights that were thus created. It is
possible that agricultural zoning might be imposed against the wishes
J
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of farmers in the area. Zoning, in such cases, might be used, not to
preclude incompatible uses until the time would come to develop, but
to permanently bar conversion from agriculture-or at least for
longer than the farmers would prefer and than economic efficiency
would warrant. If this were to occur, large-scale inefficiencies in land
use could result. Such a possibility is hardly hypothetical. Since the
earliest days of zoning, there have been fierce battles in newly
developing areas over the exercise of collective property rights
created by zoning. Recent occupants who were unsympathetic to the
farmers' desires to sell their land have frequently won out, partly
because of the voting strength derived from their higher densities
and greater numbers. Sparsely settled farmers and other older
owners of rural property have been the losers in such battles.

THE PROBLEM OF TRANSITIONAL LAND USE
A FAILURE OF PROPERTY-RIGHTS ASSIGNMENT
The market mechanism can hardly be expected to work if
property owners are prohibited from selling their property. The
power of the market lies in its systematic transfer of resources to
those who can use them more efficiently and, thus, value them most
highly. Yet, this point has been widely ignored in the land market.
Zoning creates collective property rights, yet makes it impossible to
sell those rights. Predictably, the rights have often been seriously
misallocated, preventing the transfer of wide areas of land to the use
that is valued highest.
The most significant new element in the zoning of agricultural
lands is that some recent zoning is supported by farmers themselves
and is actually designed to protect agricultural uses of the land. In the
past, zoning has often been imposed on farmers by nonfarm residents. The basic objectives have been to preserve open spaces, to
hold down local tax burdens, and to manage growth, all of which
primarily benefit nonfarm residents. Perversely, the consequences
of such zoning have been to remove more land from agriculture than
was economically efficient or than market demands justified. This
was because large-lot zoning required low densities of suburban
development and created large holding zones in which almost all
development was foreclosed. Thereby, it encouraged suburban
sprawl and forced new development to move to the farthest reaches
of metropolitan areas, where it typically displaced agriculture. As the
Rockefeller Task Force on Land Use and Urban Growth reported in
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1973, zoning restrictions impose '' another cost . . . that many
localities do not consider-the cost of sprawl. Large lot zoning can
force development patterns that are wasteful of suburban land.'' 31 It
is, thus, a bit ironic to be turning now to large-lot zoning as a
protection for agricultural land.
In developing an area on the fringes of a metropolitan region,
public control over growth has followed a regular pattern. As long as
the area remains rural and agricultural, there is little demand for landuse controls, and the first new residential entrants find few regulatory obstacles. Having once been taken into the municipality,
however, recent arrivals become concerned about more development. Continued growth will reduce just those environmental
amenities that attracted them in the first place, as well as adding to
public-service burdens. Moreover, in such transitional areas, '' as
nonfarmers become a significant proportion of the population, the
balance of political power will shift. " 32 It is in the interest of the
newer nonfarmers to zone the remaining parts of the municipality so
as to limit or preclude development. In transitional areas, many
municipalities have effectively made major areas of metropolitan land
unavailable for development, typically against the wishes of farmland
owners. The strong protests in the late 1960s and early 1970s
against '' exclusionary zoning' ' were directed at these practices. 33
The cumulative effect of suburban zoning is to create an overall
rationing system for metropolitan land. It is a system, however, that
allots large acreages for high-quality development and little land for
low- and moderate-quality housing. Such a rationing allotment bears
little relationship to actual demands for metropolitan housing. Like
most rationing that attempts to frustrate market pressures, suburban
zoning has fostered local corruption-the widespread zoning ''black
market.'' Although it is unfortunate that matters should have come
to such a state of affairs, corruption in zoning has very likely had a
salutory effect. It is quite possible that the whole zoning system
would have collapsed long ago had it not been for the rationality in
land use that has resulted from a de facto zoning market. 34
Adverse court decisions have occasionally helped to overturn
uneconomical and inefficient zoning. For example, in one of the first
court rulings against large-lot zoning, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court observed that farmers in Easttown Township owned most of
the land but had few of the votes: '' At present about 60 percent of
the township's population resides in an area of about 20 percent of
the township .... About 5 percent of the population live in the areas
zoned for two or four acre sites which together constitute about 4 7
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percent of the Township. " 35 In essence, the court ruled that a
politically dominant majority of nonfarrners could not indefinitely
frustrate the desire of many farmers to sell their farmland for
residential uses. In a more celebrated zoning case, a New Jersey
court ruled against the municipality of Mount Laurel, which had
placed 30 percent of its land in an industrial zone. The practical
result, however, was the same as agricultural zoning, because "in
almost a decade only about 100 acres had been developed industrially'' and ''the only residential use allowed is for farm dwellings.''
In overturning Mount Laurel's de facto agricultural zoning, the court
commented that a ''presumptive obligation arises for each municipality affirmatively to plan and provide by its land use regulations, a
reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety in choice of
housing, including, of course, low and moderate cost housing. " 36
In the 1970s, formal adoptions of zoning for agriculture have
served the same purposes as the old zoning methods. Marin County,
north of San Francisco, is justly famous for its efforts to exclude
anything but the most desirable development. Agricultural zoning
that was adopted in the county between 1970 and 1972 imposed a 60acre minimum for the size of lots. Bernard Frieden reported that
''the County has used its zoning power to give the farms much more
protection than most farmers want.'' The real proponents of agricultural zoning were nonfarm residents who recognized that ''keeping agriculture is a cheap way for governments to preserve open
space-certainly much cheaper than having to buy the land.'' Frieden
further commented that the motive for agricultural zoning often has
little to do with protecting farming: ''Keeping some farming in
suburban areas adds to the scenery, shuts out unwanted population
growth, and satisfies the taste of many environmentalists as well as
other citizens.' '37
In short, the real problem of suburban zoning is that it effectively creates collective property rights to farmlands but then, in
newly developing areas, allows other parties to take away those
rights. By contrast, in built-up urban areas, zoning is effectively
exercised by the neighborhood residents themselves. In the case of
agricultural lands, zoning often obstructs private-market forces; in
the case of urban neighborhoods, zoning in most cases complements
and effectively channels such forces.
The straightforward solution to the problems of large-lot,
agricultural, and other forms of restrictive zoning is to tum back the
property rights to farmers, perhaps as collective rights held by all
farmers in an agricultural district. If development rights were held
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collectively, farmers would receive protection against the "predatory'' intrusion of a few incompatible residential uses. On the other
hand, if market demand has pushed the residential-development
value of the land to high levels and most farmers are genuinely ready
to sell out in the near future, property owners outside the farming
district should not be able to prevent such transactions. The farmers
should decide the timing of conversion to residential land in a market
context. Social inequity and economic efficiency do not conflict here;
both would be well served by a distribution of property rights that
would assign the full property rights to the farmers themselves.
PLANNING

It is not surpnsmg that in newly developing areas, recent
arrivals (occasionally allied with older nonfarm residents) should seek
to capture development rights to the remaining agricultural and other
lands. Such behavior is clearly in their own interest; given the
opportunity, many people will accept something of high value that
does not cost them anything. What is surprising is that the courts and
other governing institutions have permitted one group of property
owners to take away the rights of another group.
Self-interested actions are often explained in idealistic terms.
The taking of farmers' development rights is said to be necessary in
order to achieve public benefits that are much greater than the
private concerns of new farmers. Public control over development
rights is necessary so that society can ensure that future metropolitan land use will be efficient and attractive. A comprehensive plan
for land use will direct future uses so as to maximize their aesthetic
quality, minimize the costs for infrastructure and other public
services, preserve wide areas of open space, and maintain other
desirable features of land use. When zoning was originated in 1916,
the progressives were confident that government could live up to
these noble aims. Zoning was part of the general march of social
progress under the banner of scientific knowledge and expertise.
The forfeiture of some property rights by some rural landowners
would be a small price to pay for such gains. Moreover, the collective
value of all property rights would eventually be increased by the
more rational use of land that would result from comprehensive
planning. 38
It has been clear for some time, however, that comprehensive
metropolitan planning does not work and that the prospects of ever
having it work well in the context of American democratic politics are
dim. The history of zoning parallels that of other progressive
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institutions. Progressivism did not survive much past World War II in
the United States, although its forms can still be observed. 39 Its
assumptions that politics can be separated from the administration of
governmental activities and that most governmental decisions have
technical and scientific bases could not survive too much contact with
the real world. It became apparent that most governmental decisions
would have to be reached by negotiation and compromise on the part
of interest groups. The doctrine of "interest group liberalism" essentially an intellectual systematizing of the approach followed by
Franklin Roosevelt-has been the governing ideology since the end
of World War II. 4 0
Nevertheless, the courts have continued to approve municipal
takings of farmers' development rights in the name of the old
progressive ideals. Following long-standing practice in the evolution
of land tenure, once-vital concepts have become outmoded, but they
continue to survive as legal fictions.
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL LAND

Where farmers oppose agricultural zoning, it would be hard to
impose it on the grounds that nonfarm residents prefer open spaces
and other amenities. Consequently, nonfarm proponents of agricultural zoning often resort to the principles of scientific management
that have traditionally been used in order to justify suburban zoning.
Proponents of agricultural zoning assert, for example, that such
zoning must be part of a larger planning process. The NALS has
stated that ''fundamentally, a plan for farmland protection is only one
aspect of a larger plan which deals with guiding growth to those areas
that should be built up and away from those areas that should be kept
open. The farmland protection plan must be part of the jurisdiction's
ongoing comprehensive planning process. " 41
California state courts have been particularly willing to sustain
agricultural and other highly restrictive zoning, even when the
owners of the land objected. The rationale has been that such zoning
is necessary for planning and for achieving a broader public welfare.
One zoning commentator has noted:
Since open space zoning imposes a greater economic burden on
the landowner than does development zoning, the question is
raised whether such a restriction is unreasonably burdensome and
therefore an unconstitutional taking. In an early leading case, a
California Supreme Court rejected the contention that a particular
open space zoning ordinance had no relation to the public welfare
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and thus was an unreasonable exercise of the police power. . . .
The California Court concluded that the power of the City Council
to zone was not limited to the protection of established districts
but also extended to aid in the development of new districts
according to a comprehensive plan that had as its basis the public
welfare. 42

Besides planning for metropolitan development, agricultural
zoning is also portrayed as a tool in implementing another kind of
plan, a national plan for the preservation of agricultural land. One of
the main purposes of the NALS was to prepare the background for
adopting a set of national policies to preserve agricultural land.
Although no formal plan has been adopted, the NALS's summaries
and reports to some degree constitute a plan for the preservation of
agricultural land. One of their primary goals was to encourage and
give guidance to further efforts by federal, state, and local governments to protect agricultural land. The research studies also provide
evidence of scientific planning for the preservation of agricultural
land, information that could be helpful if legal challenges should
arise. 43
The NALS developed projections of national supplies and
demands for agricultural lands well into the future and concluded that
supplies might be inadequate to meet demands: "Given projected
demand increases for U.S. agricultural products in the coming years,
particularly for export, and the uncertainty regarding future gains in
crop yield per acre (productivity), the economic and environmental
costs of continued conversion of the Nation's most productive
agriculture into housing tracts, shopping centers, industrial sites, and
reservoirs could be very high within 20 years.' ' 44 The implication is
that strong measures, including zoning, are required in order to
prevent a costly loss of agricultural land.
This type of analysis follows a long tradition that dates back at
least to the scientific-management precepts of the progressive era.
Along with many other professional foresters, Gifford Pinchot, a
leading proponent of scientific management in government, proclaimed the inevitability of a "timber famine." His predictions were
said to be based on long-range projections of demands for and
supplies of timber. Seventy-five years later, we are no closer to a
timber famine; yet, the threat was a powerful asset to the Forest
Service in its battles to acquire and retain the management of large
forest areas. 45 More recently, similar predictions of future "energy
famines'' led to the creation of the Department of Energy and a
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major federal management role in the development and production of
energy.
Several students of problems regarding agricultural land, including members of the NALS research staff, have questioned the
reasoning on which rest predictions of future shortages of agricultural
land. 46 Despite such doubts, protection of future food supplies is
often a stated reason for adopting agricultural zoning. Of necessity,
courts generally rely on qualitative rather than quantitative reasoning; hence, it may be sufficient for a legal defense simply to establish
in principle that zoning has objectives that are more than local. The
existence of federal reports, such as those of the NALS, may carry
substantial weight in such a legal setting.
To be sure, not all arguments must rest on science. Even during
the progressive era there were those who rejected scientific efficiency and sought preservation of nature on moral or religious
grounds. The utilitarian philosophy of Gifford Pinchot was bitterly
opposed by preservationist John Muir, founder of the Sierra Club. 4 7
Today's environmentalists invoke the tone of Muir's arguments in
appealing for judicial deference to the preservation of agricultural
land. In an extreme case, the author of a recent article in a law
review pleaded:
Judicial protection of that unique and irreplaceable national, natural
resource treasure-a limited supply of prime agricultural land in
the United States-depends upon recognition by our courts of
equity that law, not always written, but born within us, which we
have taken absorbed and imbibed from nature .... By its commands to husband all the lands upon which the human species
depends for food, this natural law summons all land owners to
fulfill their duties to the family of man .... To attempt its
invalidation by human legislation is morally reprehensible, and to
restrict its operations as a result of judicial insensitivity is a crime
against humanity. 4 8
THE MANAGEMENT OF STATE AND METROPOLITAN GROWTH

Under the traditional precepts of comprehensive planning,
government sought to project future uses for land and then to
prescribe specific areas in which each use would be located. Zoning
was to exclude all but the specific uses designated for each area.
Installation of highways, sewers, and other facilities was to be phased
with the schedule for development. The projections of demand and
supply and the other studies required for comprehensive planning
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were needed in order to work out the details of just where specific
uses should be located and the amounts of land that would be needed.
Planning of this kind, with its unrealistic requirements for reliable,
exact information about the future, has almost never been successful. One professor of planning from UCLA put it thus:
When you have the least need of planning because nothing
changes, planning works best; it is 100 percent efficient. But
when, because of rapid, universal change, planning is needed
most, it does not work at all: its efficiency is zero. The reason for
this paradox is the uncertainty of planners' expectations. For what
we need to know to achieve even a modicum of efficiency in
planning is not merely the general shape of the future but the
likelihood that some quite specific and particular events and
situations will occur. 49

Responding to a widespread indictment of traditional precepts of
comprehensive planning, a new approach to land-use planning began
to take shape during the 1970s. Under this approach, local governments were no longer to bear responsibility for land-use planning;
rather, they were to plan within controls and guidelines established
by newly created state or metropolitan planning authorities. 50 Planning was no longer supposed to claim to be a technical exercise to
remove politics from such decision making; rather, it was to be
acknowledged that planning was a political act in which all concerned
interest groups were encouraged to participate. Plans were no
longer to seek to specify exact locations for future land uses; rather,
they were simply to identify broad areas that were currently available
for more intensive development and other areas in which development was prohibited. The key regional tool in implementing plans for
land use was not to be zoning; it was to be the construction of sewer
and highway systems.
This approach recognizes that projections of future requirements for land use are uncertain and unreliable. The aim is simply to
maintain an ample inventory of land available for current development. As market demands for housing and other facilities bring land
into development, thus reducing the available inventory of lands, new
lands will be added to the inventory. Thus, the triggering action in
making new land available for development will no longer be projections about demand and supply made by planners; it will be a market
signal in the form of observed reductions in the available inventory as
land is actually developed.
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A testing ground for this new approach is the Minneapolis-St.
Paul metropolitan area. The Twin Cities Metropolitan Council was
created in 1967, and over the years its powers have increased so that
now it must approve all major infrastructure installation as well as
local plans for land use. In 1975, the Development Framework was
adopted, which formulates the basic mechanisms by which the
Metropolitan Council controls future growth. Land in the metropolitan area is to be included either within an Urban Service Area or a
Rural Service Area. Urban Service Areas include "the existing
metropolitan centers (Minneapolis and St. Paul), fully developed
suburban areas, an area of planned urbanization encompassing
developing suburban areas, and a number of free-standing growth
centers (small towns) located in the rural sections of the regions. " 51
These areas are to include enough undeveloped land to accommodate
at least five years of growth. Several factors determine the size of
the necessary inventory of undeveloped land: ''The oversupply of
land is thought to be needed to allow for locational choice within
sectors, to accommodate slight variations in the projected growth
rates, to provide adequate lead time for planning and construction of
public senrices, and to dampen any tendencies toward inflation of land
prices caused by shortages of developable land.'' 52
There is strong encouragement to adopt agricultural zoning for
farmland in the Rural Service Areas. Agricultural lands zoned for
minimum lot sizes of 40 acres or more are eligible for inclusion in an
'' agricultural preserve,'' in which favorable tax treatment and other
special support for agriculture are provided.
In developing support for the management of metropolitan
growth, the Metropolitan Council eschewed the traditional planners'
aim of maintaining an independence from politics: ''While the planning staff provided the technical basis for the Development Framework, the Metropolitan Council actively sought the advice and input
of citizens and officials throughout the region. The Council's basic
philosophy was that policy involves politics, and that there must be an
open public forum in which to test ideas and permit them to evolve
rather than restricting planning to the 'back room.' '' The emphasis
was placed on infrastructure planning rather than on planning for
future specific uses of land: ''The Council's single most successful
tool for implementing the growth policy is its control over the location
and timing of sewer construction in the region ... 'regional policy
dictates that improved transportation and facilities and services are
to be provided only within the boundaries of the Urban Service Area,
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thus encouraging future development in that zone rather than in
farming areas. ' ' 's3
A more complex program for the management of statewide
growth was enacted by the Oregon Legislature in 1973. The program
includes many of the same elements and reflects the same general
planning philosophy as the Twin Cities effort. Statewide policies for
land use are set by a Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC), and cities and counties must prepare local plans and
regulations that are consistent with statewide policies. The LCDC
has adopted nineteen mandatory goals and accompanying guidelines.
The key element of the Oregon program is the establishment of
Urban Growth Boundaries. Outside of such boundaries, land is to be
used for agriculture, forests, and open spaces, although some rural
lands may contain occasional small settlements. Agricultural lands
outside of Urban Growth Boundaries are to be zoned for '' exclusive
farm use'' (EFU). The LCDC has set as a target that sufficient land
be available within Urban Growth Boundaries for twenty years of
development, and land for at least three to five years of new
development should already contain sewers and other infrastructures. One observer has noted: ''Most of the controversy involved in
developing plans consistent with the goals has centered on the extent
of the Urban Growth Boundaries and the amount of land to be zoned
EFU.' ' 54 The desirable size of the inventory of lands that are to be
available for development has sparked some debate:
There are insistent pressures at the local level to include more
land within the Urban Growth Boundaries than could be justified
strictly on the projections of population, employment, and floor
space. Those advocating more land within Urban Growth Boundaries generally argue that if there is not a considerable choice of
building sites, land prices will rise excessively and the cost and
availability of housing will be adversely affected and that growth of
the local urban economy will be thwarted. LCDC generally takes
the position that the critical thing affecting land price is how much
undeveloped land is provided with urban services at any one time
rather than the total acreage within the Urban Growth Boundary.s5

The Twin Cities and Oregon approaches to the planning of
regional growth represent a major improvement over the old efforts
at comprehensive city planning, and it seems likely that they will have
an actual impact on metropolitan land use. Goals such as protecting
farming from premature conflicts with low-density residential uses
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and more closely phasing infrastructure installation with new development are laudable. It is by no means certain, however, that the net
impact of regional-growth management will be beneficial. Long-time
observers of American land use have good reason to be skeptical
concerning the capacity of state and metropolitan agencies to expand
the boundaries of urban growth so as to stay well ahead of
development pressures. Political demands will no doubt arise to
restrict growth at the expense of the efficient use of land. Under the
Oregon program, for example, prime agricultural land must be zoned
for agricultural use, even if residential or other nonfarm uses have a
higher value.
The potential costs of unduly restricting urban growth may be
high.56 Moreover, it is likely that substitute land and locations will be
more readily available for agriculture than for many urban uses .
When prime farmland is converted to residential use, the economic
benefit of such conversion yields substantial financial dividends,
which could be used to raise yields on less-than-prime agricultural
lands elsewhere. Land productivity is not determined by physical
characteristics alone; it may also be determined by the economic
resources that are applied to it. Two agricultural economists recently
suggested that in many cases the price tag for the preservation of
agricultural land is apt to be too high: ''Before the nation or any
locality embarks upon an extensive agricultural lands preservation
program, agricultural economists would seem to have an obligation to
determine what the opportunity costs are likely to be and make
certain the decision makers can gauge just how much prime land they
can afford to protect. " 57
·
The management of regional growth is relatively new in the
United States. England, on the other hand, has a long tradition of
highly centralized control of land use, and policies similar to the Twin
Cities and Oreg~n programs have been followed for many years ,
establishing urban boundaries outside of which green spaces and
farmlands are to be preserved. The English have shown what by
American standards seems an ' ' overwhelming desire . . . to protect
their agricultural land.' ' 58 There has been a lively debate over the
success of land policies and over recent criticism that growth
patterns have been no more rational than those in the United States,
with its highly decentralized regulatory authority. But the mistakes
made in England have simply been different from those made in the
United States.
Zoning practices in the United States have encouraged indiscriminate sprawl. ' 'In Britain land use planning is equally a force
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against change in the growing edge of cities-the suburbs. While land
use plans and planning permission do provide for additional areas of
land, additional houses and other dwelling units, and for additional
shops and industry, they clearly restrict the opportunities for such
new growth below what a freely functioning competitive market
would provide.'' Once growth-limiting boundaries are set in place,
their expansion has been very difficult, resulting in ''long and often
acrimonious struggles of some large British cities to obtain land in a
rural county to construct housing for their overspilled populations. ' '
In short, the mechanisms for transition of land use are '' antiquated
and technically inefficient.'' 59
American policy making sometimes flops from one extreme to
the other. It would be unfortunate to leap from a lack of any effective
guidance for metropolitan growth to a rigid set of controls that would
obstruct the efficient provision of housing and other urban needs.
The best way to avoid such a result is to devise new institutions
regarding property rights that will properly channel market forces for
development.

A PROPOSAL FOR A PRIVATE MARKET SYSTEM
TO PROTECT AGRICULTURAL LAND
Prominent proponents of a reduced governmental role and
greater use of market mechanisms have emphasized that their
position is not laissez faire with respect to market institutions.
Rather, they advocate active interventionism involving conscious
governmental design of property rights and other market institutions. Friedrich Hayek has said:
Most of what is valid in the argument for town planning is, in
effect, an argument for making the planning unit for some
purposes larger than the usual size of individually owned property.
Some of the aims of planning could be achieved by a division of the
contents of the property rights in such a way that certain decisions
would rest with the holder of the superior right, i.e., with some
corporation representing the whole district or region and possessing powers to assess benefits and charges to individual subowners. Estate development in which the developer retains some
permanent control over the use of the individual plots offers at
least one alternative to the exercise of such control by political
authority. There is also the advantage that the larger planning unit
will still be one of many and that it will be restrained in the
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exercise of its powers by the necessity of competing with other
similar units. 60

Leading welfare-state theorists have expressed similar views.
Gunnar Myrdal has argued that greater decentralization and local
bargaining are desirable:
It often happens that people confuse planning with direct and
detailed state regulations. The opposite, however, is true; there
is still such a large volume of intervention because the measures
are not ideally coordinated and planned. Planning should normally
imply simplification and rationalization. We assume further that, as
planning proceeds, it will be seen to be in line with the ideals of the
Welfare State to delegate, wherever it is safe and practicable,
responsibility for detailed public regulations to local and sectional
collective authorities instead of having them carried out by means
of direct state intervention. . . . The assumption is a continued
strengthening of provincial and municipal self-government and a
balanced growth of the infrastructure of effective interest organizations. This would, in its tum, presume an intensified citizens'
participation and control, exerted in both these fields. 61

The basic objectives for the process of converting agricultural
land are twofold: (1) to protect existing farming areas from incompatible residential and other urban uses and (2) to provide a
satisfactory transitional mechanism for deciding when and how
conversion from farm to nonfarm use should occur. Because these
aims are not met by the existing system, a new system of property
rights is needed.
Under the system that I propose, the basic unit for controlling
the use of agricultural land would be the agricultural district. It should
be large enough to possess a self-contained farm environment,
probably a minimum of several thousand acres, yet not so large that
individual farmers would feel submerged in an anonymous organization. The newly created district would have the authority to control
and, if desired, exclude any nonfarm uses. Such authority would be
equivalent to current agricultural-zoning powers except that the legal
status of the district would be private. Controls of land use would be
modeled on private communities, such as Reston, Virginia, and
Columbia, Maryland, or smaller condominium associations. The
agricultural district would not have the power to control farm
activities except where one farmer's actions significantly affect other
farmers.
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The farmers in an agricultural district would elect a governing
council analogous to a condominium's or a corporation's board of
directors. Districts that had their own controls over nonfarm use
could protect the farmers from undesired intrusions, thereby maintaining the attractiveness of the area for farming. On the other hand,
some nonfarrn uses might not cause any significant adverse effects
for farming. Requests for permission to develop could be reviewed,
and those that were considered compatible with farming could be
approved by the governing council.
The private status of the district would make available another
important option. Some nonfarm uses might have adverse impacts on
farming, but developers might find a location desirable enough that
they would make a substantial payment in order to gain permission. If
the offer were enough to compensate the farmers for any adverse
impacts that they might feel, the governing council might accept the
offer and grant permission for the new use. Payments that were
received would become the collective property of district farmers
and would be redistributed, somewhat like a corporation's dividend
payments. If adverse impacts on agriculture were not equally
distributed among farmers in the district, the governing council might
devise a payment formula that would offer higher shares in proportion to the adverse impacts that were experienced. 62
In those agricultural districts that face strong pressures from
residential development and escalating farmland values, the governing council would be responsible for deciding how to respond to the
pressures and, in many cases, for converting the area to a residential
district. It is possible that collectively, farmers might ignore rising
land values for residential use and choose to remain a farming area
indefinitely. It is more likely that farmers would seek to manage the
transition in the most satisfactory way. The district might gradually
allow nonfarm uses, or it might partition the district into contiguous
sections and make them available for development in some sequential
order. At the extreme, the district might delay any piecemeal
conversion to residential use and then might sell all the farmland in
one bundle of rights to a large developer, much as the stockholders of
a corporation might vote to sell the whole corporation and its assets.
The private status of agricultural districts would give them flexibility
to pursue any of these or other options, most of which would be
unavailable to a public agency.
Under the property-rights system proposed here, market pressures reflected in rising land values would propel the process of
conversion of farmland to residential use. The pace and timing of the
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conversion of agricultural land would be determined by the interaction between the demand for residential homes and the supplies of
land that were made available by agricultural districts. Properly
channeled, the market provides as good a mechanism as any that is
available for allocating land for agricultural and other uses. Efficient
central planning of such allocation faces great informational as well as
political obstacles. Local planners are not in any position to evaluate
the importance of preserving one more acre of farmland. The best
role for government is to design institutions for property rights and
to set the schedule for the installation of infrastructures.
Full-cost pricing of the installation of sewers and other infrastructures would be an important contribution to improved efficiency of the land-market mechanism. Currently, residents of
municipalities pay much of the cost of new infrastructures, thus
providing a subsidy for development projects. By requiring each new
project to pay its own way, strong economic incentives will cause
developers to look for sites that minimize the costs for infrastructures. The government need only be concerned with projecting
future demands and then constructing the facilities to meet such
demands.
Market mechanisms could also be used to determine where
open spaces should be preserved. If farmers did not want to see an
area converted to residences, no special steps would be necessary. If
farmers wanted to sell, however, the government would either have
to buy the development rights or, preferably, the land. The actual
willingness of government to incur such expenditures provides a
desirable test of the true value of open spaces to the public.
Frequently, in the absence of direct purchase, regulatory protections
of agriculture will eventually collapse anyway. Reflecting such concerns, in 1976 Suffolk County (or Long Island) decided to purchase
the development rights to 3,883 acres of farmland; and by 1980,
development rights had in fact been acquired to more than 3,000
acres at an average cost of $2,908 per acre. 63
In areas that have already come under strong pressures for
conversion of farmland, imposing the above scheme of property
rights might generate some windfalls. Recent purchasers may have
acquired farmland property at a substantial discount, reflecting the
limited development potential under tightly restrictive zoning. Abolishing existing restrictions and thereby allowing the property to be
sold for the full current developmental value would create a large
capital gain for any such purchasers. Some students of zoning have
suggested that because zoning has already effectively taken the
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development rights away from property owners in many areas, it
would be more reasonable and equitable for local government to sell
the rights; that is, to sell changes in zoning directly. 64 Various
intermediate options, such as levying special taxes on any windfall
capital gains that might have been realized, are also available. 65
The majority of farmers in some districts might object to the
collective control over the use and sale of their farms. Such districts
should be able to decide not to establish any system of collective
controls, instead leaving all property rights in the possession of each
farmer. On the other hand, those districts should also have the
opportunity to change their minds. Some kind of voting or other
mechanism would be needed whereby farmers could decide to
establish or to abolish collective controls in the district.
The districting procedures described here are not without some
drawbacks. Some farmers would have collective controls on the use
of their property imposed against their wishes-a kind of deprivation
of individual liberty. Collective decision making in the districts might
become cumbersome and might encourage strategic maneuvering
among neighbors. In case of a stalemate, the availability of agricultural land for urban development could be excessively delayed.
Public regulation might still be needed where activities of agricultural
districts affect areas outside the district (e.g., the burning of fields).
In addition, there are many details that would have to be
specified so as to implement the system of property rights that I have
proposed here. The exact size of districts, the means of setting
boundaries, the procedures for collective decision making, the
allocation of voting shares in the district, and other matters would
have to be worked out. My purpose is not to resolve such matters
but to stimulate further discussion of them.
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9
Regulating Agricultural Land Use
John Baden

Wherever we go in America, it seems that farmland is rapidly being
converted to subdivisions, industrial parks, streets, parking lots,
business strips, and roller-skating rinks. The final report of the
National Agricultural Lands Study (NALS) supports this perception
by asserting: ''In the war between the bulldozer and the plow, one
million acres of America's prime farmland are urbanized each
year. . . . In addition to the prime land loss, we are losing another ·
two million acres of lesser quality, but nevertheless productive,
agricultural land to nonagricultural conversion each year. ' ' 1 Such
statements buttress our windshield empiricism, which tells us that
urban creep is consuming our agricultural base.
Reality is less bleak. As shown by the other authors in this
volume, the data clearly indicate that we are dealing with what is
essentially a nonproblem. The simple fact is that many people notice
the conversion of farmland because it occurs near population centers.
Moreover, randomly selected farmland has not significantly appreciated in value because of pressures from urban development.
Suppose, for a moment, that agricultural land is becoming more
scarce. What reactions could be anticipated? The market value of
farmland is affected by a number of variables: social status makes
farms and ranches attractive to some people; tax advantages accruing to owners are capitalized into the land value at a rate that is
dependent on the magnitude and expected longevity of the land; and
the life that is allegedly offered by farming and ranching is a
consumptive activity. Several agricultural economists have demon145
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strated that people will pay to farm and ranch in the same way that
they will pay to be ski instructors, dancers, artists, and writers.
Some of this payment is in the form of opportunities forgone, and the
balance is paid in cash.
In most regions of the country, the market price of agricultural
land is determined primarily by the discounted value of all of its future
productivity. Thus, when an investor appraises his alternatives, he
estimates the return that can be expected in the future. Tobacco
land, for example, may rent for a high price because of the federal
program that limits the production of tobacco; but given that the
subsidy is considered insecure, its sale value is discounted accordingly. Land that produces primary staples suffers no such liability.
Over the past several years, the value of wheatland that will produce
100 bushels per acre in the Palouse region of Washington and Idaho
has not been significantly influenced by governmental programs. Its
price is determined primarily by its comparative advantage in
growing wheat.
Given that Americans have been subjected to a systematic
barrage of bad information regarding the scarcity of agricultural land,
we might expect the value of land to be somewhat skewed by false
expectations. Although the government has no monopoly on making
errors, it certainly holds a comparative advantage in doing so. The
information that is generated by governmental bureaus, offices,
agencies, and departments is not produced under the auspices of
owners who must acknowledge the reality check of a bottom line. In
the political sector, individuals may view their offices as giving them a
license to exercise their preferences for the future, and they can do
so without penalty.
Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that governmental predictions will be less accurate than those supplied by the private sector.
The penalty for letting personal preferences distort estimates is far
smaller in the public sector than in the private one, but this only
partly contributes to the proliferation of inaccuracies. An individual in
the public sector who has a record for successfully predicting
consequences can always be bid away from his job by those in the
private sector, as long as the area under his purview involves a
commodity that can be packaged; that is, as long as it is not a public
good, such as national defense. For example, try to estimate what a
petroleum geologist who is working for the United States Geological
Survey would be worth to a private energy company if his predictions
were three standard deviations better than those of the average
geologist's in the private sector. Whatever that figure, it would be
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followed by enough zeros to place him far beyond the governmental
salary schedule. The best estimators of the future are attracted away
from governmental service; so, even discounting the pathologies
inherent in agency projections, we should place little credence in
governmental estimates.
Errors are made in both the private and the public arenas. The
critical difference is that in the private sector, individuals normally
bear the consequences of their mistakes. This has a remarkable
effect on the slope of the learning curve of decision makers and on
the probability that they will retain their jobs. There is, of course, a
systematic bias in the private sector, where control of resources
tends to gravitate toward those who are most optimistic about future
prices. This applies to hard-rock minerals, peat moss, worn-out
tires, and farmland.
To decide whether a piece of farmland should be developed, the
decision maker simply compares its value (net of development costs)
in a developed state with the expected highest value of its use in the
future. If, as judged by the decision maker, current development
would produce more net benefits than would any future use of the
land in agriculture, then the decision maker merely chooses to
develop rather than to preserve. The major problem, of course, is in
estimating the value of future use. The value of 165-bushel cornland
in any future period depends on several factors, all of which are
subject to a great deal of uncertainty. Availability of substitute crops,
the price of substitutes, preferences on the usefulness of com, risk
preference, and the discount rate-all determine the decision makers' estimates of that cornland's future value. For a given area,
people are likely to differ on whether the land should be preserved or
whether current development provides the highest payoff.
Those who are most optimistic about the future value of
agricultural land will determine its use. Given a market system,
anyone who wishes to develop land now must outbid those who are
most optimistic regarding the land's future value in agriculture.
Thus, the interests of future generations are represented in the
market. Essentially, the tendency is for those with the strongest
preservationist bias to control. These individuals are normally called
speculators.
Environmentalists and preservationists have a tendency to
condemn speculators, but their criticism is radically at variance with
their announced preferences. The critics claim to favor the deferred
consumption of resources, which is merely preservation for the
future. This is exactly what the speculator does. Only by paying a
147

John Baden

higher price than those who prefer to develop now can the speculator
conserve the resource for his profit and for the future. While citizens
who want a subdivision lot may have good reason to object to
speculators for driving up the price and reducing current consumption, those who may be hungry in the future should shower those
speculators with praise and rewards-if the speculator has guessed
correctly. Successful speculators benefit consumers in the future at
the expense of those in the present.
It is not important whether the speculator in agricultural land has
a long view of the future or whether he is short-sighted. It is only
important that he be motivated by profits. As long as the speculator
can transfer the agricultural land that he holds and as long as another
individual has a similar view of the land's future value, that land will
remain a saleable asset and a sound investment. If the purchasing
speculator is wrong and if potential bidders begin to realize this, ·he
will suffer a loss as the land's value rises less rapidly than other
assets that could have been purchased. Whatever happens, the
farmland is preserved.
This type of speculative activity is a predictable consequence of
private, well-defined, and transferable property rights. Resource
prices in such markets reflect bidding for future use, and current
exploitation will occur only when all speculative bids are overcome.
Thus, the equilibrium market price for agricultural land clearly
includes pressure from future potential bidders, including those not
yet born, since speculative bids are based on what future users are
expected to be willing to pay. In a market system with transferable
property rights, those who are most optimistic regarding the future
value of any storable resource are those who will control that
resource. Given that we have been led to believe that the future
value of agricultural land will be high, many of us expect to be
rewarded by preserving it. The recent drop in the price of agricultural land strongly suggests that many of us have erred regarding
the crisis in agricultural land. There is no such crisis.
Most of the demand for preserving agricultural land has little to
do with the nation's demand for food and fiber. Urban and suburban
residents view a green belt of agricultural land as an amenity whose
cost they can impose on others, part of whose benefits would be
reaped by free riders if the urbanites are privately financing the green
belt. Farmers and ranchers who hope to expand their holdings may
also support measures to ensure the preservation of agricultural
land, since agricultural zoning would both reduce the competition for
their lands and the prices that they are likely to face. For example,
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suppose I were interested in buying a piece of land whose price is
four or five times its agricultural value. If that land were restricted to
agricultural use only, its price would fall substantially, and I would be
more likely to purchase it. At the same time, however, I would
prefer to sell my own land for its highest value, not for its agricultural
value. Such situations give us bad economics and interesting politics.

THE MARKET AS AN INFORMATION SYSTEM
The market is able to coordinate and transmit information and
incentives in a cohesive manner. This is accomplished through prices
that convey condensed information and through incentives to act on
that information. The market operates as a discovery process in
selecting, from among a wide range of alternatives, those options
that promote the efficient use of resources. Allocation is made on the
basis of expected profitability. The spontaneous and uncoordinated
shifts within American agriculture testify to the efficacy of the
system. For example, to obtain the best estimate of the cost of lamb
chops two years in the future, merely look for the price spread
between ewe and wether lambs. If that spread does not reflect future
expectations, there is an opportunity to make a lot of money.
Both consumers and producers use market prices in order to
make rational economic decisions. The knowledge obtained by prices
makes it possible to calculate the cost and revenues and so to
determine if products that are most highly valued by consumers have
been or are being produced. Private decision makers bear the costs
and reap the benefits of their actions, and expected profits induce
landowners to allocate lands to the uses where expected returns will
be the highest.
Other factors encourage a reliance on markets to allocate
farmland. First, although distorted by governmental programs, the
food and fiber sectors of the economy are highly competitive. Hence,
they closely approximate the neoclassical ideal that is enshrined by
economists. 2 Second, the private market will normally guide developers to use land that is less suited for crops when it is in society's
best interest to do so. If developers find that good agricultural land
and bad agricultural land are equally attractive, they will naturally
chose the poorer land, since the opportunity costs of displacing it
from agricultural production are less. Third, no process can take into
account all of the relevant variables as fully as do bid and asked prices
in a competitive market, since the market process harnesses nearly
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all available relevant information. The contrast with bureaucratic
decision making is striking. Fourth, the only market failure that could
justify social intervention in the land market is the provision of open
space as a collective public good.

THE PREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCE
OF GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION AND ZONING
The explicit protection of agricultural land is a relatively new
phenomenon in America. The restricted-use designation is often
obtained by placing a large minimum lot size on building sites. Ten to
twenty acres is common, but in some cases the area reaches a full
section, that is, 640 acres. Agricultural zoning was uncommon before
1970; but by 1980, 270 local governments had imposed constraints
on agricultural uses and development, affecting 15 million acres of
land. 3 In addition to protecting future supplies of food and fiber, this
zoning is designed to protect the farmland from the harassments of
adjoining and incompatible uses; that is, from negative spillovers,
such as stock-chasing dogs, drunk drivers who run their cars through
fences, and pilgrims who don't know how to drive on country roads in
the winter. The farmer, being both sensible and neighborly, shoots
the dogs, fixes the fences, and pulls the cars out of barrow pits.
As the intellectual foundations that justified traditional approaches to zoning dissolved, the ideal of comprehensive planning
could not withstand analysis. A new prospective emerged, which
viewed zoning as an evolving property-rights institution whose
consequences and purposes were camouflaged by political myths and
legal fictions. With the myths and fictions gone, zoning is seen as a
collectively held property right that is analogous to other private
collective property rights, such as those involving corporations and
condominiums. 4 From this perspective, exclusions of agricultural
land are like those that are inherent in the exercise of any property
right. This, of course, is merely one form of economic segregation
and is justified by the desire to preserve amenity values.
The process of zoning agricultural land may be conceptualized as
a way to protect the commons. 5 The existence of common property
or open-access resources becomes a relevant policy issue only when
demand at zero price exceeds supply. Originally, this involved
overgrazing of livestock on commonly held lands. 6
If a portion of land is especially attractive in terms of environmental amenities, it will tend to attract numerous uses. Many of
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those who are attracted would depreciate exactly that environmental
quality that made the area initially appealing. For this reason, many
owners of ranchettes or suburban tracts often want their houses to
be the last residences permitted in the area. With a system of purely
private property rights and in the absence of covenants, it is difficult
to protect these amenity sheds from competing and damaging uses.
The private incentives that face individual property owners tend
toward less desirable uses. For example, portions of a ranch might
make attractive sites for mobile homes. Although the owner would
capture significant personal benefits on a per acre basis, the problems associated with high-density developments would have a negative impact on neighboring farms and ranches. Thus, we can expect a
general tendency toward a deterioration of amenity values. When the
area is considered an amenity shed, the process described above is
analogous to overgrazing the commons.
Like ranchers who grazed the public lands with no private
agreements restricting access (and before the Taylor Grazing Act of
1934), the rational strategy for the individual is to privatize benefits
and to socialize costs. Thus, each rancher had an incentive to
overstock the commons. Analogously, each farm and ranch owner
near an urban area has incentives to exploit the developmental
potential of his land while restricting his neighbors to traditional
agricultural activities. In this way he can extract economic rents from
the local amenity shed. In effect, undeveloped surrounding farm and
ranch lands provide buffers against congestion and other negatives
that are associated with residential development. Obviously, a fear of
impending constraints on development would encourage at least the
plotting of agricultural land, since such parcels normally have '' grandfather," or prior use, rights to development.
Zoning provides lucrative opportunities for successful political
entrepreneurs, and zoning restrictions are unlikely to withstand
substantial and long-term economic pressures. As the pressures
build, the potential windfall gain that becomes available for reclassification of agriculturally zoned lands also grows. This increases
the leverage to those who have political power and augurs well for
campaign contributions and side payments. While it is both theoretically and practically impossible to design a political system that is
immune to corrupting influences, a system of agricultural zoning
seems to be calculated to maximize the potential for corruption. 7
Measures that effectively preserve agricultural land will require
either the imposition of involuntary controls or the purchase of land,
or development rights to it, by governmental units. The latter
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strategy is extremely expensive, and taxpayers rationally prefer to
transfer this cost to the current owners of agricultural lands. There
is, of course, an inefficiency generated by zoning. Most simply,
because it is free to the taxpayer, the demand for environmental
amenities will be exaggerated. How does one keep from having
regulations that freeze land in agriculture when it has a higher social
value than when it is developed? The conversion of farmland to
nonfarm uses occurs if, and only if, its expected value will be
increased by development. The fact that agricultural zoning is now
championed as a permanent rather than a transitory category of use
means that the goal is to prevent the conversion of agricultural land
to other uses regardless of the opportunity costs. This implies that
agricultural land has a value in perpetuity that is greater than any
alternative future use. It is difficult to imagine a more extreme,
myopic view.
When agricultural zoning is implemented, substantial problems
are certain to emerge. Many economists have built careers on the
analysis of market failures. Given poorly defined and poorly defended
property rights, monopoly elements, externalities, and inadequate
information, market outcomes will fail when contrasted to the ideal.
Unfortunately, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to
expect governmental failures to be far more pervasive and consumptive of the moral order. 8 Finding market failure by no means implies
that governmental intervention is warranted. The appropriate strategy is to attempt to estimate the benefits and costs of both
organizational forms.
The market is best perceived as an informational system in
which participants face strong and pervasive incentives to obtain the
amount of information that is optimal in their own situations. In terms
of time and other resources, information is a scarce and expensive
commodity. Thus, we expect most actors in the political process to
be rationally ignorant of nearly all policy issues. Special interests, of
course, will be well informed about specific issues but ignorant about
most other issues. The marginal costs of obtaining information about
public decisions swamp the marginal benefits. It is hardly surprising,
then, that the average American cannot name his own congressman.
The basic problem of land allocation is to secure the best use of
land resources by using the knowledge of all members of society for
purposes whose relative importance is known only by individual
citizens. Thus, there is an '' aggregation of knowledge'' problem. 9
Information regarding the preferences of buyers and sellers is
radically decentralized and is revealed only by the market process.
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When land-price signals are distorted by zoning, information is
systematically destroyed. If the nation were to pass an '' endangered
information act,'' all regulations that were not based on externalities
and monopolies would probably be illegal. In addition to supplying
information, the market provides strong incentives for paying heed to
the information that is discovered. This, of course, fosters adaptation
to an increasing change of pace.
It has been argued that because our information base and our
information-processing capacities have grown so remarkably, we are
able to make comprehensive, long-range plans. This statement is
incorrect. It is not intuitively obvious, however, that the more
knowlege we have and the greater our capacity to process it, the
more difficult it is to plan for the future. The difficulty increases
exponentially as we look further into the future. Individuals are
purposive actors who are motivated in large part by self-interest; and
as they consider their opportunities, they continually seek ways to
improve their relative positions. This normally involves the development of new combinations of resources and institutions that, from
their perspective, move outputs to uses that are more highly valued.
Increments in knowledge and the ability to process and arrange
them simply mean that the set of potential outcomes is dramatically
expanded. Until recently, individuals expected to have short lives in a
relatively stable environment. Although there were many natural
perturbations over which they had little control-such as floods,
drought, and famine-the range of disturbances was quite small. Now
individuals look forward to long lives in an unstable environment.
With increments and interdependencies, disturbances in one location
are rapidly transmitted throughout the system.
There are at least four incentive problems that arise when the
governmental sector attempts to allocate the use of resources. First,
governmental evaluations depend on the cooperation of the bureaucrats who administer the programs. Can we really expect the wellintended and competent bureaucrat in the United States Forest
Service to announce anything other than an impending timber famine
and the need for a larger budget? It is equally unlikely that Soil
Conservation Service personnel will announce a reduced need for
conservation measures and, hence, for reduced budgets. Brewer and
Boxley noted, in their analysis of the National Agricultural Lands
Study (NALS):
The NALS raises important issues of process as well as fact.
Can special analyses . . . be assured of objectivity? Many inter153
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ested parties have a stake in the conclusions and recommendations of such inquiry. Payoff can be in the form of expanded
bureaucratic turf, larger budgets for particular agencies, public
sanction, particular tools for constraining local development,
reduced taxes on rural properties or personal advancement. . . .
Their work is vulnerable to influence, to misrepresentation in the
public media, or to be withheld entirely from the public.
Should this occur, the tradition of science is to wait until the
work of scientists and scholars elsewhere erodes the credibility of
those accounts. When there is momentum for political action, this
process may take too long. Misguided policies, programs, or
executive orders may result. 10

Second, as we learn on the eve of any election, the political
process is extremely short-sighted. Beyond two, four, or six years,
the relevant discount rate of the politician approaches infinity, for his
or her power is subject to the reality check imposed by the election.
Thus, regardless of the future costs that may be ordained by the
imposition of agricultural land zoning, if the majority of voters favor
such a course, the temptation to acquiesce may prove irresistible.
Within the political process, the exercise of conscience often assures
its elimination.
Third, political decision makers, who are self-interested, face
incentives to play it safe. While private actors bear the costs and reap
the benefits of good decisions, and thus have incentives to use
resources effectively, governmental bureaucracies are not residual
claimants. The costs and payoffs of risky decisions are dispersed
among those in the relevant community. Thus, there is a strong
incentive for political actors to avoid risk. Even if there is a large gain
in efficiency associated with changing regulations to permit development, the risk would discourage such changes.
Fourth, governmental distortions of the market process will
generate reactions by individuals in the private sector. In such an
environment, there are always at least two margins to exploit: the
economic margin and the political margin. Rather than focusing on
efficiency and on moving resources to uses that are more highly
valued, landowners and others are encouraged to court benefits from
taxes, subsidies, or regulations. Under such a system, lawyers and
politicians gain, and taxpayers and consumers are disadvantaged.
Measures that are being proposed and implemented to change
patterns of land use increasingly rely on the governmental sector,
transferring decision making from individuals to collectivities. Voluntary transfers that rely on the rule of willing consent are being
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replaced by coercive apparatus that are necessarily empowered to
make transfers of wealth. In addition to generating substantial
declines in efficiency and imposing violations of equity, such measures will also reduce the quotient of freedom that Americans still
have. A key task of economists and other policy analysts is to identify
and evaluate the real problems and to develop the intellectual
foundations for new institutional forms that will address them, taking
into account the implications that these forms have with regard to
efficiency, equity, and freedom.

ALTERNATIVES TO ZONING AGRICULTURAL LAND
In The Environmental Protection Hustle, Bernard Frieden tells
us that the advocates of agricultural zoning are suburban residents
who realize that ''keeping agriculture alive is a cheap way for local
governments to preserve open space-certainly much cheaper than
having to buy the land. " 11 Such motivations have little to do with
food or fiber; they are the expression of transfer activities. ''Keeping
some farming in suburban areas adds to the scenery, shuts out
unwanted population growth, and satisfies the tastes of many
environmentalists as well as other citizens.' ' 12 The task of designing
alternatives to zoning will be easier if the self-interest of the
proponents is exposed and if decision makers understand that there
is simply no problem in regard to food and fiber shortages in this
country. Robert Nelson has advanced a proposal in this volume that
relies on the development of an expanded set of property rights.
Another alternative takes a more passive approach that depends on
the manipulation of the tax system.
The program that is outlined below, which involves the relatively simple manipulations of easements, assumes that there is a
general interest in preserving agricultural land. While this proposal
clearly favors relatively wealthy groups, such advantages may be less
than those found in existing systems. It is an invariant relationship
within the social order that wealth and political power are positively
correlated. Thus, we may expect the proposed system to continue
evolving.
Historically, Americans have viewed agriculture, in general, and
ranching, in particular, very favorably. While less than 2 percent of
Americans derive their primary income from farming and ranching,
an increasing number of Americans appear to be interested in this
economic activity and the life style that it represents. Relatively few
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individuals, however, can afford to devote their full attention to
agriculture. The opportunity costs of the time that is required are
high, and the financial returns to agriculture are low. There are,
however, three reasons to believe that new ownership patterns are
or soon will be emerging.
First, as of 1984, Americans are being confronted with high
interest rates and high unemployment. Although these outcomes
have been generated by the need for long-overdue structural reform,
much of the blame is being placed on the Reagan administration's
fiscal and monetary policies. This situation presents opportunities for
politicians who have a preference for interventionist policies: that is,
for those who believe that the government should manage the
economy. As a result, some Democrats prepared for the 1982
congressional and are preparing for the 1984 presidential races with
the theme, "It took Roosevelt to get us out of Hoover's Depression,
and it will require a Jerry Brown (or a Gary Hart or whomever) to get
us out of the Reagan depression.'' They assert that '' what is
required is an American revitalization effort with the goals of the
Great Society but without its problems.''
There are good reasons to believe that the intelligent citizen's
reaction to the above includes a rational fear that (1) an uncontrollable
rate of inflation may follow such a policy; (2) that the Reagan tax cuts
will be repealed and higher marginal tax rates will be imposed,
perhaps accompanied by an income surtax; and (3) controls on prices
and credit will be reimposed, accompanied by further governmental
direction of and intervention in the market. The bottom line is that
some Americans are apprehensive about the future of the economy.
Second, a significant proportion of well-educated and relatively
wealthy Americans find farming and ranching psychologically attractive. While the majority of Americans abandon their childhood dream
of becoming planters or cowboys, not all outgrow it. Ranch life can be
alluring. It can be readily combined with an interest in fishing,
hunting, skiing, and living the good life in a rural environment. As an
added incentive, there are significant tax advantages. For example,
an investor can take a trip to inspect yearlings or monitor branding
and simultaneously take a fishing, hunting, or skiing vacation. While
not all good things go together, some do; and in ranching and farming
there are bountiful opportunities to find the ones that do.
Third, the development and growth of survivalist newsletters,
magazines, and books indicate that there is growing anxiety about
basic physical security and an associated interest in rural retreats. It
is reasonable to believe that in the event of social disorganization,
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disorder, and violence, one would be more secure in Manhattan,
Montana, than on Manhattan Island in New York.
It has often been said that there is no farm or ranch land that is
located in an attractive place that would pay for itself. In the narrow
view, this may well be correct. It is certainly true that one cannot
purchase a ranch for $2,500 per animal unit and pay for it by raising
60-cent calves or 50-cent lambs. Thus , the individual who does not
have financial assets is unlikely to be able to acquire a farm or ranch
by borrowing the money and paying off the mortgage with proceeds
from crops and livestock. At the same time, the individual who does
not have substantial farm and ranch experience is disadvantaged in
attempting to manage a profitable enterprise. Thus, we anticipate the
development of new patterns of ownership and management.
The selling price of a ranch includes at least the following: (l)the
present capitalized value of the expected agricultural production from
the unit, (2) anticipated appreciation, (3) the amenity or consumptive
value of ranch ownership, and (4) the tax advantages that are
capitalized into the selling price. It follows that individuals who are
facing relatively high marginal tax rates are the most likely future
purchasers of farms and ranches, in which case, programs similar to
the one outlined below are likely to develop.
Assume that a ranch costs from $3 million to $7 million. The
ranch has a trout stream flowing through it, is well suited for a small
number of second-home sites, and has timbered land, cropland for
growing hay and grain, grazing land, and wildlife habitat. A small
number of individuals may form a partnership with an existing
rancher who has substantial equity and experience, and the rancher
would serve as general manager. Each partner in the corporation
would make an initial investment (carried on contract for the land)
involving land, machinery, physical facilities, improvements, and
livestock. Obviously, the investors would reap the tax benefits,
including interest on the land, investment credit on facilities and
machinery, and depreciation on livestock; but these are only a small
portion of the total tax benefits that are available.
Choice ranch land in highly desirable locations in the Rocky
Mountain States sells for between $1,500 and $3,000 per acre. Land
that is suitable only for grazing sells for a fraction of the price
demanded for subirrigated bottom land that has a history of producing
100 bushels of barley or 5 tons of hay per acre per year with a month
of grazing on the aftermath. Clearly, the amenity values and the tax
advantages of the area have been capitalized into the cost of the land.
There is, however, a more important consideration.
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Even though farms and ranches with a high potential for
development may not be subdivided for residential purposes in the
foreseeable future, a number of well-financed hobby ranches, farms,
horse farms, and ranchettes have developed. Thus, agricultural land
in regions that are less desirable for development may sell for close
to its agricultural value, while equally productive land in the highly
attractive areas will sell for from two to ten times its agricultural
value. In brief, development potential places a high premium on the
land.
In the structure that is proposed here, a small group of investors
or a corporation would buy a set of farms or ranches that could be run
as an economic unit. The investor(s) would identify specific parcels,
ranging from 10 to 40 acres, which would have the highest value for
the development of second homes and ranchettes. In the Rockies,
the parcels would, for example, have a trout stream, open meadows
bordered by timber, and a southerly aspect with an attractive view.
In the Midwest, emphasis may be on wildlife and wood lots. Each
investor would obtain title to one or several of these sites, making
this land available to him or her for a second home or for sale.
After a minimum of one year, the balance of the land, probably at
least 90 percent, would have the development rights gifted to a
private conservation organization, such as the Nature Conservancy,
the Audubon Society, Trout Unlimited, or the American Farmland
Alliance (these organizations are merely used as examples). There
are many such private, nonprofit conservation organizations, and
careful exploration would be required before one would be selected.
Such organizations would merely receive the development rights that
were not assigned to the investors, with the stipulation that future
development is precluded on the lands that are placed in their trust.
When a portion of land on a ranch is divested of its development
value, the value of the land becomes equated with its agricultural
productivity. Thus, the value of the ranchland remaining in agriculture (excluding the ranchettes assigned to investors) is reduced from
$2,000 per acre to perhaps $800 per acre. From the investors'
perspective, this differential represents a charitable contribution to
the conservation organization that receives it and therefore is tax
deductible. For individuals in high marginal tax rates, there is a
decided advantage.
There is an additional advantage for investors: Their land
increases in value because an absence of congestion is guaranteed in
perpetuity. This is like holding land buffered by a game preserve or a
park, with the added advantage of not having the land overrun by
158

REGULATING AGRICULTURAL LAND USE

back packers, hunters, fishermen, and other seekers of outdoor
amenities. In effect, one is holding land that is buffered by a private
park, a game ranch, and a working ranch.
Investment decisions are made with a recognition of the constraints and the opportunities that are available in the environment.
Changes in this environment foster the development of alternative
modes of economic organization. Increments in the scope of government and projected perturbations in a social environment create
incentives to develop organizations similar to the one described
above. It is likely that this model or some variant of it will be
developed. That is one important function of entrepreneurs.
Such a change provides numerous benefits for participants and
for society. Well-managed ranches provide specific benefits to
owners and managers, while additional benefits '' spill over'' to
others. For example, the ranch habitat nurtures wildlife, bringing
individual pleasure to investors and providing a breeding population
that exceeds ranch boundaries. Watershed values and visual amenities also redound to those who live outside of the boundaries of the
ranch. This appears to be a case where one could do good while doing
well. Such alternatives are likely to be highly preferable to conventional zoning of agricultural land.
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